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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 January 2010
Are voters sophisticated? Rational choice theories of voting assume they are. Students of voting behaviour are more doubtful. This article examines voting in a particularly demanding setting: direct democratic elections in which two competing proposals are on the ballot. It develops a spatial model of voting and proposal qualification with competing proposals. If voters are naïve, then competing proposals can be used to block the direct democratic route to change, but, if voters vote strategically, competing proposals can bring outcomes closer to the median voter. Voting intention data from California polls provide evidence that some votes are cast strategically even in these demanding circumstances. However, the level of strategic voting appears to be affected by the nature of the election campaign.
1 See especially Gerber, Elisabeth, Lupia, Arthur, Mathew, D. and Kiewiet, D. Roderick, Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000).Google Scholar
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3 Party identification may be useful if proposals have been referred to the people by the legislature.
4 Being closer to the median voter is not always beneficial. For example, protections for minorities may move policy away from what the median voter wants. This article assumes that so long as the courts protect minority rights, direct democracy ought to enact the will of the majority: failure to do so will as likely benefit powerful special interests as endangered minorities. In any case, the empirical results of this article stand or fall independently of their normative import.
5 Appendix A, published with the online version of this article by Cambridge University Press at doi:10.1017/S0032247409990520, contains formal proofs.
6 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Massachussetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Utah. Mississippi uses this system unless the counter-initiative is sponsored by the legislature, in which case the Washington State system is used. Oklahoma uses this system but specifies that if both measures fail but one gets more than a third of votes cast, it is voted on alone at the next election. See the list of state constitutions at http://www.iandrinstitute.org, downloaded December 2005.
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25 A formal proof is available on request. Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are given in Appendix A of the website version of this article published online by Cambridge University Press, 2010, doi:10.1017/S0032247409990520.
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27 A model of individually rational voting demonstrating this is available from the author on request.
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30 These regressions are summarized in Appendix B of the website version of this article published online by Cambridge University Press, 2010, doi:10.1017/S0032247409990520. Full results are available from the author on request.
31 No measure of voter information was available in 1990.
32 Lacy, and Niou, , ‘A Problem with Referendums’.Google Scholar
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