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Can Grid Governance Fix the Party-state's Broken Windows? A Study of Stability Maintenance in Grassroots China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 June 2022

Jianhua Xu Open the ORCID record for Jianhua Xu [Opens in a new window]  and
Siying He
Jianhua Xu*
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Macau, Macau SAR, China.
Siying He
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Macau, Macau SAR, China. Email: mb75625@connect.um.edu.mo.
*
Email: jianhuaxu@um.edu.mo (corresponding author).
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Abstract

Grid governance has been developed by the Chinese party-state to collect intelligence at the grassroots level for the early pre-emption of what it defines as social instability. Using data collected from four months’ participant observation and extensive interviews with personnel who work in the grid governance system in what we call W Street, a location in a second-tier city in southern China, this paper examines how China's grid governance is used for stability maintenance and how in practice the system has become alienated from its original purpose of social control. We find that grid governance is achieved mainly through three mechanisms: intelligence gathering, case coordination and real-time reporting for stability maintenance. We further reveal that while grid governance provides an important infrastructural power for intelligence gathering, the realization of this power could be hindered by contradictory logics among different levels of government. This research not only provides empirical data on how China's grid governance works in practice but also calls for a rethinking of the capacity of China's stability maintenance regime.

摘要

摘要

在中国，网格化治理被用于收集基层维稳信息从而进行及早干预。通过在中国南方某二线城市 w 街道进行为期四个月的参与式观察以及对网络化治理人员广泛访谈进行资料收集，本文探讨了网格化治理机制如何被运用于稳定维护以及这一制度在实践中如何被异化而减弱其社会控制的目标。研究发现，信息收集、案件协调和实时汇报构成网格化治理的三大机制。我们进一步揭示，虽然网格化治理给国家政权提供了强大的渗透性(基础性)权力，这一权力的实现却受阻于不同层级政府矛盾的运行逻辑。本研究一方面丰富了我们对于中国网格化治理的经验认知，另一方面也提醒我们重新审视中国维稳体制的能力。

Keywords

grid governancestability maintenanceinfrastructural power“broken windows”grassrootsChina关键词网格化治理维稳渗透性(基础性)权力破窗基层中国
Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 251 , September 2022 , pp. 843 - 865
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London

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