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What the Enemy Knows: Common Knowledge and the Rationality of War

  • Thomas Chadefaux (a1)
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References
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British Journal of Political Science
  • ISSN: 0007-1234
  • EISSN: 1469-2112
  • URL: /core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science
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