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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2015
When we talk about harmonisation, we may mean quite different things. There is a close, yet often unclear, relationship between minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition on the one hand, and between full harmonisation and the country of origin principle on the other hand. This paper will discuss harmonisation in relation to these other regulatory models with, among others, the Tobacco Products and Services Directives as illustrations. Moreover, many years after Tobbaco Advertising I and II it remains entirely unclear how minimum harmonisation instruments must be designed in order to be lawful. This paper proposes a consistent reading of the case law on what is called legislative minimum harmonisation based on Article 114 TFEU. It is also shown that the Court of Justice of the European Union applies a lenient standard to more stringent national measures under what is called constitutional minimum harmonisation based on competences for social policy and the environment.
This article expresses the personal opinion of the author, who is grateful for comments by the reviewers of this journal to an earlier draft of this article. A much shorter version of some parts of this piece has appeared under the title ‘Altes und Neues zur Harmonisierung im Binnenmarkt’ in the European Journal of Business Law (EuZW) 2015, 265.
1 Article 2(6) TBT Agreement states: ‘Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products.’ The general prohibition in EU law can also be seen as either prescribing a presumption of legality of national law, or, to the contrary, as presuming national (trade-related) measures being a priori unlawful and in need of justification. For this discussion, see Klamert, M, ‘Of Empty Glasses and Double Burdens: Approaches to Regulating the Services Market à propos the Implementation of the Services Directive’ (2010) 37 (2) 111 Google Scholar.
2 Such national measures shall ‘be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’ both under the SPS Agreement and under the GATT. See Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, para 177.
3 In the context of the WTO, harmonisation has been defined ‘as the process of making different regulations, principles, domestic laws and government policies substantially or effectively the same or similar’. See Mayeda, G, ‘Developing Disharmony? The SPS and TBT Agreements and the Impact of Harmonization on Developing Countries’ (2004) 7 (4) 737, p 740 Google Scholar; Schroder, H Zúñiga, Harmonization, Equivalence and Mutual Recognition of Standards in WTO Law (Kluwer Law International, 2011), p 22 Google Scholar.
4 Compare Weatherill, S, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827 Google Scholar.
5 Land Oberösterreich v Commission, C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:510.
6 See Wagner, M, Das Konzept der Mindestharmonisierung (Duncker and Humlot, 2001), p 42 Google Scholar.
7 C Tietje in E Grabitz et al (eds), Das Recht der Europäischen Union: EUV/AEUV, 56th ed (Beck, 2015), art 114, para 36.
8 Directive 2014/40/EU [2014] OJ L127/1.
9 Directive 2006/123/EC [2006] OJ L376/36.
10 Rec 9 Directive 2011/83/EU [2011] OJ L304/64.
11 This is stated to concern, inter alia, paraphernalia used for tobacco products (including waterpipes) and for herbal products for smoking, and products resembling in appearance a type of tobacco or related product.
12 Gallaher, C-11/92, ECLI:EU:C:1993:262; Ratti, C-148/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:110; Cindu Chemicals, C-281/03 & C-282/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:549.
13 See Art 16 Directive 2009/110/EC [2009] OJ L267/7; Rec 1 Directive 97/27/EC [1997] OJ L233/1; Rec 9 Directive 2008/48/EC [2008] OJ L133/66.
14 See Annex I Directive 2005/29/EC [2005] OJ L149/22. See Galatea, C-261/07 and C-299/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:244, paras 51–53. See also Art 14 Services Directive 2006/123/EG.
15 See Art 4 Directive 2011/83/EU [2011] OJ L304/64.
16 See Howells, G and Reich, N, ‘The current limits of European harmonisation in consumer contract law’ (2011) 12 ERA Forum 39 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p 40.
17 Weatherill, S, ‘Maximum or Minimum Harmonisation – What Kind of “Europe” Do We Want?’ in C Boele-Woelki and W Grosheide (eds), The Future of European Contract Law, Liber Amicorum E.H. Hondius (Kluwer Law International, 2007), pp 140–141 Google Scholar.
