¹ The nations with which Peking has established diplomatic relations are: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, East Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, North Korea, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, the Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S.S.R., the U.A.R., the U.K., North Vietnam, the Yemen, and Yugoslavia. All are at the ambassadorial level with the exception of the Yemen (legation) and the Netherlands and the U.K. (both offices of the chargé d'affaires). Since shortly after the Chinese charged Belgrade with “revisionism” in 1958, Peking has had no ambassador in Yugoslavia (considered as a bloc nation in this essay). In addition, Peking has at least 10 consulates-general or consulates in cities other than national capitals. The Chinese also maintain diplomatic relations of a sort with the “Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.” The New York Times (07 8, 1960)Google Scholar reported from Tunisia that “Algeria” “… confirmed … that it was naming a permanent representative … to reside …” in Peking. To date, Peking has not appointed an “ambassador.” In all likelihood, “Algerian affairs” are conducted by the embassy in Cairo, where a long-time intimate of Chou En-lai (Ch'en Chia-k'ang) is ambassador.

² The writer is indebted for this information to a Westerner (who prefers to remain anonymous) resident in Peking in those early days.

³ For example, Chou made a number of the major pronouncements during the Lebanese crisis of 1958, the Quemoy flare-up of the same year, and the Tibetan affair of 1959—all important events post-dating Chou's resignation. Chou has conferred with Nehru this year, and almost certainly will represent Peking at a “summit” meeting if and when the Chinese participate. His relationship with Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi seems quite similar to that of Adenauer and von Brentano.

⁴ The full Central Committee member is Liu Hsiao, ambassador to the U.S.S.R.; the three alternates are: Vice-Foreign Ministers Chang Han-fu and Lo Kuei-po, and ambassador to India P'an Tzu-li.

⁵ U.S. Admiral C. Turner Joy, one of the few Americans who has negotiated with the Chinese Communists in the post-1949 era, has commented as follows: “Force of intellect is the primary consideration. Reputation, rank, and position are of secondary consideration to the Communists in choosing the members of their delegation.” See How Communists Negotiate (New York: 1955), p. 10.Google Scholar

⁶ The dearth of high-ranking C.C.P. figures notwithstanding, one searches in vain for any influential non-Party persons in the M.F.A. A number of ex-K.M.T. diplomats are known to have returned to the mainland, and are probably utilised in non-sensitive posts such as translation work.

⁷ See, for example, the remarks of Clark, Gerald in Impatient Giant: Red China Today (New York: 1959), p. 29.Google Scholar

⁸ In addition, Ch'en attended the 19th C.P.S.U. Congress in Moscow in 1952 under Liu Shao-ch'i and led a delegation to the celebrations of the East German régime's fifth anniversary in 1954. One of his few earlier statements on foreign policy came at the Eighth Party Congress in Sept. 1956.

⁹ In addition to the present five, another five men have served as Vice-Foreign Ministers. They are: Chang Wen-t'ien, former ambassador to the U.S.S.R., who was dismissed in Sept. 1959; Wang Chia-hsiang, Peking's first ambassador to Moscow, also dismissed in Sept. 1959, but who has since made numerous appearances on occasions when foreign Communists have visited Peking; Li K'o-nung, relieved in 1954 and now a ranking military figure; Wu Hsiu-ch'üan, leader of the Chinese delegation to the U.M. in 1950 and ex-ambassador to Yugoslavia (1955–58), who has (much like Wang Chia-hsiang) been very active in contacts with visiting foreign Communist Party figures; and Yüan Chung-hsien, who died in 1957 after serving for over five years as ambassador to India. Note that the first four easily rank above the present Vice-Foreign Ministers in Party stature—another indication of the trend of using fewer senior Party members in the M.F.A.

¹⁰ Chang has been a Vice-Foreign Minister since the government was established in the autumn of 1949.

¹¹ The dates from which Chi P'eng-fei, Tseng Yung-ch'üan, Lo Kuei-po, and Keng Piao have been Vice-Foreign Ministers are Jan. 31, 1955, June 18, 1957, Oct. 18, 1957, and Jan. 7, 1960, respectively.

¹² The periods during which Keng was Minister to Denmark and Finland were partially concurrent with his tour in Stockholm where he resided.

¹³ There are also three former Assistant-Ministers: Wang Ping-nan, who held the post briefly in 1954–55 before going to Poland in 1955 as ambassador; Ch'en Chia-k'ang, now ambassador to the U.A.R. and Minister to the Yemen; and Ho Wei, currently ambassador to North Vietnam.

¹⁴ The dates from which Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Liu Ying, Han Nien-Iung, and Liu Hsin- ch'üan have been Assistant-Ministers are Oct. 31, 1954, Jan. 31, 1955, Nov. 21, 1958 and Apr. 29, 1960, respectively.

