Kantian Self-Conceit and the Two Guises of Authority
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2019
There is a debate in the literature as to whether Kantian self-conceit is intrapsychic or interpersonal. I argue that self-conceit is both. I argue that, for Kant, self-conceit is fundamentally an illusion about authority, one’s own and any authority one stands in relation to. Self-conceit refuses to recognize the authority of the law. But the law “shows up” for us in two guises: one’s own reason and other persons. Thus, self-conceit refuses to recognize both guises of the law. Hence self-conceit is essentially double-sided, at once intrapsychic and interpersonal.
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 2 , February 2020 , pp. 268 - 283
- © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy