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Cognitive Modularity of Emotion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

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In a recent survey of contemporary philosophy of emotion, Ronald de Sousa states that “in recent years … emotions have once again become the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy, as well as in other branches of cognitive science” (de Sousa 2003, 1). He then goes on to make the important observation that “in view of the proliferation of increasingly fruitful exchanges between researchers of different stripes, it is no longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotion in isolation from the approaches of other disciplines, particularly psychology, neurology and evolutionary biology” (de Sousa 2003, 1). This last remark is particularly apt in the case of a topic like modularity and emotion, which represents an ideal opportunity for reflecting on the emerging alliance between the philosophy of emotion and emotion science. In addition to being interesting in its own right, the topic also illustrates some of the perils associated with the new alliance, as different academic traditions must adapt to interdisciplinary dialogue.

Type
3. The Analogy with Perception
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2006

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