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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 December 2011
The thirteenth century, like the eighteenth century, was a siècle français. Even Frederick II had failed to eradicate the impression German decline which had found expression after Philip Augustus's victory at Bouvines in 1214. After Frederick II's death in 1250, the Capetian monarchy had used its power, its prestige and its traditions to obtain political predominance in Europe and, indeed, throughout the Mediterranean world. The French monarchy was not, indeed, so firmly established as contemporaries supposed: after 1314 a period of “feudal reaction” set in, which revealed the weaknesses in the political structure the Capetians had built up. But the sudden concentration of French power in the closing years of the thirteenth century, the unity of the country around the throne, and the unanimous support which all classes, nobility, clergy and bourgeoisie, gave to royal policy, not only contrasted markedly with the divergences of interest within England and within Germany, but also gave the Capetian monarchs decisive advantages in their dealings with other governments. French policy, based on Carolingian tradition and directed to the “reintegration” of Gaul, was, by comparison with the mere conservatism of Edward I, positive, clearly defined, and systematically pursued. Unlike English or German policy i t was invigorated by a conscious “ideology”, which found expression not only in the unofficial writings of Pierre Dubois, but also in the official memoranda of Nogaret, Flote and Plaisians, and which had deep roots in French history.3 Because of these advantages, France at this period was the focal point at which all the complex problems of European politics converged: all the wires which statesmen were pulling, passed through Paris. European policy responded or reacted to the policy of France.
1 [Monumenta] G[ermaniae] H[istorica], Script, XXIII, 186; cf. Cartellieri, A., Die Schlacht bei Bouvines (1914), 20Google Scholar.
2 Cf. Kern, F., [Die Anfänge der französischen] Ausdehnungspolitik [bis zum fahr 1308] (1910), bk. 1Google Scholar.
3 Cf. Kāmpf, H., Pierre Dubois und die geistigen Grundlagen des französischen National bezvusstseins um 1300 (1935)Google Scholar.
4 Cf. particularly Zeller, G., “Les rois de France candidats à l'Empire”, R[evue] H[istorique], CLXXIII (1934)Google Scholar.
5 Cf. Busson, , Sitz[ungs]-Ber[ichte] d. Wiener Akademie, Phil.-hist. Kl. LXXXVIII (1877)Google Scholar; Rodenberg, , M[ittheilungen des] I[nstituts für] Ö[sterreichische] G[eschichts farschung], XVI (1895)Google Scholar; Jordan, , Les origines de la domination angevine en Italie (1909) 444 sqqGoogle Scholar.
6 Cf. Sorel, A., L'Europeetlarévolution française, 1,261–2Google Scholar; Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 65Google Scholar.
7 Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 38 sqqGoogle Scholar.
8 Cf. particularly Kern, F., “Die Reichsgewalt des deutschen Königs nach dem Interregnum”, H[istorische] Z[eitschrift], CVI (1911)Google Scholar.
9 It was stated in parliament in 1297 that “la layne d'Engleterre est a poy la moyté de l a value de tote la terre par an, e si amunte la maletolte par an le quinte de la value de totte la terre”, Hemingburgh, , Chron. II, 124Google Scholar; cf. Cotton, , Hist. angl. 325Google Scholar, Rishanger, , Chron. 175Google Scholar. Cf. Pirenne, , Hist, de Belgique, 1 (1929), 277Google Scholar, and Sturler, J. de, Les relations politiques et les échanges commerciaux entre le duché de Brabant et I'Angleterre (1936)Google Scholar.
10 Kienast, W., Die deutschen Fürsten im Dienste der Westmächte, 1 (1924), 213Google Scholar.
11 Déprez, E., Les préliminaires de la Guerre de Cent Ans (1902)Google Scholar; Lucas, H. S., The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War (1929)Google Scholar.
12 Bock, F., M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII (1933), 200, 247Google Scholar; Offler, H. S., E[nglish]H[istorical] R[eviezv], LIV (1939), 617Google Scholar.
13 Notices et extraits des manuscrits, XX, ii (1862), 123 sqqGoogle Scholar. The document was republished by Funck-Brentano, , R.H., XXXIX (1889), 328–34Google Scholar, and then by Schwalm, , M.G.H., Const. III, 631–5 (no. 645)Google Scholar.
