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Who Commands the Gun? Mobilization and Use of China's Armed Police

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2022

Joel Wuthnow*
Affiliation:
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, US National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA
*
Corresponding author: Joel Wuthnow, email: joel.wuthnow.civ@ndu.edu

Abstract

Recent reforms to China's People's Armed Police have changed the balance of authority between central and local officials, continuing a pattern of reduced local control and granting more authority to Xi Jinping in his role as Central Military Commission chairman. The new system, however, attempts to balance central control with provisions that allow local officials down to the prefecture level to take command in some circumstances. This system intends to allow for rapid mobilization in cases of social unrest or natural disasters, although a review of emergency response plans and other Chinese sources indicates uneven implementation. The risk is that centralization could slow emergency response, although the effects will depend on the nature of civil–military coordination at different levels. The paper describes new legal authorities, assesses implementation and challenges, and reaches conclusions about the implications for Chinese political control and emergency response.

摘要

摘要

中国人民武装警察部队最近的改革改变了中央和地方官员之间的权力平衡,继续减少地方控制的模式,并赋予习近平作为中央军委主席的更多权力。然而,新制度试图在中央控制与允许地方官员在某些情况下至地级的规定之间取得平衡。该系统旨在允许在社会动荡或自然灾害的情况下迅速动员,尽管对应急预算和其他中国消息来源的审查表明实施不平衡。风险在于集中化可能会减缓应急处置效力,尽管其影响将取决于不同级别的军民协调的性质。该文件描述了新的法律权威,评估了实施和挑战,并得出了对中国政治控制和应急处置的影响的结论。

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London

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