4 To be clear about the nature of this part of the argument—I do not wish to challenge the relevance of these more venerable depictions of business-government relations for a number of important policy contexts, as laid out in leading works such as the following: Wiebe, Robert, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement (Cambridge, Mass., 1962);Google ScholarKolko, Gabriel, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900–1916 (New York, 1963);Google ScholarHawley, Ellis, The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions, 1917–1933 (New York, 1979);Google ScholarKeller, Morton, Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900–1933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1990). Pivotal business interests in the early twentieth century did frequently and vociferously oppose regulatory action, especially with regard to labor conditions; they did, especially after the cooperative experience of World War I, and including in the area of commercial speech, frequently seek government assistance in facilitating industrywide standard setting; they did sometimes fervently desire governmental regulation, as in the case of the creation of the Federal Reserve or the tweaking of transportation rate regulations, or the imposition of federal oversight over food and drugs sold in interstate commerce. In addition, the capacious domain of “business” almost always contained fault lines, as particular industries and firms took different sides of particular regulatory issues. I seek not a new framework for “lumping,” but rather some additional “splitting,” both about regulatory aspirations and the extent to which they bore institutional fruit.Google Scholar