18 Ibid, p 145.
19 See, for instance, the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC [2009] OJ L140/16.
20 Directive 2011/24/EU [2011] OJ L88/45. See also the voluminous Handbook on Implementation of the Service Directive (2007) issued by the European Commission.
21 Denkavit, 251/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:252.
22 Hedley Lomas, C-5/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:205. Directive 74/577/EEC [1974] OJ L316/10.
23 Hedley Lomas, ECLI:EU:C:1996:205, p 19.
24 Ibid, p 18. See also Monsees, C-350/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:242, p 24.
25 Directive 2006/123/EC [2006] OJ L376/36.
26 COM/2006 226 final.
27 See S Weatherill, note 17 above, p 142.
28 See note 26 above.
29 Rewe-Zentral AG, 120/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42.
30 See M Klamert, see note 1 above, pp 126–129.
31 Art 10(3) Directive 2006/123/EC [2006] OJ L 376/36.
32 Weatherill, S, ‘Union Legislation Relating to the Free Movement of Goods’ in PJ Oliver (ed), Oliver on Free Movement of Goods in the European Union, 5th ed (Hart Publishing, 2010)Google Scholar, para 13.91.
33 Slot, PJ, ‘Harmonisation’ (1996) 21 European Law Review 378 Google Scholar, p 378; M Wagner, see note 6 above, p 54.
34 PJ Slot, ibid, p 386.
35 M Wagner, see note 6 above, p 51.
36 C Tietje, see note 7 above, art 114 para 41; similarly, S Leible and M Schröder in R Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV, 2nd ed (Beck, 2012), art 114 para 34.
37 See eg Art 1(3) Directive 2010/31/EU [2010] OJ L153/13; Art 1(2) Council Directive 2007/43/EC [2007] OJ L182/19.
38 See the example given by S Weatherill in note 32 above.
39 This has been termed exclusivity clause. See note 31 above.
40 See Art 12 Toys Directive 2009/48/EC [2009] OJ L170/1: ‘Members States shall not impede the making available on the market in their territory of toys which comply with this Directive.’
41 See Rec 53: ‘Tobacco and related products which comply with this Directive should benefit from the free movement of goods. However, in light of the different degrees of harmonisation achieved by this Directive, the Member States should, under certain conditions, retain the power to impose further requirements in certain respects in order to protect public health.’
42 Tobacco Advertising I, C-376/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:544.
43 Tobacco Advertising II, C-380/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:772.
44 See S Weatherill, note 17 above, p 137.
45 Ex parte BAT, C-491/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:741, para 74.
46 Directive 2014/40/EU [2014] OJ L127/1. See the pending preliminary reference proceeding concerning the validity of parts of Directive 2014/40/EU, Philip Morris, C-547/14. See also the pending action for annulment of parts of Directive 2014/40/EU, Poland v European Parliament and Council, C-358/14.
47 Quelle, C-404/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:231, para 36; Ausbanc, C-484/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:309; Gysbrechts, C-205/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:730; DocMorris, C-322/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:664.
48 Laval, C-341/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
49 See Dougan, M, ‘Minimum Harmonization after Tabacco Advertising and Laval Un Partneri ’ in M. Bulterman et al (eds), Views of European Law from the Mountain: Liber Amicorum Piet Jan Slot (Kluwer Law Publishing, 2009), p 13 Google Scholar.
50 Which is notoriously difficult in view of the more recent case law on restrictions of use. See, among others, Spaventa, E, ‘Leaving Keck behind? The Free Movement of Goods After the Rulings in Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos’ (2009) 35 European Law Review 914 Google Scholar.
51 See Gourmet International Products, C-405/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:135.
52 See Section III above: market access clauses sustain regulatory differences but neutralise their practical consequences for market participants.