14 Funck-Brentano, , R.H., XXXIX (1889), 338Google Scholar.
15 Const, III, 633, § II.
16 Ibid.: “Ne ne se murent, et fu Ten aseur de cele partie.”
17 Cf. Schwalm, , M.G.H., Const, III, 631Google Scholar; Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 424–6Google Scholar; Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 344Google Scholar.
18 Funck-Brentano, , R.H., XXXIX (1889), 339–48Google Scholar; Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX (1909), 433–43Google Scholar.
19 Cf. Funck-Brentano, 348. But it must be emphasized that the question is to-day no longer argued on national lines, and it is fair to say that the credit for this change of ground is due, above all, to Kern, Fritz, M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 423Google Scholar.
20 The latest and most radical attack on the document is that made by Samanek, V., “Der angebliche Verrat Adolfs v. Nassau”, H[istorische] V[ierteljahrsschrift], XXIX (1935), 302–41Google Scholar. His argument is that the writer is speaking, not of Adolf, but of his successor, Albrecht of Austria; but this thesis has found no support, and is, in my view, completely untenable. Cf. Kienast, , H.Z., CLI, 411Google Scholar.
21 Fournier, P., Le royaume d'Aries et de Vienne (1891), 298–9Google Scholar. He adds: “Adolphe avait pris les armes parce qu'il recevait des subsides de l'Angleterre; il n'est nullement étonnant qu'il ait ensuite vendu sa neutralité au roi de France.” Boutaric's arguments (La France sous Philippe le Bel, 1861, 393 sq.)Google Scholar were similar, and were immediately answered by Schliephake, , Gesch. v. Nassau, III (1869), 208Google Scholar.
22 Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 169Google Scholar: Adolf, “scheint zu Beginn seiner Regirung (1292) die Gefahr, die dem Reich von der französischen Ausdehnung drohte, erkannt zu haben; sein kräftiges Einschreiten gegen den burgundischen Pfalzgrafen will so ver-standen werden”. Cf. also p. 164Google Scholar: “Trotzdem war der äussere Erfolg König Adolfs unbestreitbar; die Hoffnung, Burgund vom Reich zu trennen, war fürs erste vereitelt.” Cf. Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., XLV, 245Google Scholar: “der König zu Anfang den Willen hatte, dem Abbröckeln der Westgrenze Einhalt zu tun.” The four main questions which aroused Adolf to activity, even before English intervention, were Burgundy (the Franche-Comté), Valenciennes, Lyon and Bar; cf. Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 138–42Google Scholar(Valenciennes, Osterbant, Tournai), 143, 162 (Bar), 148-9, 163-4 (Burgundy), 151-6 (Lyon), and Samanek, V., “Studien [z. Gesch. König Adolfs”, Sitz.-Ber. d. Wiener Akademie, Phil.-kist. Kl. CCVII (1930)]Google Scholar, Abh. 2, no. vi (Valenciennes), xiii-xiv (Burgundy), and in summary p. 142.
23 M.G.H., Const, III, 501 (no. 524).
24 Cf. Kern's summary of the position at the death of Adolf's predecessor, Rudolf, of Habsburg, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 156–8Google Scholar.
25 Fournier, 298, writes: “après tout, Adolphe éteit l'agresseur.” It would be hard t o find a more complete travesty of the facts.
26 Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 245Google Scholar.
27 Cf. Samanek, V., “Studien z. Gesch. König Adolfs”, Sitz.-Ber. d. Wiener Akademie Phil.-hist. Kl. CCVII (1930)Google Scholar, Abh. 2; “Neue Beiträge zudenRegesten König Adolfs”, Ibid. CCXIV (1932); “Der angebliche VerratAdolfs von Nassau”, H. V., XXIX (1935), 302–41Google Scholar. —This appreciation of Samanek's work is supported by Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., XLV, 245Google Scholar: Samanek has, he writes, “die… etwas grobschlachtig geschilderten Ursachen für das Scheitern des Reichskrieges…in vorsichtig abwägender Betrachtung in manchem richtiggestellt”. Samanek's views, though supported by a heavy weight of new critical material, differ fundamentally little from those of Schliephake, , Gesch. v. Nassau, III (1869), 185–299Google Scholar.
