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Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato: some Parallels*

  • R. W. Sharples (a1)
Abstract

As was first pointed out by Gercke, there are close parallels, which clearly suggest a common source, between Apuleius, de Platone 1.12, the treatise On Fate falsely attributed to Plutarch, Calcidius' excursus on fate in his commentary on Plato's Timaeus, and certain sections of the treatise de Natura hominis by Nemesius. Gercke traced the doctrines common to these works to the school of Gaius; recently however Dillon has pointed out that, while Albinus shares with these works the characteristic Middle-Platonic notion of fate as conditional or hypothetical – our actions are free, but once we have acted the consequences of our actions are fated and inevitable – he does not share certain other common features, such as the identification of fate as substance with the world-soul and the hierarchy of three providences.

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1 Gercke A., ‘Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus’, Rb.Mus. 41 (1886), 266–91.

2 Cited according to the edition of Thomas P., Apuleius: tres de pbilosophia libri (Stuttgart, Teubner, 1970, reprint of edition of 1908–21).

3 Plutarch, Moralia 568 b-574 f; henceforth simply ‘pseudo-Plutarch’. Cf. the commentaries of de Lacy P. H. and Einarson B. (Plutarch, Moralia, Loeb vol. 7, 1959) and of Valgiglio E. (Pseudo-Plutarco De Fato, Rome, 1964).

4 Chs. cxlii-cxc; cited according to the edition of Waszink J. H., Timaeus: Calcidius. Plato Latinus IV, (London-Leiden, 1962).Cf. especially den Boeft J., Calcidius on fate: his doctrine and sources. Pbilosophia antiqua 18, (Leiden, 1970).

5 xxxiv. 740 b-741 a, xxxviii 743 b-756 b, and xliv 796 a. References to Nemesius are by column number of Patrologia Graeca vol. 40, ed. Migne J.-P., (Paris, 1863).

6 (Above, n. 1), p. 279; cf. Theiler W., ‘Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre’, Pbyllobolia für P. von der Mühll (Basel, 1946), p. 71, and den Boeft (above, n. 4), p. 10. (Theiler's essay was reprinted in his Forscbungen zur Neuplatonismus, Berlin, 1966, pp. 46103; references are to the 1946 edition). In his edition of Calcidius Waszink argued that the common source was Numenius (pp. lviii f., cf. lxi f.), but in his Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius i. Pbilosophia antiqua 12 (Leiden, 1964), p. 22, n. 2, he changed his position to agree with Theiler as far as the source of chs. cxlii-clix was concerned. Cf. also den Boeft, p. 129.

7 Dillon J. M., The Middle Platonists (London, 1977), pp. 294 ff., 320, 337 f.

8 Albinus, Didasc. xxvi. 179. 7 ff. (cited from the edition by Hermann C. F. in Platonis Dialogi vol. vi, Leipzig, Teubner, 1902). Cf. pseudo-Plutarch 570 a ff., Calcidius cl. 186. 13 ff., Nemesius xxxviii 765 ab; Gercke (above, n. 1), pp. 273 f., 278 f., Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 67–82, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 294–7, 321–3, 413. Cf. also Nemesius xxxvii 749 b, taken as a reference to the Stoics by Telfer W., Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa. Library of Christian Classics, 4 (London and Philadelphia, 1955), p. 404, but as a reference to Platonist doctrine by Theiler, op. cit., p. 79 (but cf. n.l) and by Amand D. (Amand de Mendieta E.), Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque (Amsterdam, 1973; reprint of Univ. de Louvain, Rec. de travaux d'bist. et de pbilol., 3rd ser., fasc. 19, 1945), p. 565. Cf. below, n. 31.

9 Pseudo-Plutarch 568 e, Calcidius cxliv. 182. 16 ff., Nemesius xxxviii 753 b. Gercke (above n. 1), p. 270, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 296, 321 f.

10 Apuleius, de Plat. 1.12 96.2 ff., pseudo-Plutarch 572 ff., Nemesius xliv 793 b; not in Calcidius (but cf. Waszink's notes in his edition on 184.13 and 206.14–18, and id. in Porphyre (Entretiens Hardt 12, 1965) 66). Gercke (above, n. 1), pp. 285 ff.; den Boeft (above, n.4), pp. 15 f.; Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 323–6.

11 Cod. Par. gr. 1962 fo. 146V; Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 70 and n. 2, Dillon, p. 267, cf. p. 308.

12 Dillon, locc. citt. in n. 7. At pp. 404–7 Dillon tentatively suggests that the source (his ‘S’) for those features in Calcidius that do not derive from Adrastus may be Numenius' associate Cronius.

