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Converting Philosophical Conclusions into Policy Prescriptions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 February 2015
This article analyzes a neat conjuring trick employed in bioethics, that is, the immediate conversion of a philosophical conclusion into a policy prescription, and compares it to the “grand leap of the whale up the Niagara Falls” mentioned by Benjamin Franklin. It is shown that there is no simple and easy way to achieve the conversion, by considering arguments falling under four headings: (1) reasonable disagreement about values and theories, (2) general jurisprudential arguments, (3) the differences between policymaking and philosophy, and (4) the messy world of implementation. The particular issue used to illustrate the difficulties in moving from philosophical conclusion to policy description is infanticide of healthy infants, but the analysis is general, and the conclusion that the immediate move to policy is illegitimate is quite general.
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