¹ Klaus Dodds, “‘Real Interest’? Understanding the 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean” (2019) 10 Global Policy 542 at 543; TI Van Pelt et al, “The Missing Middle Central Arctic Ocean: Gaps in Fishery Research and Science Coordination” (2017) 85 Marine Policy 79.

² “The Arctic Community Falling into the Ocean” (17 November 2022), online: CBC.ca <www.cbc.ca/player/play/2114297411923>.

³ Between 1975 and 2012, sea ice thickness decreased by 65 percent. In 2017, scientists recorded the lowest maximum ice extent in thirty-eight years; 2018 saw even greater loss. Christian Prip, “Arctic Ocean Governance in Light of an International Legally Binding Instrument on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction” (2019), online: Marine Policy <doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103768>; Michon Scott, “Arctic Sea Ice Extent at 2018 Winter Maximum Second Smallest on Record” (2018), online: NOAA Climate.gov <www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/arctic-sea-ice-extent-2018-winter-maximum-was-second-smallest-record>.

⁴ “Cruise Ships Could Sail Now-icy Arctic Seas by Century’s End” (2021) 595 Nature 474. Already, a non-specialized cruise ship made a thirty-two-day voyage through the Northwest Passage, carrying over one thousand passengers, a journey made possible due to the rapid pace of environmental change in the Arctic.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Dodds, supra note 1 at 551.

⁷ Nord, Douglas C, The Changing Arctic: Creating a Framework for Consensus Building and Governance within the Arctic Council (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016) at 144 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ US Department of State, “Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” (3 March 2022), online: <www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/>; Timo Koivurova et al, “Arctic Cooperation in a New Situation: Analysis on the Impacts of the Russian War of Aggression” (2022) 3 Government Report Finland, online: <VN_Selvitys_2022_3.pdf>; Paul Arthur Berkman, Jenny Baeseman & Akiho Shibata, “Arctic Science Diplomacy Maintains Russian Co-operation” (2022) 604 Nature 625 at 625; Astri Evardsen, “Arctic Council Paused: The Search for a Future for Arctic Cooperation Continues,” High North News (27 April 2022), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-paused-search-future-arctic-cooperation-continues>.

⁹ Evardsen, supra note 8; Trine Jonassen, “The Arctic Council: The Arctic 7 Resume Limited Work without Russia,” High North News (8 June 2022), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-arctic-7-resume-limited-work-without-russia>.

¹⁰ Koivurova et al, supra note 8; Timo Koivurova & Akiho Shibata, “After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Can We Still Cooperate with Russia in the Arctic?” (2023) 59 Polar Record 1.

¹¹ Emilie Canova & Paulin Pic, “The Arctic Council in Transition: Challenges and Perspectives for the New Norwegian Chairship” (13 June 2023), online: Arctic Institute <thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-council-transition-challenges-perspectives-new-norwegian-chairship/>; “Q&A with Morton Høglund, the New Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials” (15 May 2023), online: Arctic Institute <arctic-council.org/news/q-a-with-morten-hoglund-chair-of-the-senior-arctic-officials/>.

¹² International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean, 3 October 2018 (entered into force June 2021) [CAOFA].

¹³ Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 19 September 1996, (1996) 35 ILM 1387 (entered into force 19 September 1996) (comprising Canada, Denmark, United States, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russian Federation) [Ottawa Declaration].

¹⁴ Arctic Council Secretariat, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure (17–18 September 1998) at para 7, online: <2015-09-01_Rules_of_Procedure_website_version.pdf> [Arctic Council Rules of Procedure]; Ottawa Declaration, supra note 13 at para 7.

¹⁵ Nord, supra note 7.

¹⁶ Ottawa Declaration, supra note 13 at para 1.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid at para 5; Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, supra note 14 at para 17.

¹⁹ Ibid at para 10. For the first fifteen years of the Council’s operation, the chair was also responsible for providing support to the Secretariat to carry out its functions. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 13 at para 5.

²⁰ Nuuk Declaration on the Occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council (12 May 2011) at 1.

²¹ Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, supra note 14 at 5; Ottawa Declaration, supra note 13 at para 2.