13 Plato, Republic 617 e,Phaedrus 248 c (cf. pseudo-Plutarch 568 cd, Calcidius clii. 187.20, cliv. 189.4, Nemesius xxxviii 753 b, 756 b); also Plato, Laws 903 d ff. (However, the Middle-Platonists transfer to the conse quences of choices made in this earthly life Plato's remarks concerning choices made by the soul outside this life.) Cf. Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 67–82, and den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 30–4.

14 Cf., in general, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 337 f.

15 i.e. Nemesius and Calcidius (though the latter might indeed be regarded as a Middle Platonist in spite of his later date); cf. Dillon, pp. 401 ff., and below nn. 197–202 on Calcidius' sources.

16 Cited according to the edition of Bruns I., Supplementum Aristotelicum II. ii (Berlin, 1892). I am currently preparing a translation of and commentary on this work.

17 Witt R. E., Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge, 1937), p. 86 (Alexander and Albinus);Todd R. B., Alexander of Apbrodisias on Stoic Physics. Philosophiaantiqua 28 (Leiden, 1976), 16 f., n. 78 (the same); Switalski B. W., ‘Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato's Timaeus’, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, ed. Baeumker C. and von Herding G. F., 3.6 Mü;nster, 1902), 94–6 (Alexander and Calcidius); Theiler (above, n. 6) pp.65 f. and 66, n. 4 (Alexander, Calcidius, and Nemesius).

18 Long A. A., ‘Stoic Determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias de fato (I-XIV)’, Arch. Gescb. Philos 52 (1970), 267. For the Stoics as Alexander's opponents cf. ibid. 247 and my comment, Aristotelian and Stoic Necessity in the de fato of Alexander of Aphrodisias’, Pbronesis 20 (1975), 258, n. 24. Alexander, like Greek writers in general, does not use an expression for ‘free will’; he employs the expression inline-graphic. which I have rendered ‘responsibility’, used both by libertarians and by the Stoics, whose position is a ‘soft-determinist’ one (cf. n. 41). But for the libertarian character of Alexander's position cf. Sharpies, loc. cit. and p. 256, n. 22.

19 As for example with the Stoic arguments for determinism from divination (Alexander, de fato xxxi. 201.32, Calcidius clxi. 194.20–2) and from universal divine foreknowledge (Alexander, de fato xxx. 200.12; Calcidius clxi. 193.17); Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 95 n. and Waszink, ad loc. Cf. also below, nn. 61, 71, 134, 225.

20 As with the definition of the contingent as what can happen or not (Alexander, de fato ix. 175.2, Caicidius clxii. 195.16 f.; Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96) and the discussion of chance, based, both in Alexander and in the Middle-Platonic tradition, on Aristotle (cf. the commentators in nn. 3–4): Aristotle, Phys. 2.5–6, Metaph. Δ 30 1025a14 ff., 24 ff., Alexander, de fato viii. 172.17 ff., xxiv. 194.15 ff., pseudo-Plutarch 571 e ff., Caicidius clviii 191.18 ff., Nemesius xxxix. 761 b ff. Cf. Switalski, p. 96; Waszink, 193.5n.; Domanski B., ‘Die Psychologie des Nemesius’, Beiträge zur Gescb. derPbilos. des Mittelalters (cf. n. 17), 3.1 (1900), 159, n. 1; Sharpies, ‘Responsibility, Chance and Not-Being (Alexander of Aphrodisias Mantissa 169–172)’, BICS 22 (1975), 46 and nn. 86–9. Cf. also below, § II.

21 The question of Caicidius' and Nemesius' sources is too complex to discuss here in full; but cf. Waszink, pp. xxxv-cvi of his edition of Caicidius, den Boeft (above, n. 4) pp. 128–37, and Koch H. A., Quellenuntersucbungen zu Nemesius von Emesa (Berlin, 1921), especially pp. 2249. Cf. also below, nn. 197–202, 227–9.

22 On Alexander's later influence cf. especially Théry G., ‘Autour du décret de 1210: II, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Apercu sur l'influence de sa noétique’, Bibliotbèque Thomiste (Kain) 7 (1926), 13 ff.

23 Supplementum Aristotelicum II. i, ed. Brans I. (Berlin, 1887), 179. 24186. 31.

24 I am grateful to Professor Long for discussion on this point. Reference will also be made to other sections of the mantissa and of the other collections of short discussions attributed to Alexander; here too questions of authorship are raised, and my use of ‘Alexander’ for the author in such cases is purely for convenience and does not indicate that the passages in question are authentic works of Alexander, though they draw on his work and are probably in any case by authors closely associated with him. Cf. in general the discussions referred to in Sharpies, BICS 22 (1975), 53, n. 28, and addenda, ibid. 23 (1976), 72.

