1 Chou had planned to visit those African countries that recognised China. The disturbances in East Africa in mid-January, however, forced him to modify his plans. In the end he visited ten countries. China had already exchanged diplomatic recognition with eight of these—the United Arab Republic (05 1956), Algeria (12 1958), Morocco (November 1958), Ghana (July 1960), Mali (October 1960), Guinea (October 1959), Sudan (February 1959), and Somalia (December 1960). Chou made a special visit to Tunisia to establish diplomatic relations. But because of the revolution in Zanzibar in January (China had recognised the overthrown government in December 1963) and the mutinies in Tanganyika (recognised December 1961), Uganda (October 1962) and Kenya (whose independence celebrations had been attended by the Chinese Foreign Minister in December 1963) Chou had to cross these countries off his visiting list. However, he did manage a face-saving visit to Ethiopia. On his seven-week tour Chou was accompanied by Marshal Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister, and an impressive entourage of more than fifty. It included K'ung Yuan, Deputy Director of the State Council's Office in Charge of Foreign Affairs; Huang Chen, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs (now Ambassador to France); Wang Yü-t'ien, Director of the West Asian and African Department of the Foreign Ministry; Kung P'eng, Director of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry; and Liu Hsi-wen, Director of the Asian and African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.Google Scholar

2 “All the World's Forces Opposing U.S. Imperialism, Unite!”, People's Daily, 01 21, 1964Google Scholar; Peking Review, No. 4, 1964.Google Scholar In his talks with a delegation of French Deputies, Mao said, “France, Germany, Italy, Britain—if she can cease to be America's agent—Japan and ourselves (China)—that is the third force.” L'Humanité, 02 21, 1964.Google Scholar Lack of space precludes discussion of this new “United Front” of China and France adumbrated by Mao and de Gaulle, an essential feature of which can already be seen to be the same sort of rivalry for influence in Africa, Latin America and Asia that had already marked the Sino-Soviet relationship; its ultimate purpose is to “transform” the other partner, by first gaining control of the “intermediate zone.” On French policy see the article by Vernant, J. in Politique Etrangere, No. 6, 1963.Google Scholar

3People's Daily-Red Flag editorial, 03 31, 1964. Peking Review, No. 14, 1964.Google Scholar

4 On “turning points” see The Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963)Google Scholar, p. 344. The passage from “The present situation and our tasks” deals with the “turning point from growth to extinction” for Chiang, after the People's Liberation Army had “turned back the wheel of counter-revolution.” The poems by Mao published this January, especially the last written in January 1963, indicate that a new turning point is at hand, like when Mao crossed the Yangtse in spite of “well-meaning” advice, no doubt from the Russians. See poems and article by Kuo, Mo-jo in Red Flag, No. 1, 1964: “Heaven and earth revolve; time presses … wipe out all harmful creatures until no enemy remains.”Google Scholar

5 The time has come when the term “Communist” has more emotive content than precise significance. The Chinese tend to use the term “Marxist-Leninists” to denote those revolutionaries of whom they approve, but such terms as “populists,” or “national-socialists” would be more accurate. The veteran Comintern agent M. N. Roy has pointed out that “Communism” in Asia is essentially the nationalism and racism of the educated middle class, which plays up the misery of the masses with the ambition of achieving dictatorial power. See Radical Humanist, 01 13 and 20, 1952. This is equally true of Africa and Latin America.Google Scholar

6Peking Review, No. 7, 1964.Google Scholar

7People's Daily, 02 7, 1964.Google Scholar

8 Describing Captain Kuo's methods of Socialist education, Peking Radio said on February 17 that vigorous bayonet practice was necessary to promote class hatred and show how to “eliminate our class enemy.”Google Scholar

9 Suslov's Report to the plenary meeting of the Soviet Central Committee, delivered on February 14, 1964, released 04 3, 1964. Soviet Booklets, II, No. 3 (London: 1964).Google Scholar

10 The Kenyan Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Oginga Odinga, expressed this idea all too clearly during his visit to Peking in May 1964. He called for a general war, “I repeat, war,” against the present South African régime and said, “Comrades, the war in Africa needs your help” This passage was censored by NCNA. The Chinese have recently disbursed large sums in the hope of securing a foothold in such places as Basutoland, which offer opportunities for operations against South Africa. At a Peking rally in April, Mao Tse-tung hailed the armed rising in Pondoland and predicted the outbreak of violent revolution in South Africa with great vehemence (NCNA, April 1964).Google Scholar

