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Definitions of Kant’s categories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Tyke Nunez
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Corresponding
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Abstract

The consensus view in the literature is that, according to Kant, definitions in philosophy are impossible. While this is true prior to the advent of transcendental philosophy, I argue that with Kant’s Copernican Turn definitions of some philosophical concepts, the categories become possible. Along the way I discuss issues like why Kant introduces the ‘Analytic of Concepts’ as an analysis of the understanding, how this faculty, as the faculty for judging, provides the principle for the complete exhibition of the categories, how the pure categories relate to the schematized categories, and how the latter can be used on empirical objects.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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References

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