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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Formosa has the unenviable distinction of having proportionally more men under arms than any other country. With resources and manpower being poured into keeping approximately 600,000 men in readiness for an eventual return to the mainland the military presence inevitably pervades Formosan life. Military needs conflict with personal freedom and restrain economic growth. Yet for all the efforts of the Nationalist government—sustained by huge amounts of American aid—the changing international scene and difficulties within the Nationalist forces make a return to the mainland less likely as time goes by.
1 The Chinese Nationalists exercise rigorous security on military information. Nevertheless independent estimates show surprising consistency.
2 China Yearbook 1961–62 (Taipei: China Publishing Company), p. 221Google Scholar, hereafter cited as CY.
3 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives' Commitee on Foreign Affairs, Judd, Walter, Report on a Special Study Mission to Southeast Asia and the Pacific (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 9.Google Scholar There are reported to be a number of quasi-legal institutions for political indoctrination that are presumed to receive financial support in the classified military budget. “Wo-men te chün-shih” (“Our Military”) in Tzu-yu Chung-kuo (Free China) XVII, No. 4 (1957) 3–4.Google Scholar
4 There is considerable discussion about the existence of personal cliques in the armed forces, centred on General Chiang Ching-kuo. For an alleged description of this problem see Sun Chia-ch'i, Chiang Ching-kuo Chien-kuo Nei-mu (The Inside Story of Chiang Ching-kuo's Seizure of Power) (Hong Kong: Tzu-li Chu-pan-she, 1961).Google Scholar
5 Bailamme, Joseph W., Formosa: A Problem for V.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1952), 218 pp.Google Scholar, for a discussion of the early phases of this programme.
6 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Chavez, Dennis, Report on United States Military Operations and Mutual Security Programs OverseasGoogle Scholar (86th Congress, Second Session), Committee print (hereafter referred to as the Chavez Report), p. 45.Google Scholar
7 Chavez Report, p. 46.Google Scholar This estimate was for 1959.
8 Barnett, , Doak, A., Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960), p. 403.Google Scholar
9 Boei Nenkan 1962 (Defence Yearbook 1962) (Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kankokai, 1962), pp. 431–433. Hereafter cited as BN.Google Scholar
10 London Institute for Strategic Studies, The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliance (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1962, p. 23).Google Scholar
11 BN, 1955, p. 417.Google ScholarBN gives a figure of 12,000 for a Chinese Nationalist division. The New York Times for the same year (August 29, 1955, p. 3) gives the figure as 11,200.
12 BN, 1955Google Scholar, refers to these units as remnants of warlord forces. Their existence is confirmed in the U.S. Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Mutual Security Act of 1959, p. 141.Google Scholar The precise figures are deleted.
13 For an official description of the plan see CY 1960–1961, pp. 225–226.Google Scholar See also K'uang-hua, Ting, “Tzu-yu Chung-kuo te chin-pu yu fan-yung” (“Progress and Prosperity of Free China”) in Tzu-yu Tai-p'ing-yang (Free Pacific), VI, No. 1 (01 1962), pp. 9–14.Google Scholar
14 U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Mutual Security Act of 1959, p. 359.Google Scholar
15 BN, 1962, p. 433.Google Scholar
16 Besides the Army field commands there is the Formosa Garrison Command whose major task is to deal with subversion. This was set up in 1958 to replace the Formosa Defence Command, the Taipei Garrison Command, the Provincial Peace and Preservation Command and the Civil Defence Command. China News Service, Free China Weekly (05 20, 1958), p. 3Google Scholar; hereafter cited as CNS.
17 BN, 1955, p. 417.Google Scholar
18 NYT (08 28, 1958), p. 1.Google ScholarBarnett, , op. cit. p. 403.Google Scholar
19 Tang-ch'ien fei wo ch'ing-shih fen-hsi (An Analysis of the Rebels and Our Present Situation) (Taipei: Hsing-cheng yuan, hsin-wen chü, 1962), p. 27.Google Scholar
20 BN, 1955, p. 417.Google ScholarBN, 1958, p. 486.Google ScholarBN, 1962, p. 432.Google Scholar
21 Chavez Report, p. 46.Google ScholarBN, 1962, p. 432.Google Scholar
22 Compare BN, 1955, p. 417Google Scholar; BN, 1957, p. 464Google Scholar; 1962, p. 432.Google Scholar
23 NYT (07 6, 1955), p. 7.Google ScholarBN, 1955, p. 417.Google Scholar
24 An Analysis of the Rebels and Our Present Situation, p. 28.Google Scholar The London Institute for Strategic Studies reports the presence of Sidewinder missiles on Nationalist jet aircraft.
25 Cy 1961–62, p. 226.Google Scholar
26 CNS (04 29, 1958), p. 3Google Scholar; (December 12, 1960), p. 2; (May 2, 1963), p. 3.
27 CNS (04 15, 1952), p. 3.Google Scholar
28 CNS (06 17, 1958), p. 2.Google Scholar
29 CNS (08 17, 1954), p. 1.Google Scholar
30 CNS (03 29, 1955), p. 2.Google Scholar
31 CNS (01 10, 1956), p. 3.Google Scholar
32 The development of facilities and programmes for advanced training and research are a particularly noticeable feature of the Nationalists' military education programme. See comments in the People's Daily (Jen-nan Jih-pao) (07 3, 1962), p. 3Google Scholar, and An Analysis of the Rebels and Our Present Situation, p. 28.Google Scholar
33 Yun-t'ien, Chiang, “Shih-nien lai tzu-yu Chung kuo te chu-shih tsai-cheng chiao-yü yü wai-chiao” (“Military Affairs, Finance, Education, and Foreign Relations of Free China in the Past Ten Years”) Tsu-kuo (China Weekly), XL, No. 2, p. 27.Google Scholar
34 Che, Meng, “Fan-kung fu-kuo wen-t'i” (“Problems of the Recovery of the Mainland”), Tzu-yu Tai-ping-yang (Free Pacific) (03 1962), pp. 9–10.Google Scholar
