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Trust in Scientific Expertise and the Varying Demands of Value Transparency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2025

Hanna Metzen Open the ORCID record for Hanna Metzen [Opens in a new window]
Hanna Metzen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, https://ror.org/02hpadn98 Bielefeld University , Bielefeld, Germany
*
Email: hanna.metzen@uni-bielefeld.de
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Abstract

Value transparency is thought to promote trust in scientific expertise. Yet, transparency is a complex concept. I will argue that transparency requirements come with a varying extent of engagement: merely disclosing information, providing information that is publicly accessible, or having additional mechanisms for criticism in place. It is often not clear in which sense transparency requirements are to be understood in the context of trust in expertise. However, each sense can backfire in different ways. Merely talking about transparency in a general sense hides these possible trade-offs. This furthermore shows that requiring transparency may come with a greater regulatory force.

Keywords

transparencytrust in sciencevalues in sciencescience communicationpublicityaccountability

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Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , First View , pp. 1 - 16
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Inc

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