28 This applies to his arguments, Studien, 203 n. 65, as Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 244Google Scholar, has already noted; but it applies still more to the arguments in Der angebliche Verrat, 331-3. How, if, as Samanek there urges, Mouche is confusing Adolf and his successor, Albrecht, can the memorandum perfectly correctly refer to Adolf's brother, Diether, “le frere le roy”?
29 Studien, 158, 201, Neue Beiträge, 37-8; cf. Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., XLV, 245Google Scholar. The pope's diplomatic intervention only influenced Edward when he had other reasons, such as the affairs of Scotland, to wish for a postponement of the continental war. On the other hand, the financial difficulties which Boniface deliberately put in Edward's way by the promulgation of the bull Clericis laicos in 1296, and which soon led to political disturbances at home, may well have affected the course of the war.
30 Cf. particularly Studien, 201, 230; cf. infra, p. 249, n. 106.
31 Schmeidler, , H. V., XXVI, 394–5Google Scholar: “wenn Samanek seine Widerlegung mehr indirekt, durch Aufzeigung einer seiner Meinung nach sehr klaren und eindeutigen, bis zuletzt folgerichtigen Politik Adolfs gegen Frankreich, für England, führen will, so ist zu bedenken, dass die Politik des späteren Mittelalters… ungeheuer kompliziert und raffiniert, vieldeutig und verschlagen ist, keinesfalls und niemals einfach…. Also zu eindeutigen Lösungen zu kommen ist da sicher sehr schwer.”
32 Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 186Google Scholar, citing Cron. Fiorentina, 257.
33 M.G.H., Script, XVII, 135: “et sic confudit se ipsum primo et per consequens imperium, eo quod stipendia immerita recepit, quod predecessores sui reges Romani fecissent inviti.” Cf. Samanek, , Studien, 136, n. 55Google Scholar; Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 243Google Scholar.
34 Cf. Musciatto's caustic remark on Edward's desertion of Flanders: “et puiz fist sa pais et laissa li conte de Flandres et les Flamens en la guerre. Si y doivent les autres prendre axemple” (Const. III, 634).
35 I therefore agree neither with Samanek, , Studien, 230Google Scholar, who speaks of the “Entschlossenheit Adolfs, seine Bündnispflicht zu erfüllen”, nor with his critics, Kienast, (H.Z., CXLVII, 228)Google Scholar and Bock, (M.I.Ö.G., XLVIII, 184)Google Scholar, of whom the latter asks whether Samanek maintains “dass das Bezahlen einer Summe Geldes an Adolf durch den französischen König keine Bestechung sei?” The answer to this question is: not necessarily. Cf. Charles II's remark to Temple in 1678: “Since the Dutch would have a Peace upon the French Terms, and France offered Money for his Consent to what he could not help, he did not know why he should not get the Money” (Sir Temple, Wm., Memoirs of what past in Christendomfrom the War begun in 1672 to the Peace concluded 1679, London, 1692, 319)Google Scholar.
36 Perrin, , R.H., CLXXXIV, 442Google Scholar, states categorically: “On admet, en général, que si Adolphe ne bougea pas, c'est que dès le printemps 1295 il s'était Iaissé achete r par un agent du roi de France, Musciatto de' Franzesi, qui a Iaissé sur sa mission un mémoire d'un témoignage décisif.” This statement is not merely a misrepresentation of generally accepted opinion, but is contradicted by the memoir in question, which definitely states that the mission of the bishop of Bethlehem and of the prior of the Dominicans in Paris, which occurred in 1295, had “petite odience”, “pour ce qu'il n'alerent pas bien fondez” (Const, III, 633). Perrin appears to rely on Leroux, , Recherches critiques [sur les relations politiques de la France avec I'Allemagne de 1292 à 1378 (Paris, 1882)], 75–8Google Scholar, who places the Franco-German negotiations in May 129s; but his arguments (cf. Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 436, n. 2)Google Scholar are no longer worth contradiction. The same applies to Hentze, , England, Frankreich u. König Adolf v. Nassau (Kiel, 1914), 52Google Scholar; cf. Bock's, judgement, M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 243, n. 7Google Scholar.
37 Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 434Google Scholar. Funck-Brentano makes no attempt to date the negotiations in his article, R.H., XXXIX; but in his subsequent thesis on Philippe le Bel en Flandre [1896] 254–5Google Scholar, he arrives at a dating practically identical with that of Kern. The negotiations, he implies, were concluded before 31 August 1297, and the basis of agreement was reached in the French camp “devant Lille”.