25 Albinus, Didasc. xxvi. 179.13 ff., Caicidius cliii. 188. 9 f. Cf. also Maximus Tyrius 13.5, p. 164 Hobein (Leipzig, Teubner, 1910) and Origen in SVF 2.957; but cf. n. 32).

26 XXXI. 202.10 f. Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 95; Witt (above, n. 17), p. 86; M. Dragona-Monachou, ‘Providence and fate in Stoicism and Prae-Neoplatonism’, inline-graphic (Athens) 3 (1973), 271, n. 45. Cf. also Donini P. L., Tre studi sull' aristotelismo nel 11 secolo d.C. (Padua, 1974), p. 86, n. 8.

27 xxxi. 202.5–25.

28 xxxi. 202.25 ff.; inline-graphic 203.1.

29 SVF 2.956–7, 998. Cf. Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 51, n. 2; Rist J. M., Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 120 f. Below, n. 42.

30 SVF 2.956; cf. Origen in SVF 2.957 (where however the names are not given—perhaps because they have already been used to make another point; cf. n. 25) and (also without the names) Diogenianus in SVF 2.998, p. 292.34.

31 Cf. Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 73 f.; Valgiglio (above, n. 3), p. XXIX, and ‘Il fato nel pensiero classico antico’, RSC 16(1968), 61 f. and n. 50; Long (above, n. 18), p. 267; Dragona-Monachou, loc. cit. (above, n. 26).

32 Theiler, Valgiglio, locc. citt. Everything is in fate, but not everything according to fate; Albinus xxvi. 179.2 f., pseudo-Plutarch 570 e, cf. 570 be. Contrast, however, Maximus Tyrius, for whom Apollo knew Laius' character and knew that he would disobey (13.5 p. 164 Hobein; Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 51).

33 SVF 2.978; Theiler, loc. cit. Admittedly, at SVF p. 284.31 ff. Oenomaus seems to be referring to a view which takes Laius' initial action to be free, which might suggest that he is attacking Platonists rather than Stoics; but he only mentions Chrysippus, Democritus, and ‘prophets’ as his opponents (Patr. Gr. 21.437 be), and 284.28–30 seems to correspond to 284.25 and 27, which do refer to Chrysippus. Oenomaus has, before the passage at 284.31, been attacking the claim to predict Oedipus' action as absurd (Patr. Gr. 21.437d), and in this context it is a useful objection to bring against Chrysippus that he is inconsistent in allowing Laius to be responsible tor his action and yet regarding the oracle as valid so that Oedipus' action is predictable. However, for Chrysippus responsbility for an action is not removed by the fact that it is determined and can be predicted (see below) – a point that Oenomaus ignores.

For conditional oracles cf. Servius in SVF 2.958; and on the possibility, in a deterministic context, of taking precautionary action as the result of a prophecy cf. Cicero, de div. 2.20 f., 24, Seneca, nat. quaest. 2.37, and Diogenianus in SVF 2.939, p. 270.29;Gould J. B., The Philosophy of Chrysippus (Leiden, 1970), p. 145.

34 SVF 2.939, p. 270.39 ff.

35 This qualification is not in Diogenianus, but seems necessary; the outcome is equally fated before and after Laius' disobedience, but nevertheless it is for Chrysippus on Laius' disobedience that the outcome depends (though not, presumably, in a sense that removes Oedipus' responsibility for his action). Diogenianus does not point out, either, that Laius' attempt to escape his fate was not only ineffective but self-defeating (cf. n. 27 above).

36 Cicero, de fato 33.

37 Alexander, de fato xxxi. 202.13.

38 At least with Bruns's conjecture inline-graphic in 202.12 as opposed to Usener's (cf. Bruns's apparatus). I am grateful to Dr. G. E. R. Lloyd for directing my attention to the details of expression of this whole passage.

39 xxx. 200. 12 ff.

40 Cf. SVF 2.939,1191 f. Sambursky S., Physics of the Stoics (London, 1959), pp. 6571, Gould (above, n. 33), pp. 144 f.

41 This is shown above all by his ‘cylinderargument’ (SVF 2.974,1000); we are responsible for our actions as being their principal cause, even though they are determined by the combination of principal and auxiliary causes. Cf. Sambursky, op. cit., pp. 61 ff.;Pohlenz M., La Stoa (ed. Alfieri V., Florence, 1967) 1.20911;Long A. A., Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1974), pp. 166 f.;Donini P. L., ‘Fato e volunta umana in Crisippo’, Atti dell' Ace. delle Scienze di Torino 109 (1974-1975), 144. For Chrysippus as a ‘soft determinist’ cf. J. B. Gould (above, n. 33), p. 149, n. 1, and p. 152, n. 3.