²² Oran R Young, “Is It Time for a Reset in Arctic Governance?” (2019) 11 Sustainability 1, online: <doi.org/10.3390/su11164497>.

²³ Nord, supra note 7.

²⁴ Ottawa Declaration, supra note 13 at para 2. Currently, there are six permanent participants representing Indigenous communities across the Arctic: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Aleut International Association, the Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council.

²⁵ Heather Exner-Pirot et al, “Form and Function: The Future of the Arctic Council” (5 February 2019), online: Arctic Institute <www.thearcticinstitute.org/form-function-future-arctic-council/>.

²⁶ Ottawa Declaration, supra note 13 at para 3; Danita Catherine Burke, Diplomacy and the Arctic Council (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2019).

²⁷ Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, supra note 14 at paras 37 and 38.

²⁸ Ibid at para 37.

²⁹ Ibid at para 38 [emphasis added].

³⁰ Ibid at para 38.

³¹ Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, supra note 14 (Article 6 outlines the general suitability of applicants. It notably specifies that the prospective Observer must recognize the Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over their territories in the Arctic [Annex 2, para 6(b)]. They must also recognize that an extensive legal framework, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), applies to the Arctic Ocean [Annex 2, para 6(c)]).

³² Ibid at para 37.

³³ Ibid at para 37.

³⁴ Nord, supra note 7; Rebecca Pincus, “Three-Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic” (2020) 14 Strategic Studies Quarterly 40. The European Union (EU) was also given the opportunity to join at a later date, but it still does not hold observer status since it is a supranational body, not an inter-governmental body. Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, supra note 14 at para 36. However, several EU states have observer status, and the EU helps finance certain projects.

³⁵ Antarctic Treaty, 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 23 June 1961).

³⁶ Burke, supra note 26 at 117.

³⁷ 2008 Ilulissat Declaration (28 May 2008) (comprising Canada, the Russian Federation, Denmark, the United States, and Norway).

³⁸ Burke, supra note 26 at 123.

³⁹ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 1994) at art 3 [UNCLOS].

⁴⁰ Ibid, arts 55, 57.

⁴¹ Ibid, art 56(a).

⁴² Ibid, art 56 (b).

⁴³ Ibid, art 58.

⁴⁴ Ibid, art 87(1).

⁴⁵ Ibid, art 76(1).

⁴⁶ Ibid, art 76(5).

⁴⁷ Ibid, art 81.

⁴⁸ Rebecca Pincus, “Three-Way Power Dynamics in the Arctic” (2020) 14 Strategic Studies Quarterly 40.

⁴⁹ The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) under UNCLOS, supra note 39.

⁵⁰ The United States has not submitted a claim as it has not ratified UNCLOS, though the American government has claimed that its continental shelf extends past its designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Its claim also crosses other states’ claims.

⁵¹ Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Doc CLCS/40/Rev.1 (17 April 2008), at 5(a), Annex I.

⁵² CLCS rulings require extensive research and input from scientists from different fields. Consequently, final rulings take considerable time. Joanna Mossop, The Continental Shelf beyond Two Hundred Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). At this stage, Greenland/Denmark’s claim will not be ruled on before 2032, and Canada’s will take longer still. Julia Hager, “Russia’s Claim to North Pole Territory Officially Confirmed” (21 February 2023), online: Polar Journal <polarjournal.ch/en/2023/02/21/russias-claim-to-north-pole-territory-officially-confirmed/>.

⁵³ Dodds, supra note 1.

⁵⁴ CAOFA, supra note 12.

⁵⁵ Dodds, supra note 1 at 543.

⁵⁶ Ibid at 544.

⁵⁷ UNCLOS, supra note 39, art 122.

⁵⁸ Ibid, art 89.

⁵⁹ Ibid, art 123.

⁶⁰ Dodds, supra note 1 at 543

⁶¹ Oran R Young & Jong-Deog Kim, “Next Steps in Arctic Ocean Governance: Meeting the Challenge of Coordinating a Dynamic Regime Complex” (2021) 133 Marine Policy 1, online: <doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104726>; Malgorzata Smieszek et al, “The State and Challenges of Arctic Governance in an Era of Transformation” (2021) 4 One Earth 1665 at 1666.

