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Morality or Modality? What Does the Attribution of Intentionality Depend On?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Bence Nanay
Bence Nanay*
Affiliation:
Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA
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Extract

It has been argued that the attribution of intentional actions is sensitive to our moral judgment (Knobe 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, see also Mele 2003, Phelan & Sarkissian 2008). I will examine these arguments and Suggest an alternative explanation for the experiments they are based on.

Joshua Knobe conducted the following experiment (Knobe 2003) to support this claim. Subjects were given two vignettes that differed only in one small detail and this difference influenced their attribution of intentionality. The first vignette was the following:

The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.’

The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don't care at all about harming the environment. I jus)t want to make as much profit as I can. Let's start the new program.’

They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 40 , Issue 1 , March 2010 , pp. 25 - 39
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2010

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