1 Thus I shall use the terms ‘subject matter’ and ‘representational content’ interchangeably in this paper, as having no implications as to whether there actually is some subject (namely, some actual object, event, or state of affairs) that might serve as a standard of correctness or appropriateness in each case of visual representation. On the distinction of content from (actual) subject see Dominic Lopes, Understanding Pictures (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), 3-4.

2 Of course, there is much argument as to exactly how the relations between a pictorial representation, its subject matter, and its actual subject (if any) should be characterized, in such works as Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1968) and Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1987). But my current concerns lie elsewhere.

3 They also have differing identity-conditions, as discussed in Section II.

4 I introduced these concepts in a paper entitled ‘Pictorial Orientation Matters’ that has been submitted for publication, though I hope that it is clear enough that they have a high degree of intuitive obviousness about them.

5 However, the concepts are also applicable to other orientational frameworks, including that of compass orientation (see nn.18 and 19).

6 For further details see my ‘Pictorial Orientation Matters.’

7 As a non-normal example, it is possible that an artist might clearly indicate which side of a given picture would normally be considered as its intrinsic top (such as by the orientation of her signature, or a title placed below the picture, etc.), yet nevertheless deliberately arrange to have the picture hung in a position inverted from that ‘normal’ orientation — thus acting within the avant-garde tradition of mocking or subverting ‘normal’ artistic conventions. I discuss such cases in my ‘Four Theories of Inversion in Art and Music,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2002) 1-19.

8 This is not to deny that, from the differing epistemic perspective of a picture's creator, her desire to represent the subject matter as having a given field orientation determines which side of her painting — assuming that the subject matter has already been painted there — she should count as defining the intrinsic top of the corresponding picture. Thus the actual relation in question is one of co-determination, in that knowledge of either enables the other to be fixed.

9 However, choosing such an example, in which the subject matter itself has an intrinsic orientation, is not necessary to the point being made; I do it only because it is easier to describe the field orientation of a subject using a term such as ‘upright’ that implies an intrinsic orientation for any object that it describes.

10 One caveat should be mentioned. In my ‘Four Theories of Inversion’ I discuss various theories of pictorial inversion, including theories that would deny that a picture retains its identity through rotation. However, a modified form of the OSMI principle would still apply in such cases: the family of distinct pictures (namely, those corresponding to various rotational stages of what we normally consider to be the same picture through rotation) would still be such that their subject matters each have the same invariant field orientation.

11 I discuss such pictorial ambiguity cases in two other papers, ‘Pictorial Orientation Matters’ and ‘Four Theories of Inversion.’ Further arguments for distinguishing pictures (and other visual artworks such as sculptures) from physical objects are given in my ‘Artworks Versus Designs,’ The British Journal of Aesthetics 41 (2001) 162-77 and ‘A Representational Theory of Artefacts and Artworks,’ The British Journal of Aesthetics 41 (2001) 353-70

12 My thanks to anonymous referees for the objections.

13 For the distinction of representational content from actual subject see the opening paragraph of this paper, and n.1.

14 Trompe l'oeil paintings will be discussed in Section VII.

15 By which he means roughly a picture or depiction in the above sense, minus any trompe l’oeil paintings, minus any (in his view) non-representational abstract pictures (Wollheim, 62).

16 Indeed, an aircraft or satellite photograph of an area of terrain (which, as a photograph, is surely a picture, if anything is) could be used as a map, and it would become one with only minor visible alterations (such as suppressing irrelevant details, or adding captions). Thus for me, the burden of proof regarding maps lies with those who would deny (as shall I) that they are pictures.

17 I shall discuss pictorial interpretations of maps in Section IX.

18 This is so because, if the map were placed horizontally, and its North-facing side were aligned with a (North-pointing) compass needle, then this would count as being the ‘upright’ or ‘standardly aligned’ orientation of the map. However, it should be pointed out that the geographical or geometric relationships made possible by a compass grid (such as that one place A is South-East of another place B) constitute invariant or structural information, of the kind I am claiming to be involved in a structural map interpretation (see the next footnote).

19 To be sure, some structural information may indirectly depend on intrinsic orientation, in that it is in some sense ‘part of the meaning’ of a claim that place A is South-East of place B that there is also some method of standardly aligning the map with an actual compass needle (hence determining an ‘upright’ position for the map, with its North-facing side thereby counting as its intrinsic top), so that the map content may correspond or be aligned with actual geographical relationships. Nevertheless, A's being South-East of B is of a piece with A's being tw ice as f ar from B as is some other place C — all of it is invariant, structural or geometric information that takes no direct account of either a map's current field alignment relative to an actual landscape, nor of any additional ways in which that purely structural information may be linked to an intrinsic top so as to maximize the representational utility of the map.

20 Also, it should not be overlooked that many diagrams or blueprints may themselves include symbols or words that do indeed require literal reading, so the effects of such linguistic parts should not be allowed to confuse the issue of the status of the non-linguistic parts of a map or diagram.

21 Of course, with some diagrams such as an electrical circuit diagram, there is less reason to say that it delineates any specifically visual subject matter. However, as Wollheim points out in another connection, it is possible to hold that an item may visually represent non-visual aspects of a subject matter — so that, for instance, a painting of Laocoon can represent him as about to cry out in agony, which is a future sonic event (67). But in any case, clearly there can be genuinely visual representations which at least attempt to delineate non-visual subject matters, so that the diagram itself may still be interpreted visually as a delineation in such a case, no matter how little specifically visual subject matter information it gives.

22 Which is of course the cognitive side of a claim that some objects are structural delineations.

23 So far, one such mode has been found, that of structural visual representation, which fails to satisfy the OSMI principle because an object (such as a map) in this mode fails to have an oriented subject matter of any kind (no matter what orientation it itself may be placed in).

24 I n the next Section, I shall argue that an additional principle (concerning the identification of a perceived top with an actual top) is needed to complete the characterization of aspectual representation.

25 Thus I agree with Wollheim's view that similarly denies picturehood to such trompe l’oeil paintings — but, as with maps, for different reasons than his (Wollheim, 62).

26 Thus my account may have some advantages over that of Susan Feagin, who in an otherwise insightful discussion argues that trompe l'oeil paintings ‘present’ rather than ‘represent’ things: see ‘Presentation and Representation,’ The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998) 234-40.

27 See my ‘A Representational Theory’ for an account of what is involved in this process.

28 This is of course a more abstract sense of ‘changeable views of content,’ or of changeable orientation with respect to content, but it is one that befits the exploratory context.

29 The issue here should be distinguished from that of aesthetic evaluations of the ‘pictorial unity’ of a picture, which evaluations arguably presuppose that an object is indeed a picture (even if a poor one because of its relative disunity).

30 Also see the papers mentioned in n.11.

31 My thanks to anonymous CJP referees for very helpful comments on an initial version of this paper, and to audience members at the American Society of Aesthetics Eastern Division Meeting in Philadelphia, April 2001, for useful comments on a more distant precursor of this paper (entitled ‘Re-Orienting Artistic Depiction’).