42 On this cf. especially Donini, op. cit., pp. 2831.

43 For similar tendentiousness on Alexander's part cf. Long, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 249–54, 262.

44 Cf. Seneca, de prov. 4.5 ff.,Sandbach F. H., The Stoics (London, 1975), pp. 107 f.; SVF 3.177.

45 Cf. Lloyd-Jones H., The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 119–25.

46 xxxi. 202.8 f.

47 On the contrast between the positions of these two groups cf. above, n. 32.

48 Cf. further below, § III.

49 Alexander, de fato xxxi. 201.30,inline-graphicinline-graphicinline-graphic Calcidius CLVII 191.8 ff., ‘salva est, opinor, divinatio, ne praesagio derogetur auctoritas; potest quippe praescius tali facta informations fati consilium dare aggrediendi vel non aggrediendi, recteque et rationabiliter mathematicus originem captabit instituendi actus ex prosperitate siderum atque signorum, ut, si hoc facta est, proveniat illud.’ Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96; Waszink, ad loc.

50 Contrast Oenomaus in SVF 2.978, who finds it implausible that Apollo should know the consequences of Laius' disobedience but not whether he would disobey (above, n. 33).

51 Cf. de fato xxxi. 201.30; also x. 176.27 ff. (on the reading at 177.1 f. cf. Apelt O., ‘Die kleinen Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias’, Rh. Mus. 49 (1894), 61–3, and Langerbeck H., ‘Zu Alexander von Aphrodisias de fato X’, Hermes 71 (1936), 473 f.), mantissa 179.16 ff., and below, n. 186.

52 de fato vi. 170.9 ff. (even if there are difficulties in Alexander's position here; cf. my remarks at Phronesis 20 (1975), 267–71).

53 de fato xxvii. 197.3199.7, xxix. 199.24–9.Cf. Donini, Tre studi, pp. 171–3, 180f.;Sharpies, BICS 22 (1975), 44 and nn.

54 de fato xxix. 199.29 ff.; cf. mantissa 174.27–35. Cf. Donini, Tre studi 176184,Sharpies, loc. cit.; also Pack R. A., ‘A passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias relating to the theory of tragedy’, AJPh 58 (1937), 429 and n. 36.

55 Granted, Oedipus failed to recognize Laius; even so, however, he presumably both could and should have refrained from killing the unknown person he had met.

56 Pack, op. cit., pp. 428 f. At p. 429 Pack argues that Laius was predisposed to disobedience by his nature, but could have acted otherwise.

57 mantissa 185.33; cf. Pack, p. 428 and n. 30. Cf. also de fato vi. 171.7, mantissa 186.8.

58 Albinus, Didasc. xxvi. 179.7; for Alexander cf. n. 61. Witt (above n. 17), p. 86; Todd (above, n. 17), pp. 16 f., n. 78, the latter also citing Clement Strom. 1.17, Patr. Gr. 8.800 a. Cf. my comments at Phoenix 31 (1977), 89.

59 Cicero, de fato 40 (on which cf. Huby P. M., ‘An Epicurean Argument in Cicero, de fato XVII-40’, Phronesis 15 (1970), 83–5); also Plutarch, de Stoic. Rep. 1050 c,pseudo-Plutarch, de fato 574 c. Praise and blame are connected with inline-graphicinline-graphic by Epicurus, ad Menoeceum 133;cf. Aristode, Eth. Nic. 3.1 1109b30. Amand (above, n. 8), pp. 574–8; Koch (above, n. 21) p. 37.

60 SVF 2.1000, pp. 293.39, 294.3. Cf., for praise and blame, Diogenianus in SVF 2.998, p. 292.5; though the introduction of praise and blame here could be Diogenianus own.

61 de fato xxvi. 196.25 f., 197.1 f., xxxv. 206.1; and cf. inline-graphic in Todd's fourth passage, xxxiv. 206.28–30. He also cites xxxvi. 209.20–210.3; for Alexander's own use of the argument one might also add xvi. 187.26 ff.

62 Cf. e.g. inline-graphic at Alexander, de fato xxiv. 206.30, xxxvi. 209.21, with Diogenianus, SVF p. 292.25; it does not occur in the passages of Albinus or Clement cited by Todd.

63 clvii. 194.14–17, clxiii 196.3 ff.; cf. Waszink ad loc, Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96 fin. So too Nemesius xxxv. 741 b; Amand (above, n. 8), p. 568.

