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Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity

  • Elmar Unnsteinsson (a1)


Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.


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Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity

  • Elmar Unnsteinsson (a1)


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