⁶² Burke, supra note 26.

⁶³ Ibid at 5.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ramesh Thakur & Luk Van Langenhove, “Enhancing Global Governance through Regional Integration” (2006) 12 Global Governance 233 at 233.

⁶⁶ Ibid at 233.

⁶⁷ Malte Humpert, “Control over the Arctic Ocean Top Priority of New Russian Naval Doctrine,” High North News (4 August 2022), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/control-over-arctic-ocean-top-priority-new-russian-naval-doctrine>; Malte Humpert. “New Satellite Images Reveal Extent of Russia’s Military and Economic Build-up in the Arctic,” High North News (3 May 2019), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/new-satellite-images-reveal-extent-russias-military-and-economic-build-arctic>; Astri Edvardsen, “Large Army and Navy Exercises in the Nordic Region This Late Fall,” High North News (1 December 2022), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/large-army-and-navy-exercises-nordic-region-late-fall>.

⁶⁸ Bipandeep Sharma, “‘De-securitising the Arctic’ in Climate Change: An Indian Perspective” (2021) 77 India Quarterly 622.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, Can TS 1994 No 7 (entered into force 21 March 1994); Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993).

⁷¹ UNCLOS, supra note 39, art 87.

⁷² Ibid, art 58.

⁷³ Ibid, art 137.

⁷⁴ Ibid, art 136.

⁷⁵ Ibid, art 238.

⁷⁶ Carrai, Maria Adele, Defraigne, Jean-Christophe & Wouters, Jan, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and Global Governance: By Way of Introduction’ in Carrai, Maria Adele, Defraigne, Jean-Christophe & Wouters, Jan (eds), The Belt and Road Initiative and Global Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2020) at 2 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁷ Christer Pursiainen, Chris Alden & Rasmus Bertelsen. “The Arctic and Africa in China’s Foreign Policy: How Different Are They and What Does This Tell Us?” (2021) 12 Arctic Rev Law & Policy 31.

⁷⁸ Nong Hong, “The Melting Arctic and Its Impact on China’s Maritime Transport” (2012) 35 Research in Transportation Economics 50 at 50.

⁷⁹ State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy (January 2018), online: <english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm>.

⁸⁰ Pursiainen, Alden & Bertelsen, supra note 77; Shiloh Rainwater, “International Law and the ‘Globalization’ of the Arctic: Assessing the Rights of Non-Arctic States in the High North” (2015) 30:1 Emory Intl L Rev 115.

⁸¹ Yun Sun, “The Intricacy of China’s Arctic Policy” (2018), online: Stimson <www.stimson.org/2018/intricacy-chinas-arctic-policy/>.

⁸² State Council Information Office, supra note 79 at 3.

⁸³ Pursiainen, Alden & Bertelsen, supra note 77.

⁸⁴ Yun Sun, supra note 81.

⁸⁵ State Council Information Office, supra note 79 at 3.

⁸⁶ Ibid at 3; Hong, supra note 78; Rainwater, supra note 80.

⁸⁷ Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, “Competing Structural Powers and Challenges for the EU’s Structural Foreign Policy” (2015) 1 Global Affairs 43 at 44.

⁸⁸ State Council Information Office, supra note 79.

⁸⁹ Hong, supra note 78.

⁹⁰ Mia Bennett, “China, Japan and South Korea Hold Their Own Arctic Dialogue,” Arctic Today (15 June 2017), online: <arctictoday.com/china-japan-and-south-korea-hold-their-own-arctic-dialogue/>.

⁹¹ Pursiainen, Alden & Bertelsen, supra note 77 at 45.

⁹² State Council Information Office, supra note 79 at 2 [emphasis added].

⁹³ Ibid at 3; Pursiainen, Alden & Bertelsen, supra note 77; Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 (entered into force 24 October 1945).

⁹⁴ Yun Sun, supra note 81.

⁹⁵ State Council Information Office, supra note 79.

⁹⁶ Ibid at 3 [emphasis added].

⁹⁷ Ibid [emphasis added].

⁹⁸ Canada has consistently claimed that the Northwest Passage forms part of Canada’s internal waters according to Article 8 of UNCLOS. UNCLOS, supra note 39, art 8.

