Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 December 2018
During the previous years, voluntary moral bioenhancement (VMBE) has been contrasted to compulsory moral bioenhancement (CMBE). In this paper a third possible type of moral bioenhancement is discussed: genome editing for moral enhancement of the unborn that is neither voluntary nor compulsory, but involuntary. Involuntary moral bioenhancement (IMBE) might engineer people who will be more moral than they otherwise would have been. The possibilities of genome editing aimed at moral enhancement of our offspring is assessed. It is argued that genome editing might have the potential to engineer our offspring in three domains: to be more empathetic, to be less violently aggressive, and to have a higher potential for complex moral reflection. Genome editing is discussed in these three domains, and a proposal made that a combination of VMBE and IMBE might be the best option humans have to become better.
This article has been supported by project # 41004 of the Serbian Ministry of Education, Sports and Technological Development.
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17. “Practical” is used here as an antonym of “theoretical.” The meaning of “practically superfluous” comes close to “functionally superfluous.” It denotes something that is inoperative.
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20. Ibid., at 231.
21. The gap between how we believe we ought to act (moral cognition) and how we actually act (moral behavior) I called the “comprehension-motivation gap” (see Rakić V. The issues of freedom and happiness in moral bioenhancement: Continuing the debate with a reply to Harris Wiseman. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 2017;14(4):469–74.
24. VMBE also affects our freedom, but in ways that still permit us to take credit for moral choices. Some choices available to people in advance of VMBE might be unavailable after they embark upon VMBE, but these people still deserve credit. Their position is in a certain sense analogous to that of alcoholics who decide to destroy all alcohol in their home. After they remove alcoholic beverages and can no longer choose to drink they do not deserve credit for no longer drinking; however, they do deserve credit for deciding to make it impossible to drink. I am thankful to Nick Agar for making this analogy.
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30. The role of moral behavior (and MBE) in the enhancement of happiness can, to a certain extent, be in line with features 1 and 3 of the conception of morality that is being promoted by Persson and Savulescu. Happiness can be understood as a consequence of morally appropriate behavior (and MBE), while such behavior (and MBE) has an instrumental value for the enhancement of happiness. However, in the position of Persson and Savulescu is UH prevention that is designed to be a consequence of MBE, while MBE is an instrument leading to UH prevention.
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33. It is possible to argue that the “bootstrapping problem” wouldn’t be entirely eliminated, as parents who would reject VMBE for themselves might be inclined to reject IMBE for their children, offering analogous reasons. My reply to this argument is that parents might be more willing to subject their future children to IMBE than to accept MBE for themselves—for two reasons. First, by employing IMBE they wouldn’t deprive their children of anything, including a free will or even the right to informed consent, because these children wouldn’t exist yet. Second, parents might have a very personal interest to have morally enhanced children: these children would presumably be more inclined to care for their parents in their old days than morally unenhanced children.
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