38 Const, III, 539-40 (no. 576); Kern, 430-1. Cf. infra, p. 248.
39 Const, III, 540 (no. 577); cf. Kern, 431; Samanek, , Studien, 200Google Scholar. Kern seems to regard this letter, like Adolf's correspondence at the same period with Edward, as deliberate deception; but in that case it is difficult to see why Adolf mentioned, or what was to be gained by mentioning, the possibility of finales tractatus with Philip. Nevertheless, I regard the phrasing of this letter as putative rather than probative evidence.
40 Régistres de Boniface VIII, no. 1850; cf. infra, p. 248.
41 If the statement in the Chronicle of St Denis, “se fist la paix entre le roy de France e ledi t Adulphe la veille de Penthecouste ”, has any value, then we may conclude that preliminary agreement was reached between Musciatto and th e German king on 1 June 1297; cf- Kern, 436-8.
42 Their statements are summarized by Samanek, , Studien, 219–20Google Scholar.
43 One related group of chronicles, “die Gruppe der Chronique Normande”, forms an exception; cf. Kern, 442.
44 Cf. Hessel, , Jahrbücher des deutschen Reichs unter König Albrecht (1931), 48Google Scholar; Hentze, 91-2, 100, 109; Schliephake, III, 379 sqq.
45 Const, III, 540 (no. 577); cf. Samanek, , Studien, 218Google Scholar.
46 Schliephake, III, 269-70, 298, 391; Lindner, , Deutsche Geschichte unter den Habsburgern u. Luxemburgern, 1 (1890), 114Google Scholar.
47 Cf. Samanek, , Studien, 221Google Scholar, Neue Beiträge, 38-42, and particularly Verrat, 309-10, where he writes: “Dass Eduard der eingegangenen Verpflichtung nur einmal, in der ersten Zeit, nachkommen konnte, die zweite, entscheidende Subsidienzahlung aber nicht zu leisten vermochte, war allein schon Grund genug, Adolf von jeder Pflicht, nach Flandern zu Hilfe zu kommen, zu befreien.” For the statement, “covenaunt est, quil deit paer au rey d'Almaigne sauntz delai a sa venue la outre trente mille mars”, cf. Palgrave, , Parliamentary Writs, 1 (1827), 394Google Scholar.
48 Kienast, , H.Z., CLI, 411Google Scholar.
49 Perrin, , R.H., CLXXXIV, 442Google Scholar, complains that Samanek's narrative “ne brille pas par la clarté”; but neither does Adolf's diplomacy. Nothing would be easier than to satisfy M. Perrin by producing a simple analysis of Adolf's actions; but this is a point at which verisimilitude is preferable to lucidity.
50 The records of the English Exchequer and Wardrobe have given us valuable new information on the formation of the Anglo-German alliance in 1294 and 1295; but they contribute nothing to our knowledge of the diplomacy of 1297 and cannot be expected to do so; cf. Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 203–4Google Scholar, and Samanek, , Neue Beiträge, 42, n. 64Google Scholar, whose criticism of Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., XLV, 245Google Scholar, seems to me in this point justified. There has been no substantial addition to our knowledge since the publication of Kern's Acta Imperil Angliae et Franciae in 1911; and even there the first document bearing on Anglo-German relations in 1297 dates from no earlier than 12 August (no. 120).
51 Const, III, 537-8 (no. 574); it was received by Edward at Canterbury “le jour de la Pentecoust” (Rymer, , Foedera, 1, 866)Google Scholar.
52 M.G.H., Const, III, no. 511; cf. nos. 512, 517, and Rymer, [Foedera], 1, 812. As:. nothing controversial is contained in this section, I have with few exceptions omitted references to authorities. The main documents are to be found in the two collections here cited; among modern authorities, cf. in particular Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 199–248Google Scholar, and Samanek, , Studien, nos. xvii-xix, xxiv–xxvGoogle Scholar; cf. also Samanek, , H.V., xxix, 304–23Google Scholar
53 Bock, 241.
54 Funck-Brentano, , R.H., XXXIX, 336Google Scholar.
55 Bock, 243.
56 Samanek, , Verrat, 309Google Scholar.
57 Cf. Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 173Google Scholar; Pirenne, , Hist, de Belgique, 1, 398Google Scholar. Cf. Edward's letter of 4 June 1297, emphasizing the advantages of Flanders over Holland from the point of view of naval communications; Rymer, 1, 867.