64 Alexander, de fato xvii. 188.1 ff., Calcidius clxv. 203.9–13; Waszink, ad loc. Nemesius, loc. cit.; Amand, loc. cit.

65 Alexander, de fato xvii. 188.11–17, Calcidius clxxv. 211.9–13; Waszink, ad loc, (but the parallel hardly seems a close one). Cf. also above, n. 49.

66 Alexander, de fato xxxvi. 209.4, 12, Calcidius clvii. 191.13; Switalski, p. 96. Nemesius, loc. cit. and xxxix. 765 b; Amand, p. 568 and n. 1.

67 Alexander, de fato xvi. 186.30 ff., Calcidius clxv. 203.15 f.; Waszink, ad loc.

68 Cicero, de fato 2830.

69 On the uselessness of law if all is determined cf. Amand, pp. 93 (Philo, deprov. 1.80) and 574 ff.; for the incompatibility of providence and prophecy with determinism, ibid., pp. 584 f.

70 Alexander, de fato xxxv. 207.8,inline-graphic Calcidius clvii. 191.14, ‘… iussum sciscens honesta, prohibens contraria.’ Waszink, ad loc.; Switalski (above n. 17), p. 95.

71 Marcianus, Dig. 1.3.2; Gercke A., ‘ChrysippeJabrbuch für klass. Phil. Suppl. 14 (1885), 694. Moreover, whereas the definition in Calcidius forms part of his own argument against determinism (above, n. 66) that in Alexander is part of one that he gives as his opponents' (xxxv. 207.5–21).

72 As pointed out above, parallels between Alexander and Nemesius or Calcidius admit of explanation, not in terms of a common source, but in those of the influence of Alexander on the later authors; further parallels between Alexander and these authors will be discussed below.

73 Cf. Sharpies, Phronesis 20 (1975), 247–58 (the contingent); BICS 22 (1975), 47 (chance); Phronesis 20 (1975), 267–71, and Donini, Tre studi, pp. 171 f. (fate and nature).

74 Cf. also my comments at Phronesis 20 (1975), 259 ff. and n. 37.

75 mantissa 181.22–8; cf. Sharpies, Phronesis 20 (1975), 271–4.

76 de fato xxvii. 197.3–17, xxix. 199.24–29; cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.5 1114a13–21.Donini, Tre studi, pp. 171 f., 180 f.;Sharpies, BICS 22 (1975), p f.

77 Pseudo-Plutarch 570 f – 571 a, Nemesius xxxiv. 740 b; not in Albinus, Apuleius, or Calcidius. Dillon (above, n. 7), p. 323.

78 Pseudo-Plutarch 571 b, Calcidius civ. 189.13 ff., Nemesius xxxiv. 740 b; Gercke, Rh. Mus. 41 (1886), 274 f. Cf. also Boethius in de interpretatione comm. ed. sec. 234.3 ff. (ed. Meiser C., Leipzig, Teubner, 1877 (ed. pr.)and 1880 (ed. sec.); henceforth ‘Boethius comm. ed. pr./ ed. sec.’ simply); and id. SVF 2.201 fin. with the comments of Mates B., Stoic Logic 2 (Berkeley, 1961), p. 37, n. 52.

79 Pseudo-Plutarch 571 cd, Calcidius clvi. 190.8 ff., Nemesius xxxiv. 737 ab, 740 c-741 a. This docttine reflects various Aristotelian texts (de int. 9,19a19, a38 ff., an. pr. 1.13, 32b4 ff., Metapb. E 2, 1026b20 ff., K 8, 1064b28 ff.) and appears in Alexander, in an pr. 1.13, 162 f. and in top. 2.6, 177.22 ff., without however the explicit connection of the middle class of the contingent with human choice; it is common later (Ammonius, in de int. 9, 142.1 ff., 151.9–152.11; Philoponus, in an. pr. 1.13, 151.27 ff.) Cf. den Boeft, op. cit., pp. 39, 45 n. 2, 99, and Frede D., Aristoteles und die ‘Seeschlacbt’ (Hypomnemata 27, Gottingen, 1970, pp. 60–2.

80 def ato ix. 175.7 (cf. Domański (above, n. 20), p. 148, n. 1, Waszink, p. 189.19n.); cf. quaest. (Suppl. Arist. II. ii) ii. 5, 52.5–7.

81 Alexander ap. Simplicius, in de caelo 359.1 ff.; Baltes M., Die Weltentstehung des Platoniscben Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten i (Philosopbia antiqua 30, Leiden, 1976), 77.

82 Quaest. i.18, 31.18 ff. For the impossible as that of which the opposite is necessary cf. Aristotle Metaph. Δ 12, 1019b23.

