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Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2021

Benjamin Lennertz Open the ORCID record for Benjamin Lennertz [Opens in a new window]
Benjamin Lennertz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, USA
*
Email: belennertz@gmail.com
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Abstract

I generalize the notion of a conditional attitude by bringing together two topics of inquiry. One is the ordinary inquiry into conditional attitudes. The other topic is the inquiry into the attitude of thinking that a proposition is likely, or having a high credence in a proposition. For instance, what is it to intend to go to the game if it is likely that Kershaw pitches? Being likely that Kershaw pitches is the condition of the attitude. Given a natural position about statements like “It is likely that Kershaw pitches,” the target attitude looks different from ordinary conditional attitudes.

Keywords

Conditional attitudescredencesnonfactualismattitude ascriptionsinformation-sensitivity
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 62 - 79
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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