58 Pirenne, I, 400.
59 For the detail of English diplomacy in the Netherlands, which cannot here be discussed, cf. Bock's, lucid narrative, M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 314–39Google Scholar.
60 Bock, 215-16.
61 In his letter (Rymer, I, 821) Edward says that the German envoy, Robin de Coure, had intimated “quod dies s. Iohannis Baptistae… ob aliquas certas rationes nimis brevis esset”. In this way he seems to throw the responsibility for the delay on Adolf. But it is not stated that Robin was acting on Adolf's instructions; and it is reasonable to suppose that the “certae rationes ”which are alleged, were conditions in England and Wales, which Robin during his stay at Edward's court had ample opportunity of observing. It would be mistaken to read more into these words than agreement between Edward and the German envoy that a campaign was not yet opportune.
62 Cf. the terms of the treaty in Rymer, I, 830-1.
63 There is no mention of Adolf in the document; Rymer, 1, 824-5.
64 Rymer, i, 826-7.
65 Cf. Loserth, , Gesch. d. späteren Mittelalters (1903), 196Google Scholar.
66 Const, III, 523 (no. 556). Bock's strictures on this, and other, letters of Adolf (M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 247) seem to me unjustified. The tone of Adolf's words seems sincere and genuine enough; but it is at best a question of personal impression, and I know no objective reason to adopt Bock's personal and subjective criticism. The question is perhaps of small importance here; but it is important in regard to Const, III, no. 574, and here I must categorically reject Bock's interpretation (p. 247, n. 5), which is borne out by nothing in the words of the document; cf. infra, p. 246, n. 89.
67 Cf. his letters of 17 January 1297; Rymer, I, 854.
68 Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 177Google Scholar.
69 On the events leading up to Guy's change of policy, which cannot be considered in detail here, cf. Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 177–8Google Scholar, and particularly Pirenne, 1, 403-8. Funck-Brentano, , Philippe le Bel en Flandre, 195–204Google Scholar, is vitiated, as Pirenne observes, by pro-French bias.
70 For the series of letters detailing the powers of the two envoys, cf. Rymer, 1, 857-9.
71 The best account of the internal unrest is in Bémont, , Charles des libertés anglaises (1892), xxxiii–xlviiiGoogle Scholar.
72 Hemingburgh, , Chron. II, 124Google Scholar: “ne lur semble pas qe ceo serroit a lui preu de passer en Flaundres, si il ne fust plus assuré pur lui et pur sa gent des Flaundres, et aussi pur la terre d'Escoce, la quele se commence a lever contre lui.” Cf. the Latin text in Bémont, 78 (§ 7).
73 Cf. Rymer, 1, 843 (18 August 1296), 848-9 (21 November 1296), 858-9 (6 February 1297), 860 (12 February 1297).
74 Rymer, I, 865.
75 Cf. infra, p. 245.
76 Rymer, I, 869, 873, 876.
77 Tout, , Pol. Hist. 205Google Scholar.
78 M.G.H., Const, III, 634 (§ 12).
79 This divergence of point of view emerges clearly from Edward's letter to Adolf of 4 June 1297; Rymer, I, 866-7.
80 Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 440Google Scholar, puts forward some similar arguments, but uses them against Adolf, who, he says, “was demoralized by living for years on English money without doing anything in return”. To my mind, he misses the point: the root trouble was the continued ineffectiveness of Edward's diplomatic preparations for war.
81 Rymer, I, 858.
82 Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 218Google Scholar.
83 Bock, 224; Samanek, , Studien, 196Google Scholar; Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 181Google Scholar.
84 Pirenne, 1, 409.
85 Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 181Google Scholar, maintain s “dass erst die Bestechung König Adolfs durch Musciatto den Grafen von Hennegau auf die französische Seite geführt hat”; cf. also Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 439Google Scholar. This view represents the very opposite to that suggested by the evidence. The only direct authority for the statement that the French approaches to Adolf wer e inspired by John of Avesnes is the admittedly late and untrustworthy Chronique Normande; cf. Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 435Google Scholar, Samanek, , Studien, 199Google Scholar. But the statement is supported by circumstantial evidence, and cannot lightly be dismissed.
