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A metaphysics for practical knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Kim Frost Open the ORCID record for Kim Frost [Opens in a new window]
Kim Frost*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, USA
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Abstract

Is Anscombean practical knowledge independent of what the agent actually does on an occasion? Failure to understand Anscombe’s answer to this question is a major obstacle to appreciating the subtlety and plausibility of her view. I argue that Anscombe’s answer is negative, and turns on the nature of mistakes in performance, and reveals a distinctive implicit metaphysics of mind and knowledge, structured by related capacities and exercises of capacities. If my interpretation is correct, then practical knowledge shares features with knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but deserves its own epistemic category.

Keywords

Anscombepractical knowledgemetaphysics of mindaction theoryphilosophy of mindepistemologymetaphysicsmistakes in performanceknowledge howknowledge that

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Type
Articles
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , May 2019 , pp. 314 - 340
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2018

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