83 Cf. de fato v. 169.6 ff., xii. 180.6 ff.; Pack (above, n. 54), pp. 423 f. For a more explicit expression of the point cf. mantissa 184.7–13; also 173.4–6.

84 Contrast Domański, p. 155, n. 1. Koch (above, n. 21), p. 41. The notion of the contingent that can equally well occur or not is indeed implied at de fato vii. 172.7 f., ix. 175.17 (cf. Sharpies, Phronesis 20 (1975), 251, n. 8), 176.10; but it is not there especially connected with human choice; and at in an. pr. 1.13 162.32 f. Alexander describes the results of choice as usual though giving human actions as examples of what can equally well occur or not (cf. n. 79). Cf. also n. 205.

85 Merlan P., ‘Zwei Untersuchungen zu Alexander von Aphrodisias’, Philologus 113 (1969), 90 f., on quaest. 11.21 70.34.

86 Alexander fr. 36 in Freudenthal J., ‘Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles’, Abhandl. der Berliner Akadamie 1884, 1 (Moraux P., Alexandre d 'Apbrodise: Exégète de la noétique d 'Aristote (Bibl. de la fac. de philos. et lettres de l'Univ. de Liège 99, Liege and Paris, 1942), 200), and Thillet P., ‘Un traité inconnu d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur la providence dans une version arabe inédite’, L'Homme et son destin … Actes du ler congres internat. de pbilos. médiévale (Louvain, 1960), p. 321, lines 3–5.

87 Ps.-Plutarch 573 a; cf. Nemesius xliv. 793 b. Cf. also Justin Martyr c. Trypb. 1.4, Patr. Gr. 6.473 c-476 a.

88 fr.2 in Vitelli G., ‘Due Frammenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia’, Festchrift Tbeodor Gomperz (Vienna, 1902), pp. 90–3). (I am grateful to Professor Robert B. Todd for drawing my attention to this passage.)

89 272 e.

91 Above, n. 10; Dillon (above, n. 7) p. 324.

92 X. 164.16 (t; cf. Dillon, p. 282.

93 Dillon, pp. 366–71.

94 On inter-school polemic in general cf. Dillon, pp. 249 f.; but cf. below, § 111 fin.

95 Pack's presentation of the de fato as ‘a classification of causes’ (above, n. 54), p. 418 is over-systematic (in spite of xxvii. 211.1 ff.). The dialectical, ad homines character of much of Alexander's discussion also plays a part here; above, n. 51.

96 Cf. Sharpies, BICS 22 (1975), 42 and nn. 43, 45; 44–9.

91 chs. xxvii-xxix; cf. also xv. 185.21–8 and mantissa 174.13–39. Donini, Tre studt, pp. 170–84,Sharpies, BICS 22 (1975), 43 f. Above, nn. 53–4, 75.

98 viii. 172.17 ff., xxiv. 194.15 ff. Sharpies, BICS 22 (1975), 46–9.

99 ix. 175.16 ff. Sharpies, Phronesis 20 (1975), 247–58 and 265, n. 48.

100 Above, nn. 96–7.

101 He does connect human choice with a particular class of the contingent (n. 79), but he does not analyse the processes leading to human action, in the context of the problem of freedom and determinism, in the same way as does Alexander (n. 97). (571 d hardly goes against this.) Cf. Koch (above, n. 21), p. 41 on Nemesius.

101 Above, nn. 20 (chance), 79 (Aristotelian foundations of the Middle-Platonic discussion of the contingent).

103 Above, nn. 98, 99.

104 Above, nn. 96, 97, 100.

105 Pseudo-Plutarch, 574 ef.

106 (Above, n. 7), pp. 211, 325.

107 Ibid. p. 250.

108 , The latter part of ch.X (177.7 ff.) may be cited as an extreme case.

109 de fato xiii. 181.15182.8 (SVF 2.979). For fire heating cf. xi. 179.15, xiv. 183.11, 184.13, and with the examples at xiii. 181.19 cf. also xiii. 182.8 ff., xiv. 185.3 f., xv. 185.17 f., 28 ff., xix. 189.21 ff., xxxiv. 205.27 ff. (below, n. Ill), xxxvi. 208.6 f., 23 ff. Cf. also D.L. 7.86, and, for impulse as characteristic of living creatures, SVF 2.714, 844.

110 xiii. 182.8–20. Cf. Rieth O., Grundbegriffe der Stoischen Etbik (Problemata 9, Berlin, 1933), pp. 144 ff.;Bréhier V., Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme 2 (Paris, 1951), p. 193 and nn. 2, 3; Sambursky S., Physics of the Stoics (London, 1959), pp. 63 ff.;Long A. A., Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 260 ff. and Problems in Stoicism (London, 1971), pp. 180 ff.;Donini P. L., Atti dell' Acc. delle Scienze di Torino 109 (1974-1975), 32 ff.

