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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Fatalism is a doctrine about which philosophers have by and large been in complete agreement. Even the arguments they have used to dispose of it have been remarkably constant. Yet some of these arguments are surprisingly inadequate. The purpose of this discussion is to point out a set of fallacies which are especially common in recent discussions of fatalism. Their common feature is an emphasis on the relation between fatalism and deliberation. The claim they make is that if fatalism is true, any deliberation over one's future actions is pointless. If this is not quite a refutation of fatalism by itself, it is at least a strong objection, especially when advanced ad hominem. Yet I think that it is wholly false. In the following discussion I will show how every argument intended to establish this incompatibility between fatalism and deliberation involves some fallacy.
1 Cicero, trans. Rackham, H. Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann 1918), Vol. 4, 225Google Scholar
2 A recent example: ‘If I am to accept the fiat “Let it be that p,” I must assume that it is within my power to bring it about that p. From this assumption it follows that it is possible that p; for one cannot bring about the impossible. From this assumption it follows also that the negation of p is possible; for one cannot bring about the necessary either. If then it is within my power to bring it about that p, it is a contingent matter whether p, and p is neither necessary nor impossible’ (Denyer, N. Time, Action and Necessity [London: Duckworth 1981), 39Google Scholar).
3 See, e.g., Taylor, R. ‘Fatalism,’ The Philosophical Review 71 (1962) 56CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Cahn, S.M. Fate, Logic and Time (New Haven/London: Yale University Press 1967), 9Google Scholar.
4 Ayers, M.R. The Refutation of Determinism (London: Methuen 1968), 154Google Scholar
5 Ginet, C. ‘Might We Have No Choice?’ in Lehrer, K. ed., Freedom and Determinism (New York: Random House 1966) 100–1Google Scholar
6 It might of course have an indirect point, e.g., if by making the virtuous decision to walk I reinforce a character trait which will come in handy on other occasions.
7 Inwagen, P. van An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1983), 154Google Scholar
8 This would be something of an exaggeration if taken to imply some absolute assurance which is not likely to be available in practice; but that need not be supposed.
9 Ginet, C. ‘Can the Will be Caused?’ The Philosophical Review 71 (1962) 50CrossRefGoogle Scholar
10 Taylor, R. ‘Deliberation and Foreknowledge,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964) 79Google Scholar
11 One might compare this with an argument sometimes advanced about certain human activities which can be said to involve novelty. An example would be scientific discovery. Plainly one cannot ‘discover’ what is already known. But if discovery were causally determined, it would be predictable, and so it would be possible to know something before it had been discovered. Therefore scientific discovery is never causally determined. The similarity is not surprising, since ‘discovery’ is (more or less) to human society what learning is to the individual person.
12 See, e.g., Taylor, ‘Fatalism,’ 56; Cahn, 96; and Young, R. Freedom, Responsibility and God (London: Macmillan 1975), 21CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A dissenter is Gale, R.M. who writes: ‘It is interesting to note that no one is a fatalist about the past’ (Gale, R.M. ed., The Philosophy of Time [London: Macmillan 1968] 173CrossRefGoogle Scholar). What he means by this remark, however, is somewhat unclear.
13 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, Book VI, Ch.2, 1139b
14 Ibid., Book III, Ch.3, 1112b
15 I am grateful for the comments of colleagues, especially Lloyd Humberstone, on an earlier version of this paper.