86 Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 432Google Scholar, suggests that Philip's approaches may have begun as early as the end of 1296. This argument is based on a document (Antequam essent clerici) which is supposed to contain Philip's reply to Boniface VIII's bull Ineffabilis amor of 20 September 1296. But the reply, although it suggests that Adolf had already been approached with a plan of settlement, is, as Kern admits, not dated. Nor is that all. It is now agreed that it is not an official reply at all, but simply a draft or memorandum which was never despatched; cf. Rivière, , Le problème de l'église et de I'état au temps de Philippe le Bel (1926), 98Google Scholar. It may be admitted that the draft closely follow s Boniface's letter of September 1296; cf. Dupuy, , Histoire du différend (1655)Google Scholar, Preuves, 15-19, 21-3. But there is no means of dating it, and I can se e no reason why it may not have been drawn up after 20 April 1297, when these questions were again under debate; cf. Dupuy, 27-8, and Longnon, in Lavisse, , Hist, de France, III, ii, 136Google Scholar.
87 Const, III, no. 574; Adolf refers to an earlier letter of similar content, about which nothing is known.
88 Rymer, 1, 866.
89 For Bock (cf. supra, p. 239 n. 66) it is a letter which “überflussige Ratschläge statt Taten gibt”; M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 247. This judgement ignores the fact that Edward's letter of 17 May had not yet been received, and that Adolf's proposal (whatever we may think of it) was the first proposal since the winter (i.e. during the new campaigning season) for joint action. Cf. also Hentze, 89, whose views do not merit discussion, and Samanek, , Studien, 213Google Scholar, in whose view Adolf himself by the beginning of June “dürfte mittlerweile auf dieses Schreiben kaum noch Wert gelegt haben”.
90 Bock, (loc. cit.) speaksGoogle Scholar, on the other hand, of “die gewundene Sprache dieser Adolf-Briefe”.
91 I therefore agree in substance with Leroux, 87-8, who seems to me to have arrived at a proper understanding of the situation, in spite of many errors of detail. Cf. also Samanek, , Neue Beiträge, 42, n. 64Google Scholar.
92 It is necessary to recall, at this point, that Edward was still negotiating for peace, and that Adolf did not know of his resolve to lead an expedition to Flanders. Cf. supra, p. 242.
93 Rymer, 1, 866-7.
94 Hentze, 100, and Bergengrün, , Die politischen Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Frank reich während der Regierung Adolfs von Nassau (1884), 78CrossRefGoogle Scholar, argue wrongly that the initiative came from Adolf; cf. Samanek, , Studien, 198Google Scholar.
95 This criticism is generally accepted; cf. Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 426, 428Google Scholar; Samanek, , Studien, 204Google Scholar; Kienast, , H.Z., CLI, 411: “das Bestreben, Musciattos Leistungen zu unter-streichen, hat man immer zugegeben.”Google Scholar
96 Cf. Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 434 sqq., where the statements of Jhe chroniclers are carefully weighed and siftedGoogle Scholar.
97 Devillers, , Monuments pour servir á l'histoire des provinces de Natnur, de Hainaut de Luxembourg, III (1874), 555, no. 399 (12 June 1297)Google Scholar; M.G.H., Const, III, 539, no. 576 (30 July 1297).
98 Régistres de Boniface VIII, no. 1850.
99 Cf. the passage from the Chronique Normande, cited by Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 435Google Scholar. As Kern remarks (436, n. 1), such arguments are typical of the period; cf. in addition to Kern's reference, the passage cited by Leroux, , Recherches critiques, 59Google Scholar.
100 Kern, , op. cit. 438Google Scholar.
101 Cf. his letter of 30 July (Const, III, 539): “nos fidedignorum relacionibus intel-lecto, quod rex ipse…ad pacis inter nos et ipsum reformande negocium suos exhibet ferventer affectus….”
102 Const, III, no. 576. As early as 12 June a similar arrangement had been reached between Philip and John of Hainault for demarcating the imperial and French frontiers within Hainault; cf. Devillers, no. 399. Since John of Hainault is stated by the chroniclers to have been the person behind Philip's overtures for peace, it is easy to believe that he may have suggested an extension of the procedure already agreed upon for Hainault to the whole Franco-German frontier. Samanek, Studien, zoz, appears to suggest that the agreement between Philip and Adolf referred only to the frontier in Hainault; but nothing in Const, III, no. 576, bears his argument out.