111 xxxiv. 205.24 ff. (SVF 2.1002); linked with ch. xiii by Guttmann J., ‘Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Crescas …’, Jewish Studies in Memory of G. A. Kohut, ed. Baron S. W. et al. (1935), p. 341, n. 21.

112 Above, n. 41. Alexander's description of external causes as inline-graphic (xiii. 181.29) recalls adiuvantia in Cicero de fato 41 (SVF 2.974; cf. Donini, op. cit., p. 34); cf. also xxxiv. 205.29 (n. 111) with SVF 2.1000, p. 294.7 ff. (on which cf. Long, Problems, p. 197, n. 48, Donini, p. 13). Cf. also Bréhier, loc. cit., Theiler (above, n. 6), and Long, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 261; also below, nn. 126 ff., 142.

113 Cf. Long, op. cit., p. 263.

114 Cf. Reesor M. E., ‘Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy’, Phoenix 19 (1965), 288 ff.; Long, op. cit., p. 262.

115 xiv. 183.5 ff., cf. xiii. 182.16 ff.; Long, op. cit., pp. 262 f., Problems, 196, n. 26.

116 xiii. 181.14, 182.12 ff. (quoted below, p. 258); cf. also 182.6–8, and xxxvi, 208.3, xxii. 192.7, xxxi. 203.13.

117 xiv. 183.21–185.7; Long, Arch. Gesch Philos. 52 (1970), 263 ff.

118 xxv. 744 a ff. (SVF 2.991); with the example of the plant (SVF 2, p. 290.26 f.) cf. Alexander, de fato xxxvi. 208.16 (above, n. 109).

119 comm. ed. sec. 195.10 f.

120 3.1, 7.14 ff.

121 It may be noted, however, that Aristotle regards the downwards movement of a stone as due to necessity in accordance with inline-graphic (An. Post. 2.11,94b37 ff.). Seneca nat. quaest. 2.24.2 f. and 6.17.1 speaks of fire rising as going where it wishes (Voelke A.-J., L' Idée de volonté dans le stoícisme (Paris, 1973), p. 107, n. 4).

122 SVF 2.991, p. 290.41 ff.; one might as well say that burning is inline-graphic because fire burns by nature. Nemesius says that Philopator seems to suggest this inline-graphic in his de fato (cf. n. 132); the suggestion was presumably unintentional.

123 xxxiv. 745 b (only partly in SVF).

124 Ibid.inline-graphicinline-graphic Theiler attributes the formulation with inline-graphic to Philopator himself (above, n. 6), p. 66; it may rather be his libertarian critics' way of putting the point.

125 Calcidius clxi. 194.23 ff.; ‘siquidem necesse sit agi per nos agente fato’. The parallel between Alexander, Calcidius, and Nemesius is noted by Theiler, op. cit., p. 66 and n. 2; cf. den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 51 f.

126 SVF 2.991, p. 290.29, cf. 34; Sambursky (above, n. 110), pp. 63 f. That men's actions being in accordance with their impulse is a reason for holding them responsible is asserted by Chrysippus ap. Gellius SVF 2.1000, p. 294.27; Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 63 n. 5. The freedom of the Stoic sage (rather than responsibility) consists in having a will conformed to fate and hence never thwarted, cf. SVF 3.355, 356, 544, Epictet. Diss. 1.12.9, 2.23.42, 4.1.28 ff. Long, Problems, pp. 189 ff. and nn.

127 xiii. 181.21, 29, 182.5; cf. inline-graphicinline-graphic in 181.27.

128 Above, n. 115.

129 SVF 2.991, p. 290.33, 39.

130 xiii. 182.13–16.

131 SVF 2.991, p. 290.43, 28 respectively; for fire rising cf. Aristot. An. Post. 2.11, 94b37 ff. (n. 121), Etb. Nic. 2.1 1103a19; also Marcus Aurelius 10.32.2 f. For Alexander cf. n. 109.

132 Galen, an. pass. 31.24 Marquardt (Leipzig, Teubner, 1884); Theiler, op. cit., pp. 66 f. Cf. Gercke, Jahrb. für klass. Philol. Supplbd. 14 (1885), 692, 695; Pohlenz (above, n. 41), 2.26, n. 30, 2.160 and n. 3; Telfer (above, n. 8), p. 398 n. 4.,

133 Long, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 247 n. 2, 266.

134 Theiler concluded that Philopator was the target of a common source followed by both Alexander and Nemesius (pp. 66 f.). If the formulation with inline-graphic is not Philopator's (above, n. 124) its presence in both Alexander and Nemesius may suggest an antideterminist common source. (Calcisius, above, n. 125, could have derived it from Alexander, while not taking over argument ‘A’.) Alternatively, Alexander and Nemesius (or his source) could have formulated their objection in a similar way independently. Cf. below, § VIII and n. 237; also n. 148.