53 See, among many others, SK Schmidt (ed), Mutual Recognition as a New Mode of Governance (Routledge, 2007).
54 Hatzopoulos, V, ‘Forms of mutual recognition’, in I Lianos and O Odudu (eds), Regulating Trade in Services: Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp 70–72 Google Scholar. For a comparision with WTO law, see Klamert, M, Services Liberalization in the EU and WTO – Concepts, Standards and Regulatory Approaches (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp 258–263 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
55 V Hatzopoulos, see note 54 above, p 98.
56 Möstl, M, ‘Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recognition’ (2010) 47 (2) 405 Google Scholar, p 415.
57 See Armstrong, K, ‘Mutual Recognition’, in C Barnard and J Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing, 2002), p 230 Google Scholar.
58 M Möstl, see note 56 above, p 407.
59 Ibid, p 406.
60 See Hatzopoulos, V, Regulating Services in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2012), p 269 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
61 Weiler, JHH, ‘Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade’, in JHH Weiler (ed), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp 223–225 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
62 Davies, G, ‘Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonization? Lessons on Trade and Tolerance of Diversity from the EU’, in L Bartels and F Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2006), p 271 Google Scholar.
63 See M Klamert, note 54 above, pp 263–264.
64 Directive 2001/83/EC [2001] OJ L311/67.
65 If this does not happen, then the Commission decides centrally. Compare with Art 34 Directive 2001/83/EC [2001] OJ L311/67.
66 See Dougan, M, ‘Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 853 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p 864.
67 Art 4(2) Directive 2002/98/EC [2003] OJ L33/30.
68 Octapharma, C-512/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:149.
69 Ibid, para 46.
70 Borsana, C-2/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:613. See also Bleckmann, M, Nationale Grundrechte im Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der Europäischen Union (Mohr Siebeck, 2011), pp 44–45 Google Scholar.
71 Borsana, ECLI:EU:C:1998:613.
72 Ibid, para 38.
73 Ibid, para 40.
74 Deponiezweckverband Eiterköpfe, C-6/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:222.
75 Directive 1999/31/EC [1999] OJ L182/1.
76 Deponiezweckverband Eiterköpfe, ECLI:EU:C:2005:222, para 32.
77 Ibid, paras 62–63.
78 See S Weatherill, note 4 above, p 827.
79 See Boeger, N, ‘Minimum Harmonisation, Free Movement and Proportionality’ in P Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp 73–88 Google Scholar, for evidence from case law for legislative minimum harmonisation.
80 See Damjanovic, D, ‘“Reserved areas” of the Member States and the ECJ: The Case of Higher Education’, in B DeWitte and H Micklitz (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia, 2012), p 149 Google Scholar.
81 I have argued elsewhere that there is no convincing reason to conceive of pre-emption as a distinct legal principle in Union law, but that this should not discourage the use of the term in the context of the various duties of abstentions in EU law and especially with those that are unrelated to both supremacy and exclusivity. See Klamert, M, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp 115–121 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
82 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Commission v Austria and Commission v Sweden, C‑205/06 and C-249/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:391, paras 33–38.
83 Tietje, see note 7 above, art 114 para 67.
84 Inter-Environnement Wallonie, C-129/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:628; Adeneler, C-212/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:443.
85 M Klamert, see note 81 above, pp 150–157.
86 See, among others, Opinion 1/76 (European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels), ECLI:EU:C:1977:63; and Lesoochranárske, C-240/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:125.
87 Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No 170), ECLI:EU:C:1993:106.
88 A more recent example is Art 7(3) of the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent Organic Pollutants [2004] OJ L81/37.
89 Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No 170), ECLI:EU:C:1993:106, para 18.
90 Ibid.
91 See also PJ Slot, note 33 above, p 386.
92 See note 89 above, paras 22–25.
93 Kortas, C-512/12, ECLI:EU:C:1999:272.
94 Directive 98/34/EC [1998] OJ L204/37.
95 CIA Security, C-194/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:172.
96 Art 24(3) Directive 2014/40/EU [2014] OJ L127/1.