⁹⁹ State Council Information Office, supra note 79 at 9.

¹⁰⁰ Pursiainen, Alden & Bertelsen, supra note 77 at 45.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² US Department of State, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo Speech, “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus” (6 May 2019) online: <2017-2021.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/index.html>.

¹⁰³ Indeed, the 2019 Ministerial Meeting was the first to not produce a ministerial declaration due to the United States’ insistence that the declaration makes no reference to climate change. “No Final Declaration after Arctic Council Meeting as US Refuses Mention of Climate Change,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (7 May 2019), online: <www.rferl.org/a/no-final-declaration-after-arctic-council-meeting-as-u-s-refuses-mention-of-climate-change/29926232.html>.

¹⁰⁴ Beeson, Mark, “The Limits to Cooperation: Global Governance and the Challenge of Climate Change” in Gok, Gonca Oguz & Mehmetcik, Hakan (eds), The Crisis of Legitimacy in Global Governance (London: Routledge, 2022) at 165 Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ P Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse & Paul Dean, “Why China Is Not a Peer Competitor in the Arctic” (2022) Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 80 at 85.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid at 84.

¹⁰⁷ United States, Report to Congress Department of Defense Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2019).

¹⁰⁸ Lackenbauer, Lajeunesse & Dean, supra note 105 at 87.

¹⁰⁹ Catherine Tunney, “CSIS Warning Inuit Leaders About Covert Foreign Investment in Arctic, Documents Show,” CBC News (13 October 2023), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csis-arctic-obed-russia-china-1.6993128>.

¹¹⁰ Walter Strong, “Ottawa Blocks Chinese Takeover of Nunavut Gold Mine Project after National Security Review,” CBC News (22 December 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-china-tmac-1.5851305>; Natalie Pressman, “Experts Warn About Potential Risks of Foreign Investment in Arctic Mining,” CBC News (26 April 2024), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/mining-puts-arctic-at-risk-of-foreign-investment-experts-say-1.7186761>; Lackenbauer, Lajeunesse & Dean, supra note 105.

¹¹¹ Malte Humpert, “Putin and Xi Discuss Further Deepening of Arctic Partnership,” High North News (24 March 2023), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/putin-and-xi-discuss-further-deepening-arctic-partnership>.

¹¹² Lackenbauer, Lajeunesse & Dean, supra note 105 at 88.

¹¹³ Thakur & Van Langenhove, supra note 65 at 234–35.

¹¹⁴ Luk Van Langenhove, “Why We Need to ‘Unpack’ Regions to Compare Them More Effectively” (2012) 47 International Spectator 16 at 26.

¹¹⁵ Burke, supra note 26 at 35.

¹¹⁶ Antarctic Treaty, supra note 35.

¹¹⁷ Thakur & Van Langenhove, supra note 65 at 234.

¹¹⁸ UNCLOS, supra note 39, art 8. Canada’s claim is disputed by other States who disagree with Canada’s contentious designation.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, art 2.

¹²⁰ Ibid, art 56.

¹²¹ Ibid, art 77.

¹²² Ibid, art 193.

¹²³ Ibid, arts 61–68.

¹²⁴ Ibid, art 77.

¹²⁵ Ibid, art 77.

¹²⁶ Ibid, arts 136, 137.

¹²⁷ Ibid, art 142.

¹²⁸ Arctic Council Secretariat, Arctic Council Strategic Plan 2021–2030 (20 May 2021) at 6, online: <ac-strategic-plan web.pdf>.

¹²⁹ Ibid at 15 [emphasis added].

¹³⁰ UNCLOS, supra note 39, art 192.

¹³¹ Ibid, art 194.

¹³² Ibid, art 197 [emphasis added].

¹³³ Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 37.

¹³⁴ The Ilulissat Declaration never expressly mentions UNCLOS, instead referring to a “comprehensive international legal framework” since the United States has not ratified the convention, in large part due to the provisions regarding the Area and deep seabed mining, which the American government felt would hinder American business interests. The Ilulissat Declaration, of course, covers the Central Arctic Ocean, the seabed of which is part of “the Area.”