103 Rég. de Boniface VIII, no. 1850.
104 Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 433Google Scholar, treats this whole statement as a cynical joke, and makes it one of the weightiest documents in his indictment of Adolf. But his interpretation is arbitrary; and there is no reason not to take Boniface's words (which may be presumed simply to repeat the terms of Adolf's grant) at their face value.
105 Const, III, nos. 511 (§ 1), 524.
106 “Zweifellos hat auch dieser Schritt Philipps aus dem Liller Lager keinen Erfolg gehabt”, writes Samanek (Studien, 201), “und wenn der deutsche König überhaupt auf Verhandlungen eingegangen ist, dann werden diese schon bei dem Versuch, über die erwähnte Reichsgrenze zu einer Verständigung zu kommen, gescheitert sein.” But these assertions, which deliberately ignore the French memorandum, are totally without support.
107 Cf. Leroux, 88.
108 For this story, cf. Funck-Brentano, , Philippe le Bel en Flandre, 197Google Scholar; Kern, , Aus-dehnungspolitik, 180Google Scholar; Pirenne, 1, 398. But cf. Sturler, 147. It was not an attitude con fined to John of Brabant; Bock, (M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 335)Google Scholar has singled out Reginald of Guelders as the leading exponent of “Schaukelpolitik”.
109 According to the Chronique Normande; cf. Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 435Google Scholar, and Leroux, 90. Musciatto's memorandum (Const, III, 633) says: “il promistrent, qu'il ne se meuv-roient contre le roy”, in such a way that the promise appears only to have been given at the third and final stage of the negotiations; but too much weight must not be laid upon the actual wording of the document in points such as this; cf. Kern, , op. cit. 427Google Scholar.
110 Here again Leroux, 93, seems to me to have the clearest perception of the direction of Adolf's policy.
111 Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 245Google Scholar, appears to exaggerate the degree of harmony between English and German war aims.
112 It has been suggested that France claimed the Franche-Comté of Burgundy as the spoil of war; cf. Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 38Google Scholar. But, as we have already seen (supra, p, 245, n. 86), the document containing this argument was never despatched; and the fact that in the long and ultimately only partly successful negotiations over Burgundy the argument was never repeated and never officially enunciated, suggests that the French government deliberately avoided claiming to hold the land by right of conquest. French arguments are based not on conquest but on the treaty of Vincennes; cf. Kern, , op. cit. 166-7, 221-7, 284–90Google Scholar.
113 Cf. Samanek, , Verrat, 320Google Scholar: “Es wäre gewiss ein Vorteil für das deutsche Reich gewesen, wenn es auf diesem Wege zu seinem Rechte hätte gelangen können.” But when he goes on (p. 321) to argue that Adolf in 1297 was “berechtigt… selbständig vorzugehen, da sich ja der Wert des englischen Bündnisses für ihn jetzt als recht zweifelhaft herausstellte”, the only answer is that breach of a solemn and freely contracted engagement can never be “justified”, though it may be explained, on such grounds. Cf. Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 431Google Scholar. It is true that Edward also had agreed in previous years to a truce on his own initiative; cf. supra, p. 239. But, as Samanek (p. 320) is forced to admit, he asked Adolf “nachträglich urn Zustimmung zu diesem Schritte”. On the other hand, there is, as Kern has already pointed out, no evidence whatever that Adolf asked for Edward's assent to his negotiations with France; and every indication points to the contrary.
114 Cf. his circumstantial account of the deception, Rymer, I, 794.
115 The usually accepted date of the battle is 13 August; Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 182. Samanek (following Brosien) places it a week later; Studien, 221Google Scholar.
