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Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2020

Jörg Löschke*
Affiliation:
University of Zurich, Department of Philosophy, Zurich, Switzerland

Abstract

Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism.

Type
Article
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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