¹³⁵ Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 37.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ UNCLOS, supra note 39, art 234.

¹³⁹ Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 37.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Nord, supra note 7 at 13. In Canada, for instance, the Inuit fear that if there is a reliance on UNCLOS’s framework, without regional input and consultation with Arctic Indigenous communities, that “recognition and protection of their Inuit Aboriginal title to ice and water will not be respected.” Anna Sharapova et al, “Indigenous Rights and Interests in a Changing Arctic Ocean: Canadian and Russian Experiences and Challenges” (2022) 13 Arctic Rev Law & Policy 286 at 289.

¹⁴² Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 37.

¹⁴³ UNCLOS, supra note 39, art 122.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, art 123.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Burke, supra note 26 at 6.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid at 141.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Astri Evardsen, “Massive Russian in the Arctic, High North News Overview Shows,” High North News (1 September 2023), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/massive-russian-mobilization-arctic-high-north-news-overview-shows>; Trine Jonassen, “Russia Will Stay in the Arctic Council as Long as It Serves Our Interests,” High North News (11 May 2023), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-will-stay-arctic-council-long-it-serves-our-interests>.

¹⁵¹ Heather Exner-Pirot & Evan T Bloom, “Opinion: Does the Arctic Council Make Sense without Russia?” National Post (10 November 2022), online: <nationalpost.com/opinion/opinion-does-the-arctic-council-make-sense-without-russia>.

¹⁵² Paula Kankaanapää & Oran R Young, “The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council” (2012) 31 Polar Research 1.

¹⁵³ Koivurova et al, supra note 8 at 53; Canova & Pic, supra note 11.

¹⁵⁴ Trine Jonassen, “China: Will Not Acknowledge Arctic Council without Russia,” High North News (15 October 2022), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-will-not-acknowledge-arctic-council-without-russia>.

¹⁵⁵ Burke, supra note 26 at 6–7.

¹⁵⁶ Oran R Young & Jong-Deog Kim, “Next Steps in Arctic Ocean Governance: Meeting the Challenge of Coordinating a Dynamic Regime Complex” (2021) 133 Marine Policy 1, online: <doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104726>.

¹⁵⁷ Christian Prip, “The Arctic Council and Biodiversity: Need for a Stronger Management Framework?” (2016) 2 Nordic Environmental LJ 37.

¹⁵⁸ Carrai, Defraigne & Wouters, supra note 76 at 2.

¹⁵⁹ Bennett, supra note 90.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid [emphasis added].

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ William WL Cheung, Reg Watson & Daniel Pauly, “Signature of Ocean Warming in Global Fisheries Catch” (2013) 97 Nature 365.

¹⁶⁴ UNCLOS, supra note 39, art 118.

¹⁶⁵ Burke, supra note 26 at 171.

¹⁶⁶ Canova & Pic, supra note 11.

¹⁶⁷ Trine Jonassen, “Russia Threatens to Withdraw from the Arctic Council,” High North News (14 February 2024), online: <www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-threatens-withdraw-arctic-council>; Evardsen, supra note 150.

¹⁶⁸ Jonassen, supra note 167.

¹⁶⁹ “Russia Says It Will Take Military-Technical Steps in Response to Sweden’s NATO Accession,” Reuters (28 February 2024), online: <www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-it-will-take-military-technical-steps-response-swedens-nato-2024-02-28/>.

¹⁷⁰ “One Year into the 2023–2025 Norwegian Chairship: A Q&A with SAO Chair Morten Høglund” (16 May 2024), online: Arctic Council <arctic-council.org/news/one-year-norwegian-chairship/>.

¹⁷¹ State Council Information Office, supra note 79; Rainwater, supra note 80.

¹⁷² Young, supra note 22.

¹⁷³ Van Langenhove, supra note 114 at 17.

¹⁷⁴ Kankaanapää & Young, supra note 152 at 12–13.

¹⁷⁵ Gonca Oguz Gok & Hakan Mehmetcik, ‘Global Governance and the Crises of Legitimacy: An Introduction’ in Oguz Gok & Mehmetcik, supra note 104, 1 at 1.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid at 3.

¹⁷⁷ Burke, supra note 26.