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Canadian Journal of Philosophy Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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What kind of evaluative states are emotions? The attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of emotions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mauro Rossi  and
Christine Tappolet
Mauro Rossi
Affiliation:
Département de philosophie, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Canada
Christine Tappolet
Affiliation:
Département de philosophie, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada
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Abstract

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory of emotions.

Keywords

Emotionsattitudinal theoryperceptual theoryformal objectDeonna and Teroni
Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 4 , June 2019 , pp. 544 - 563
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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