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Morality in Practice: Dees, Crampton, and Brer Rabbit On a Problem of Applied Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

John R. Boatright
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Abstract

In their article, “Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier,” J. Gregory Dees and Peter C. Crampton challenge us with a puzzle about deception in bargaining. How can the practice of misleading others about our settlement preferences—the terms on which we are willing to come to an agreement —possibly be justified? On any standard ethical theory, they claim, Brer Rabbit's trick of professing fear of the briar patch in order to avoid being eaten by the fox would seem to be wrong, and yet we read this tale to our children for their moral edification. The discussion by Dees and Crampton of this apparent inconsistency is penetrating, instructive, and well-informed. It is also a delight to read.

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Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , January 1992 , pp. 63 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1992

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