Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 August 2014
This article investigates a prominent but little discussed CCP central organ, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), and its local discipline inspection commissions (DICs) in the post-Mao era. It analyses how the CCP exerts its control over the disciplinary organizations and argues that the disciplinary agencies' lack of autonomy hinders their efforts to crack down on corruption. This article investigates the important role played by the CDIC in CCP politics by examining its organizational structure, modes of operation and criteria for imposing disciplinary sanctions, and evaluates the measures and approaches employed by the Party's disciplinary organizations to combat corruption. The study concludes that structural, institutional and cultural factors hinder the effectiveness of the CCP's disciplinary agencies in their efforts to control Party members, officials and corruption.
本文主旨在于探索改革开放时期位高权重的中国共产党纪律检查系统。通过分析党对纪检系统的控制, 文章指出缺乏独立的纪检系统和反腐败监督机制就是改革开放时期反腐效果始终不彰的根源。透过对中纪委的组织机构, 操作原则, 纪律处分规范和标准, 以及反腐措施和手段的分析和评估, 它详细诠释和分析了中纪委在中国政治运作中所扮演的举足轻重的角色。然而, 结构性和体制上的因素, 以及传统文化根深蒂固的影响, 制约了党的纪检机构有效地约束它的党员和干部以及惩贪反腐的运动和努力。
Research for this article was supported by Adrienne Israel, the academic dean, and the Clerk's Committee at Guilford College. I would like to thank Richie Zweigenhalft and two anonymous CQ reviewers for helpful comments and criticisms. I also wish to express my thanks to Joanne Phillips for her help during the editing process and Haejin Song, my research assistant, for her assistance. I am solely responsible for any errors that remain.
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