Escalating ground rents in long residential leases (rents that double or are adjusted by reference to an index at regular intervals) have been described as onerous and can prevent property sales. This article considers whether they are legally enforceable under consumer protection legislation. Although litigation would be needed both to clarify the application of key provisions in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 to ground rent terms, and to take account of the individual lease terms, the article concludes that escalating ground rent provisions may not be binding where the leaseholder is a consumer. Further, if the rent provisions are held to be unfair it would mean that the leaseholder does not have to pay and can recover sums already paid. This conclusion would therefore also weaken the human rights arguments made against the government’s plans to tackle problematic ground rents.

D.19.2.31 contains a reply to a question of law attributed to the late-Republican jurist P. Alfenus Varus. Several people had delivered grain to a carrier which was shot into a common pile in the hold of his ship. Subsequently the carrier returned a share of the grain to one of them before the ship went down. The question is asked if the others can proceed against the carrier in respect of their share by raising an action for onus aversum. This article provides a new insight into the scope and application of this otherwise obscure Roman action, by reference to the role of the tort of conversion in analogous cases at common law.

Section 13A of the Insurance Act 2015 implies a term into every insurance contract that if the assured makes a claim under the contract, the insurer must pay any sums due in respect of the claim within a “reasonable time”. It provides contractual remedies, such as damages, in the event of breach. To date, a breach of section 13A has been pleaded in two cases which have resulted in judgments – Quadra Commodities S.A. v XL Insurance Co. S.E. and others [2022] EWHC 431 (Comm) and Delos Shipholding S.A. and others v Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty S.E. and others (“Win Win”) [2024] EWHC 719 (Comm) – and in each case the section 13A claim failed. Informed by the understanding of section 13A adopted in these two cases, this paper suggests that section 13A largely is symbolic. To this end, it considers three points and argues that two of these hinder the efficacy of section 13A.

Cases across the common law world have recognised digital assets as property, but the question of how such assets should be protected against interferences remains contested. At present, the “chattel torts” (conversion, trespass and reversionary injury) do not cover digital assets, leaving a gap in protection in respect of digital assets. There have been suggestions that the tort of conversion should be extended to cover digital assets, but this article argues that this extension would be undesirable for two reasons. First, there are fundamental differences between physical and digital assets, meaning that the concepts and thresholds used in the chattel tort context generate uncertain results (and create substantial risks of incorrect results) in the digital asset context. Second, the rules governing the chattel torts are unsatisfactory and contain many negative characteristics, and so extending the chattel torts to digital assets would replicate the same negative characteristics in the digital asset context.

English courts have long professed to apply a “presumption of similarity” when faced with inconclusive foreign law evidence. However, its precise nature and implications remain unclear. Here, I argue that no true “presumption” exists. Instead, courts should only draw an inference, that English and foreign courts would render similar rulings on the same facts, when that conclusion can be reliably drawn. Understanding the “presumption” as a reliable inference helps facilitate the accurate prediction of foreign decisions, resolves various controversies surrounding its “use” in civil proceedings and does not render the proof of foreign law unpredictable or inconvenient in practice.

Critically engaging with the works of Roger Brownsword, Mireille Hildebrandt and William Lucy, the article addresses the increasing reliance on computer codes and intelligent physical infrastructure as behavioural control tools and its implications for modern state law. It is argued that, if we look at the new developments in the context of broader social and institutional trends (like the rise of Internet platforms), instead of the prospect of code superseding the law, we face complex practical challenges related to the dynamic balance between different modes of guiding and controlling behaviour in legal regulation.