Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 3
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Bortolotti, Lisa and Miyazono, Kengo 2016. The Ethics of Delusional Belief. Erkenntnis, Vol. 81, Issue. 2, p. 275.

    Bortolotti, Lisa Broome, Matthew R. and Mameli, Matteo 2014. Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik Case. Neuroethics, Vol. 7, Issue. 3, p. 377.

    Bortolotti, Lisa 2011. New Waves in Philosophy of Action.

  • Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Volume 19, Issue 2
  • April 2010, pp. 179-187

Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study


Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense ways of attributing moral responsibility, if not the very notion of moral responsibility. In the case of actions that result in undesirable outcomes (e.g., someone being harmed), the commonsense conception—which is reflected in sophisticated ways in the legal conception—tells us that there are circumstances in which the agent is entirely and fully responsible for the bad outcome (and deserves to be punished accordingly) and circumstances in which the agent is not at all responsible for the bad outcome (and thereby the agent does not deserve to be punished).

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
  • ISSN: 0963-1801
  • EISSN: 1469-2147
  • URL: /core/journals/cambridge-quarterly-of-healthcare-ethics
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *