Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
In the 23rd book of the Iliad, Menelaus loses second place in the chariot race because of a manoeuvre by Antilochus. So, after Antilochus claims the second prize as his and dares others to fight him for it with their fists, Menelaus rises before the assembled heroes, sceptre in hand, to initiate a formal proceeding against him (571ff.). First he makes the charge: Antilochus has insulted his aretē and endangered his horses. He then calls upon the leaders of the Argives to judge fairly between them. But at this point he states that he will judge the case himself – in both instances the verb for ‘to judge’ is δικάζειν. He then calls on Antilochus to follow an involved procedure and finally to swear an oath that in running the race he did not purposefully use a trick. But despite the fact that Menelaus said during the race that Antilochus would not take the prize without swearing an oath (23.411), we do not know later what the result might be if Antilochus were to accept Menelaus' challenge and to swear the oath. Homer has him sidestep the challenge and concede the prize.
1 Thür, G., ‘Zum δικáζειν bei Homer’, ZSStRom 87 (1970), 426–44Google Scholar and ‘Zum δικáζειν im Urteil aus Mantineia’, Symposion 1985 (1989), 55–69Google Scholar, argues convincingly that Menelaus is taking on the role of a judge and, by calling upon Antilochus to swear the oath, is proposing a means of settling the dispute.
2 See also Theognis 1.199–203 and 1139–43, Sophocles, Ant. 264 and Antiphon the Sophist. DK6 F44 col. 5.8–13.
3 See MacDowell, D. M., Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester, 1963), pp. 90–100.Google Scholar
4 Lipsius, J., Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren (Leipzig, 1905–1915), pp. 895–900Google Scholar, and Harrison, A. R. W., The Law in Athens, ii (Oxford, 1972), pp. 150–3Google Scholar. Cp. Bonner, R. J., Evidence in Athenian Courts (Chicago, 1905), pp. 67–9 and 74–9Google Scholar, who anticipates some of the views expressed in this paper. The discussion of G. Glotz is helpful in Dar.-Saglio, s.v. proklésis. Cp. also now Gagarin, M., ‘The Nature of Proofs in Antiphon’, CP 85 (1990), 22–32.Google Scholar
6 Thür, G., Beweisführung vor den Schwurgerichtshöfen Athens. Die proklesis zur basanos (Vienna, 1977), pp. 205–7.Google Scholar
8 Thür, op. cit., see note 1.
9 Elsewhere in Demosthenes, although the challenge referred to is for the interrogation of a slave, the phrase is the same: Demosthenes says ‘I called on him to be judge of his own case’ (30.2, 30, 36f.). See also Antiphon 1.12 and G. Thür, op. cit., note 5, pp. 265–6. Interestingly, Demosthenes also employs the topos suggested by Aristotle (1377a14), according to which the danger (κίνδυνος) before the judges is greater (30.2).
10 Harrison, op. cit., p. 152.
11 Cary, C. and Reid, R. A., Demosthenes. Select Private Speeches (Cambridge, 1985), p. 102.Google Scholar
12 Thür, op. cit., note 5, pp. 74–82.
13 Thür, ibid., pp. 61–2, points out that within the context of the basanos-challenge expressions of ‘willingness’ or ‘readiness’ are significative of a challenge.
15 Harrison, op. cit., p. 150.
16 See my article, note 7 above.
17 Previous versions of this paper have been read by J. Cargill, M. Ostwald and E. Carawan and to the Classical Association of Canada in May, 1990, all of whom I wish to thank, while taking responsibility myself for any remaining errors. Likewise, I thank the anonymous referee for CQ for his critical comments and suggestions.