¹⁵ For several years prior to 1955, Ch'iao headed the Translation Committee of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁶ The other area divisions are: U.S.S.R. and East European, West Asian and African, American and Australian, First Asian, and Second Asian. For a period in 1958, the U.S.S.R. and East European Affairs Division was known as the Socialist States Affairs Division. Before the autumn of 1956, the West European Affairs Division was known as the West European and African Affairs Division; at that time the West Asian and African Affairs Division was created, a reflection of Peking's growing interest in the Middle East In 1955, the Asian Affairs Division was divided into the First and Second Divisions. Reamalgamated in the same year, it was again split over the 1958–59 winter. The First Asian Division deals with non-Communist nations; the Second with Communist Asian countries.

¹⁷ The six known non-area divisions or offices are: International Affairs, Information, Treaty and Law, Protocol, Consular, and the General Office. In the early days of the régime there was also a Foreign Policy Committee and a Personnel Division. However, nothing has been heard of these organs for several years; presumably they have been absorbed by one of the other divisions. In addition, there are almost certainly other divisions (e.g., security and intelligence) which receive no publicity.

¹⁸ This is based on an analysis of 35-odd persons currently believed to be either a director or a deputy-director of one of the divisions.

¹⁹ It is a rare occasion when Central Committee member Liao is not on hand for Japanese visiting Peking, particularly when they are given an “audience” with Mao or Chou. In addition to a Japanese higher education, Liao has been to Japan twice in recent years, once in 1955 and again in 1957–58. In neither case was he the titular leader of these Red Cross missions (sic!), but observers in Tokyo had little doubt that he was the actual head. He is the son of the famed Liao Chung-k'ai.

²⁰ In similar fashion, the less publicised aspects of intra-bloc government affairs tend to be handled by missions to and from China. Some of these affairs—such as scientific-technological co-operation—are now so institutionalised as to call for permanent bodies which meet annually. There are, in addition, Party channels which handle those affairs descending from Comintern/Cominfonn days. In the military sphere, a Warsaw Pact meeting will always bring forth an important mission from China. (K'ang Sheng is the most recent of highly influential Peking leaders to attend a Warsaw Pact meeting—in Feb. 1960.)

²¹ That the bloc at least partially serves as a testing ground is borne out by an examination of the subsequent careers of 28 men who have completed an ambas sadorial tour abroad. Slightly less than half of those formerly in a Communist nation were “rejected” for further diplomatic service. By contrast, nine out of the 11 former ambassadors outside the bloc continued their careers in the Foreign Ministry or closely related posts. (One man, Wang Yu-p'ing, was excluded from this compilation because he had served as ambassador to both a Communist and non-Communist nation.)

²² On the surface, Central Committeeman Liu Hsiao, ambassador in Moscow, might seem to be another exception. However, his experience prior to his present assignment was limited to Party affairs. Nor do other elements in his background suggest any pertinent diplomatic qualifications. One reliable foreign correspondent told this writer that the Russians have little regard for Liu. Interestingly, he is the only full member of the Central Committee in a diplomatic post. (Liu was an alternate member when he went to Moscow in 1955, but was subsequently promoted to full membership in Sept. 1956.)

²³ This figure excludes the Yemen, the affairs of which are handled by the embassy in Cairo. The term “ambassador” is used here in a non-technical sense and includes the chargé d'affaires in both the U.K. and the Netherlands.

²⁴ An example of the last-mentioned category is Huan Hsiang, the well-educated chargé in London. Before going to London in late 1954, he headed the West European and African Affairs Division of the M.F.A. for five years.

²⁵ There appear to be commercial attachés in all non-Communist nations except in Iraq and in the recently established missions in Guinea and Ghana.

²⁶ There appear to be cultural attachés in all non-Communist countries except Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, Norway, Morocco, the Sudan and the Yemen.

²⁷ Military attachés are only stationed in the following: Burma, Denmark, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.A.R.

²⁸ This policy seems to have backfired in London recently with the defection from the Chinese embassy of a cook—apparently due to over-work and over-indoctrination. (New York Herald Tribune, 04 7, 1960.)Google Scholar

²⁹ How much time is devoted to reporting on the country concerned is an open question. It would be especially interesting to know if the reporting is generally accurate or, à la the Nazi diplomats (as revealed after the Second World War), coloured to fit dogma.

³⁰ A host of other mass organisations also play a significant role in Peking's complex diplomatic procedures. An interesting study could be made, for example, of the diplomatic aspects of the Chinese Red Cross Society in its relations with Japan. Using repatriation as a lever, this society has for several years maintained high-level contacts in Japan. It is certainly no coincidence that Liao Ch'eng-chih serves as an “adviser” to this organisation.

³¹ For example, Chi Ch'ao-ting (an economist with a Ph.D. from Columbia University) has been active for the past two years in the “Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Co-operation.” Logically, Chi was a member of the Chinese delegation to the Second Afro-Asia Peoples' Solidarity Conference held in Conakry, Guinea, in April 1960.

³² So far as is known, Liu is the first Central Committee member to have visited Latin America since the Communists came to power.