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The Kernel of m-Quota Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Bezalel Peleg
Bezalel Peleg*
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
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In (1), M. Davis and M. Maschler define the kernel K of a characteristic-function game; they also prove, among other theorems, that K is a subset of the bargaining set M1(i) and that it is never void, i.e. that for each coalition structure b there exists a payoff vector x such that the payoff configuration (x, b) belongs to K. The main advantage of the kernel, as it seems to us, is that it is easier to compute in many cases than the bargaining set M1(i).

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Mathematics , Volume 17 , 1965 , pp. 239 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Mathematical Society 1965

References

1. Davis, M. and Maschler, M., The kernel of a cooperative game, Econometric research program, Princeton Univ., Res. Mem. No. 58 (June 1963).Google Scholar
2. Kalisch, G. K., Generalized quota solutions of n-person games, Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. IV, edited by A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, (Princeton, 1959), pp. 163–177.Google Scholar
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4. Maschler, M., n-person games with only 1, n — 1 and n-person permissible coalitions, J. Math. Anal. Appl., 6 (1963), 230–256.Google Scholar
5. Peleg, B., On the bargaining set MQ of m-quota games, Advances in Game Theory, edited by M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker (Princeton, 1964), pp. 501–512.Google Scholar
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