Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-846f6c7c4f-9v9hh Total loading time: 0.279 Render date: 2022-07-06T16:23:56.916Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "useNewApi": true } hasContentIssue true
  • English
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Article contents

Modal science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Timothy Williamson
Timothy Williamson*
Affiliation:
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
*
Email: timothy.williamson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Get access Rights & Permissions[Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper explains and defends the idea that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of objective necessity. Plausible closure conditions on the family of objective modalities are shown to entail that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Evidence is provided that some objective modalities are studied in the natural sciences. In particular, the modal assumptions implicit in physical applications of dynamical systems theory are made explicit by using such systems to define models of a modal temporal logic. Those assumptions arguably include some necessitist principles.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 4-5: Special Issue: Williamson on Modality , August 2016 , pp. 453 - 492
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Artemov, Sergei, Davore, Jennifer, and Nerode, Anil. 1997. Modal Logics and Topological Semantics for Hybrid Systems. Technical Report MSI 97-05. Cornell University.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, Alexander. 2007. Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chisholm, Roderick. 1973. “Parts as Essential to Their Wholes.” Review of Metaphysics 26: 581–603.Google Scholar
Cussens, James. 2014. “Probability and Statistics.” In The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz, edited by Antognazza, M. R.. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Advance online publication.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1970. “Mental Events.” In Experience and Theory, edited by Foster, L. and Swanson, J. W., 79–101. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
Davoren, Jen, and Goré, Rajeev. 2002. “Bimodal Logics for Reasoning about Continuous Dynamics.” In Advances in Modal Logic. Vol. 3, edited by Wolter, F., Wansing, H., de Rijke, M., and Zakharyaschev, M., 91–111. London: World Scientific. 10.1142/5114CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dorr, Cian, and Goodman, Jeremy. Forthcoming. “Diamonds Are Forever.” Noûs.Google Scholar
Field, Hartry. 1980. Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Fine, Kit. 1978. “Model Theory for Modal Logic: Part I – The De Re/De Dicto Distinction.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 7: 125–156.Google Scholar
Fine, Kit. 1994. “Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.” Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1–16. 10.2307/2214160CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, Kit. 2006. “Relatively Unrestricted Quantification.” In Absolute Generality, edited by Rayo, A. and Uzquiano, G., 20–44. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Fritz, Peter. 2013. “Modal Ontology and Generalized Quantifiers.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 42: 643–678.Google Scholar
Gibson, James. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
Gunawardena, Jeremy. 2009. “Models in Systems Biology: The Parameter Problem and the Meanings of Robustness.” In Elements of Computational Systems Biology, edited by Lodhi, H. and Muggleton, S., 21–48. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.Google Scholar
Hellman, Geoffrey. 1989. Mathematics Without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Kim, Jaegwon. 1993. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511625220CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kment, Boris. 2012. “Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals.” Philosophical Review 121: 573–609. 10.1215/00318108-1630930CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kment, Boris. 2014. Modality and Explanatory Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604685.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kratzer, Angelika. 1977. “What ‘Must’ and ‘Can’ Must and Can Mean.” Linguistics and Philosophy 1: 337–355. 10.1007/BF00353453CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kratzer, Angelika. 2012. Modals and ConditionalsNew and Revised Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234684.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. 1968. “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophy 65: 113–126. 10.2307/2024555CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Linnebo, Øystein. 2013. “The Potential Hierarchy of Sets.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 6: 205–228. 10.1017/S1755020313000014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loewer, Barry. 2001. “Determinism and Chance.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32: 609–620. 10.1016/S1355-2198(01)00028-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lyon, Aidan, and Colyvan, Mark. 2008. “The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces.” Philosophia Mathematica 16: 227–243.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, Penelope. 2006. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 10.1093/0199272204.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Malament, David. 1982. “Review of Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism by Hartry Field.” Journal of Philosophy 79: 523–534.Google Scholar
Maudlin, Tim. 2007. “What Could Be Objective about Probabilities?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38: 275–291. 10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.04.006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Müller, Thomas. 2011. “Tense or Temporal Logic.” In The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Horsten, L. and Pettigrew, R., 324–350. London: Continuum.Google Scholar
Nolte, David. 2010. “The Tangled Tale of Phase Space.” Physics Today 63(4): 33–38. 10.1063/1.3397041CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parsons, Charles. 1983. Mathematics in Philosophy: Selected Essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Plantinga, Alvin. 1983. “On Existentialism.” Philosophical Studies 44: 1–20. 10.1007/BF00353411CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Portner, Paul. 2009. Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Prior, Arthur. 1956. “Modality and Quantification in S5.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 21: 60–62. 10.2307/2268488CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Prior, Arthur. 1967. Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243113.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary. 1967. “Mathematics Without Foundations.” The Journal of Philosophy 64: 5–22. 10.2307/2024603CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, Willard van Orman. 1953. “Reference and Modality.” In From a Logical Point of View, edited by Quine, Willard Van Orman, 139–159. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, Willard van Orman. 1966. “Three Grades of Modal Involvement.” In The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, edited by Quine, Willard Van Orman, 156–174. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Roca-Royes, Sonia. Forthcoming. “Similarity and Possibility: An Epistemology of De Re Possibility for Concreta.” In Modal Epistemology after Rationalism, edited by Fischer, B. and Leon, F..Google Scholar
Salmon, Nathan. 1982. Reference and Essence. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Salmon, Nathan. 1989. “The Logic of What Might Have Been.” The Philosophical Review 98: 3–34. 10.2307/2185369CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, Nathan. 1993. “This Side of Paradox.” Philosophical Topics 21: 187–197. 10.5840/philtopics199321219CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, Ted. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert. 2012. Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Strogatz, Steven. 2001. Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos: With Applications to Physics, Biology, Chemistry, and Engineering. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Strohminger, Margot. 2015. “Perceptual Knowledge of Nonactual Possibilities.” Philosophical Perspectives 29: 363–375.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Studd, James. 2013. “The Iterative Conception of Set.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 42: 697–725. 10.1007/s10992-012-9245-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vetter, Barbara. 2016. “Williamsonian Modal Epistemology, Possibility-Based.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2006. “Indicative Versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts.” In Philosophical Issues, Volume 16: Philosophy of Language, edited by Sosa, E. and Villanueva, E., 310–333. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2007a. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. 10.1002/9780470696675CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2007b. “How Probable is an Infinite Sequence of Heads?” Analysis 67: 173–180. 10.1093/analys/67.3.173CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2013a. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552078.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2013b. Identity and Discrimination. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. 10.1002/9781118503591CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woodward, James. 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
44
Cited by

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Modal science
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Modal science
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Modal science
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *