Self-regulation in the legal profession has recently, as it has on previous occasions, come under a barrage of criticism. This paper examines a narrow aspect of self-regulation, the processing of complaints through to dispositions within the disciplinary system of the Law Society of British Columbia between 1978-1988. Statistics and case reports of the Law Society are used to examine the disciplining of lawyers in light of a model which encompasses the benefits of self-regulation (funnel in) and criticism of it (funnel out and funnel away). While suggestions are made for improving the present system there is some question as to whether self-regulation will survive the rapidly changing nature of the legal profession as it bends to national and international pressures.

In Canada the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms generated a good deal of debate about the possibility of using law in the struggle for social transformation. Although couched in general terms, the current debate is ultimately about the possibility of asserting liberal democratic legal rights in courts in order to transform existing relations of subordination and domination. Somewhat remarkably, the positive claim that litigating entrenched legal rights encourages social transformation tends to be made almost exclusively at the theoretical level. Theoretical possibilities, rather than concrete victories, are invoked to support the claim for the transformative capacity of liberal legal rights. Instead of approaching the question of litigating social change from an exclusively theoretical perspective, this paper examines contemporary examples in order to illustrate some of the possibilities of and limits to this strategy. Specifically, the paper examines how both the labour and women's movements have used the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to further their social, political and economic goals. Not only did these two groups adopt widely different strategies during the entrenchment process, what is entailed by the assertion of bourgeois legal rights has a different meaning for each. Thus, by contrasting the experience of the labour and women's movements in invoking the Charter it is possible to begin to suggest the limits of liberal rights in the struggle for social transformation.

This article gives a schematic overview of metis aboriginal rights from the Huron and Superior Treaties of 1850 to the Mackenzie Valley Treaty of 1921. It traces the evolution of federal policy in several stages: treating Metis as Indians, followed by individual grants of land, scrip and money. Pragmatism and expediency led to many inconsistencies in policy, but there were also pressures of administrative precedent favouring rationalization. Awareness of this history is essential in determining what metis aboriginal rights, if any, are still “existing” under s. 25 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Over the past five years the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed on three occasions the implications of the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms for the principle of judicial independence. The justices agree that the Court's new role as guardian of constitutionally entrenched civil rights and liberties demands an expansion in its immunity from legislative and executive influence. The hoary principle of judicial independence can no longer be confined to such individual elements as security of salary and tenure but must encompass an institutional element, “reflected in [a court's] institutional or administrative relationships to the executive and legislative branches of government.” The “modern understanding of judicial independence,” according to Chief Justice Brian Dickson, recognizes that the Canadian judiciary is no longer confined to the resolution of disputes in individual cases but plays the role of “protector of the Constitution and the fundamental values embodied in it—rule of law, fundamental justice, equality, preservation of the democratic process, to name perhaps the most important.” It is not enough, therefore, to ensure the impartiality of judges in individual cases. Courts must “be completely separate in ‘authority and function’ from all other branches of government.” Accordingly, the Court ruled in a 1989 case that a royal commission of inquiry cannot compel judges involved in a matter being investigated to testify as to the reasons for their judicial decision.

In the spring of 1987, Canada's first ministers agreed to a package of proposals for reforming major elements of the country's constitution. The package, which has come to be known as the Meech Lake Accord, contains a number of significant provisions, one of which deals with the federal spending power and national shared-cost programs. This provision stipulates that the federal government must compensate provinces that decline to participate in future national sharedcost programs, but immediately adds that such compensation is conditional upon the non-participating provinces establishing “a program or initiative that is compatible with the national objectives.”

The provision has led to a great deal of debate and discussion. Of special interest, and concern for some, has been the possible effect of the provision on the capacity of the federal government to use its spending power to set up national shared-cost programs. Some contend that Ottawa's capacity would be severely restricted or even eliminated by the provision. Others claim that it would have little or no impact, that the Accord would simply constitutionalize present practices. These conflicting views on the implications of the Meech Lake Accord for shared-cost programs doubtless flow from many sources, but a major one appears to be differing views on the present ability of Ottawa to establish these types of arrangements.