116 Samanek, , Studien, 221, n. 88Google Scholar.
117 Kern, , Acta, nos. 122–3, 126–30Google Scholar.
118 Ibid. no. 124.
119 Const, III, no. 577 (31 August).
120 Cf. John of Cuijk's report to Edward; Kern, , Acta, no. 130Google Scholar.
121 Samanek, , Studien, 223Google Scholar.
122 Tout, 211.
123 Cf. Rymer, 1, 878.
124 Kern, , Ausdehnuttgspolitik, 186Google Scholar.
125 Rymer, 1, 894-5.
126 Kern, , op. cit. 183Google Scholar.
127 Cf. supra, p. 233.
128 It is possible that he regarded the definite conclusio n of the treaties wit h France as the only feasible alternative to th e threat of a n alliance between France and the Austrian party, whic h was now openly in rebellion. On Franco-Austrian relations at this period, which are unfortunately very obscure, cf. Henneberg, , Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Frahkreich unter König Albrecht I (1891), 5–7Google Scholar.
129 Rymer, 1, 879: “le Roy d'Alemaigne poe t ceste souffrance roumpre, si lui plest, en tiel manere totes voies, que elle durra quinze jours apres ce, qui lui diz Roys d'Ale-maigne l'ara fait asavoir al evesque de Tournay, ou a soun official de Tournay.” But there is no suggestion of joint action or consultation: if Adolf wishes to continue the war, it is at his own peril and with no guarantee (or probability) of support from England. Cf. Schliephake, III, 276; Samanek, , Studien, 224, 226Google Scholar.
130 Cf. supra, p. 232, II. 34.
131 Const, III, 633; cf. supra, p. 233, II. 36.
132 “Adolphe s'abandonna au encouragement”; Leroux, 89.
133 The archbishop of Trier had represented the German king at the peace negotiations in autumn 1297; Const, III, no. 579. Thereafter Germany does not appear to have been represented; cf. Hentze, 107.
134 Rymer, 1, 893; cf. Schliephake, III, 288-9, 298.
135 Cf. Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 201–13Google Scholar.
136 Cf. Edward's letter of 7 February 1297 to the archbishop of Cologne; Rymer, 1 859.
137 Cuttino, , English Diplomatic Administration (1940), 129Google Scholar.
138 Supra, p. 252, n. 118. Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 183Google Scholar, states that Adolf ”empfing… seinen Sold“; but there is no evidence of this in Langton's accounts; cf. Cuttino, , loc. citGoogle Scholar. It is generally agreed that no subsidy was, in fact, paid; supra, p. 234, II. 47.
139 Leroux, 90, also maintains that the frontier settlement was ”une des conditions qu'Adolphe avait mises à sa neutralité“.
140 Kern, , M.I.Ö.G., XXX, 441Google Scholar.
141 Funck-Brentano, , R.H., XXXIX, 344Google Scholar, on the other hand, claims that “notre auteur: lui-même présente les négotiations…comme ayant été conduites en grand secret”.
142 Kern, , loc. citGoogle Scholar.
143 Dupuy, , Preuves, 27Google Scholar.
144 Samanek, , Studien, 200Google Scholar.
145 Kienast, , H.Z., CLI, 411Google Scholar, speaks repeatedly of a “Geheimvertrag”, a “geheimer Neutralitätsvertrag”; but there could be no secrecy about negotiations to which such men as John of Avesnes or Godfrey of Brabant were parties.
146 Bock, , M.I.Ö.G., Erg.-Bd. XII, 241Google Scholar; cf. supra, p. 236.
147 Leroux, 93.
148 Cf. Leroux's judgement, p. 92: “incapable de s'arrêter à une résolution définitive et toujours ballotté de desseins en desseins, selon l'intérêt du moment.” These words well describe Adolf's state of mind in August and September, when the time for actior had come. In May, June and July, on the other hand, I should describe him as too calculating, too “clever”, unstable and over-confident.
149 Cotton, , Hist. Angl. 234Google Scholar.
150 Bémont, 77.
151 Schleyer, K., Anfänge des Gallikanismus (1937), 90–4Google Scholar.
152 Cf. Musciatto's, statement, Const, III, 634Google Scholar.
153 The French memorandum (p. 634) states that Edward sought to “coronpre… ceus du royaume” (i.e. of France), but that he found no hearing among the French baronage, except from the count of Flanders. This failure may be taken as evidence of French unity, and contrasts markedly with the position in England, where Edward was forced to take steps against “aliqui presumptuosi, quicumque sint illi in regno Anglie constituti, qui…regi Francorum…auxilium prestiterint aut iuvamen” (Const, III, 491. § 4).
154 Cf. Kern, , Ausdehnungspolitik, 183Google Scholar.
155 Flores hist, III, 104.
