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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Nationalist China's diplomatic relations were in shambles as the disastrous year of 1949 came to a close. Major cities in southern China were falling rapidly to the Communists, Mao Tse-tung had arrived in Moscow on his triumphal trip and Chiang Kai-shek had fled to Formosa in bitter defeat. Only seven nations had established permanent missions in Formosa. Meanwhile, on the mainland a diplomatic never-never land existed; there were diplomats accredited to Peking, “negotiating representatives,” and ex-diplomats (in Chinese Communist eyes) whose countries had not recognised Peking.
1 For an interesting description of this situation, see Panikkar, K. M., In Two Chinas (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955), especially Chaps. IV and VIII.Google Scholar
2 China Handbook 1955–56 (Taipei: Chiaa Publishing Co., 1955), p. 839.Google Scholar
3 “Taipei's Conduct of Diplomacy,” Richard L. Walker, unpublished, 12 pp., p. 3Google Scholar. “Missions” include embassies, legations, consulates-general, consulates, delegations, and liaison offices.
4 China News Service, New York, 09 20, 1960.Google Scholar
5 A suggestive illustration of this situation occurred in the autumn of 1961 when Mr. Cyrus Eaton wrote to the editor of the New York Times that 71 nations had diplomatic relations with Peking. Though he was 30-odd countries over the mark, the Times did not see fit to add an editorial note. See the New York Times Sunday Magazine, 10 8, 1961.Google Scholar
6 Despite the opening of diplomatic relations, Cyprus did not support Formosa in the 1960–63 U.N. votes, but abstained each time.
7 The writer is not in a position to remark on the day-to-day efficiency of Formosa's present ambassadors abroad. Based on somewhat incomplete information, however, two facts stand out. First, almost every man has had a long background in diplomatic work, ranging up to about 30 years. Secondly, the level of education is extraordinary. The overwhelming majority are college trained (more often than not abroad), many have done graduate work, and about a third hold Ph.D. degrees. In terms of education and diplomatic experience, Formosa's diplomats appear to be considerably more suited for their tasks than their counterparts from Peking. (For a discussion of Peking's diplomats, see my “Peking's Evolving Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” The China Quarterly, No. 4, 10–12 1960).Google Scholar
The only real diplomatic fiasco known to the writer occurred in 1961 when ex-warlord Ma Pu-fang was involved in a scandal in Saudi Arabia, where he was serving as Ambassador. He was quickly whisked away by the Nationalists. Another relatively minor incident in Australia in 1962 evoked harsh comment from a San Francisco Chinese-American newspaper not particularly friendly to the Nationalists. Though the charges were rather vague, the Chinese World (04 18, 1962)Google Scholar editorially alluded to the “… inefficiency of many of the Kuomintang diplomatic officials now being assigned …” abroad.
8 On the eve of Peking, 's 10th anniversary (10 1, 1959)Google Scholar, a Syrian Communist visiting Communist China delivered a speech denouncing Nasser. Cairo objected violently and there were rumours of a pending diplomatic break. After a month of hesitation, the Chinese came forth with the lame excuse that the speech was delivered at the invitation of the Party rather than the Chinese government. Cairo accepted this, and relations gradually improved. See the New York Times, 10 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13 and 26, 1959.Google Scholar
9 On the grounds that Syria was actually readmitted to the U.N. in 1961, it is not included in this calculation.
10 Although the Congo (Leopoldville) was among the 17 nations newly admitted to the United Nations in 1960, it abstained from the “China vote” of that year.
11 In addition to the embassies and legations in national capitals, Formosa has about 25 consulates-general or consulates in the U.S., Brazil, Canada, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, Tahiti, Japan, Mexico and Timor, plus its U.N. mission and a special liaison office in Macao.
12 Latin America provides a good area case study of this growth. In 1952 Formosa had five embassies, seven legations, and two consulates-general; by early 1963, 16 embassies and three legations.
13 The intention to establish an embassy in Chad, “soon” was reported in the official Chinese News Service, New York, 01 23, 1962.Google Scholar
14 Peking has only two concurrent heads of mission; Ch'en Chia-k'ang is ambassador to the U.A.R. and the Yemen, and Ho Ying is ambassador to both Tanganyika and Uganda. In addition, Peking (aside from missions in national capitals) has eight consulates-general or consulates in Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Poland, Switzerland and Vietnam.
15 Toward the end of 1962, eight heads of missions resided outside of Taipei. The writer has not been able to determine whether two recently arrived ambassadors will reside in Taipei or elsewhere. It should also be noted that Great Britain has a Consulate, technically accredited to the province of Formosa, but which can more realistically be considered the British “embassy” in Nationalist China.
16 Technically, Algeria has a “diplomatic mission” in Peking, but apparently at the ambassadorial level—the same level at which the Chinese envoy is accredited in Algiers. All of the heads of missions in Peking reside there, although a small number are concurrently accredited to Mongolia. In addition to the missions in Peking, the following nations have one or more consulates-general or consulates in various cities (mainly Shanghai and Canton): Burma, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, East Germany, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Switzerland and Great Britain. (The British office in Shanghai is actually a branch office of the Office of the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking.) Although it has not been mentioned in the Chinese Communist press, apparently reliable reports claim that the four Soviet consulates-general and consulates in Shanghai, Harbin, Urumchi and Ining were closed in the autumn of 1962. See the New York Times (international edition), 11 30, 1962.Google Scholar
17 Although official Nationalist sources continue to list Austria as a country recognising neither China, the writer has in his possession a letter dated April 15, 1961, from the Austrian Embassy in Washington stating that diplomatic relations “do exist in the form of co-accreditation of Austria's Ambassador to Japan” with the Nationalist Chinese regime.
18 The Hong Kong Tiger Standard, 07 17, 1963Google Scholar, reported that the Nationalists will “soon establish” diplomatic relations with the Ivory Coast and Niger.