11 Mao observed in On Practice (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p. 8: “if you want to acquire knowledge you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it as food.” This is reminiscent of Plekhanov's remark that Lenin “desires unity the way a man desires unity with a piece of bread.”Google Scholar

12Bulletin of Activities, No. 17, 1961.Google Scholar Several other articles in the Bulletin show China's particular interest in the Congo, and its resources: compare with the articles on Africa in Peking Review, No. 27, 07 5, 1960Google Scholar, No. 2, January 10, 1964, and No. 16, April 5, 1964. I have discussed China's plans for the Congo in my article on “China and Africa Today” Race, 04 1964.Google Scholar

13 At present China's willingness to spend money and provide means of transport, guerilla training, propaganda media, etc., even to the most reactionary elements, has the effect of making it easier for opportunists to exploit the new cold war than the old. It forces the Russians or others to go in where otherwise they might have held back (Somalia, for instance). Then they are in, not China; but confusion increases.Google Scholar

14People's Daily–Red Flag joint editorial, 03 31, 1964.Google Scholar

15 On the problems raised by the vague and different meanings attached to political terms see my article on “The Study of Chinese Politics” in Political Studies, 02 1964. Such problems deserve greater attention, if later accusations of bad faith between China and the nations it deals with are to be avoided.Google Scholar

16People's Daily, 02 6, 1964.Google Scholar

17 On the euphoria of the “Hindi-Chini Bhai-bhai” period see Karnik, V. B. (Ed.), China Invades India (Bombay: Allied publishers, 1963), p. 157ff.Google Scholar

18 The Chinese contend that their minority view really represents the will of the majority, “including those whose consciousness has not yet been aroused.” See People's Daily–Red Flag joint editorial, No. VII, 02 2, 1964. This idea of retrospective justification by a future majority was denounced by Lenin in a polemic against Plekhanov and Trotsky (see Suslov, loc. cit., p. 72). Such logic can only be refuted by “life itself.”Google Scholar

19 It has published material critical of the Algerian Government and its tone suggests that most existing African régimes need to be overthrown by a second revolution like that in Zanzibar, whose Foreign Minister “Babu” is on the magazine's editorial board. “In no former colony is any lasting solution conceivable without completely overturning social and economic structures”—Vergès in Vol. 1, No. 9, on “The People's Victory in Zanzibar.” Though it claims to incorporate the original Algerian-inspired Révolution Africaine, Algerians say that all ties have been severed since Vergès insisted on basing his line on Chinese and Cuban experience, rather than on Ben Bella's ideas.Google ScholarWhile Chou was in Algeria he had a long interview with Colonel Boumedienne, Chief of the Army, and the Army paper El Djeish published a long article on the Chinese method of “Land Reform” (controlled social revolution in an agrarian society). On March 7 changes in the military structure of the country were announced, which had the effect of removing control of the Army from Col. Boumedienne and putting it directly under the President (France Observateur, 03 12, 1964). Subsequently, Ben Bella has indicated that Soviet aid will enable him to maintain control.Google Scholar

20 President Bourguiba's speech at a reception in honour of Chou En-lai, B.B.C.'s Summary of World Broadcasts/ME/1450.Google Scholar

21Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, 04 3, 1964.Google Scholar

22Nkrumah, K., Consciencism (London: Heinemann, 1964).Google Scholar

23Horoya, 12 26, 1962. The version in Keita's own paper L'Essor, 12 22, 1962, omits this passage.Google Scholar

24 The eight points included mutual benefit and respect for sovereignty (no strings), interest free loans, help for self-reliance, selection of projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, the use of best quality equipment at international market prices, and the assurance that Chinese experts would enjoy the same living standards as the experts of the country they were sent to help. All these points reflect China's experience of Soviet aid.Google Scholar

25Ronald, Segal, African Profiles (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), p. 314.Google Scholar

26Tang, Tsou, America's Failure in China (Chicago: Chicago Univ., 1963), p. 218.Google Scholar