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Kantian Self-Conceit and the Two Guises of Authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2019

Francey Russell
Affiliation:
Barnard College and Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
Corresponding
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Abstract

There is a debate in the literature as to whether Kantian self-conceit is intrapsychic or interpersonal. I argue that self-conceit is both. I argue that, for Kant, self-conceit is fundamentally an illusion about authority, one’s own and any authority one stands in relation to. Self-conceit refuses to recognize the authority of the law. But the law “shows up” for us in two guises: one’s own reason and other persons. Thus, self-conceit refuses to recognize both guises of the law. Hence self-conceit is essentially double-sided, at once intrapsychic and interpersonal.

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© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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