135 Contrast de fato xiii. 181.19, 182.8, xiv. 185.3 with xi. 179.15, xix. 189.21, xxxvi. 208.23.

136 Above, n. 113.

137 SVF 2.1000, p. 294.16. Cf. in general Vollgraff G., ‘De lapide cylindro’, Mnemosyne 2.52 (1924), 207–11.

138 Alexander, de fato xiii. 181.19 etc.; Nemesius SVF 2.991, p. 290.27. Cf. Gercke, op. cit. (n. 132), p. 694.

139 xxxvi. 208.23; cf. xv. 185.17 ff. (where the text is correct; cf. Rodier G., ‘Conjectures sur le texte du de fato d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise’, Rev. Phil. 25 (1901), 67 as against Hackforth R., ‘Notes on some passages of Alexander Aphrodisiensis de fato’, CQ 40 (1946), 38).

140 Cf. turbinem, Cicero, de fato 42 fin.; Yon A., Cicéron: traité du destin (Paris, Budé, 1950), pp. 22, 41 f.; Donini (above, n. 110), p. 4.

141 398b28 ff; Lorimer W. L., ‘Some notes on the text of pseudo-Aristotle de mundo’ (St. Andrews University Publications 21, 1925), pp. 63–5,Maguire J. P., ‘The sources of pseudo-Aristotle de mundo’, YCS 6 (1939), 151 f, comparing with the present passage of Alexander the following example of the different behaviour of different types of creatures when released (de mundo 6, 398b30 ff.).

142 Cf. n. 116; SVF 2.1000, p. 294.2 f., 20 f. Donini, op. cit., pp. 1215. Cf. also Marcus Aurelius 10.33.2 f. (Vollgraff, (above, n. 137), p. 211.)

143 Cf. Moraux P., ‘Alexander von Aphrodisias Quaest. 2.3’, Hermes 95 (1967), 160 n. 2, 163.

144 xxii. 192.22 ff.: … inline-graphicinline-graphic Cf. also xv. 185.7–10, mantissa 170.2 ff., 174.3 ff., Sharpies, Phronesis 20 (1975), 250, 262 f. and n. 39.

145 SVF 2.991, p. 290.36–8: … inline-graphicinline-graphic

146 3.1, 2.30ff. (SVF 2.946, p. 273.42–4): … inline-graphicinline-graphic Cf. Alexander, de fato xxii. 192.1–15.

147 So of the latter Bruns I., Interpretationsvariae (Kiel, 1893) 12. Cf. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus 14 (though this refers to Alexander's commentaries, not explicitly to the independent treatises).Armstrong A. H., Cambridge History of Later Creek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967), p. 212;Wallis R. T., Neoplatonism (London, 1972), p. 29;Verbeke, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 50 (1978), 74.

148 Cf. in general on this Long, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 268 n. 54, and Problems, p. 196 n. 27.

149 SVF 2.1000, p. 293.30–2: inline-graphicinline-graphic

150 SVF 2.921–2. Cf. also Cicero, de fato 1921,SVF 2.917 (Aétius), 973 (Plutarch).

151 Comm. ed. sec. 195.21 ff., 217.25 ff.

152 Ibid. 195.15–21, 217.23–25; cf. above, n. 113. (Cf., however, ‘quod ipsa voluntas ex nobis est et secundum animalis naturam’, 196.2 f.).

153 196.3–197.4;above, n. 117. (At 218.8 ff. Boethius objects that if our will is subject to fate it cannot be free; but he does not explicitly make the point that the Stoic theory does away with any meaningful difference between living creatures and inanimate objects, at least from a libertarian point of view.)

154 For the contrast between inline-graphic and inline-graphic cf. also Alexander, quaest. iii. 13, 107.6 ff., etc.

155 Cf. above, nn. 116, 124.

156 For the complaint that the Stoics interpret inline-graphic in their own idiosyn cratic sense cf. Alexander, de fato xiv. 182.29, also xxxviii. 211.31; Plotinus 3.1, 7.15 (above, n. 120).

157 Zeller E., A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy, tr. Alleyne S. F. (London, 1883), pp. 319 f. n. 1; cf. below, n. 224.

158 That Ammonius and Boethius knew Alexander's de interpretatione commentary through that of Porphyry is argued by Beutler R., art. ‘Porphyrios (21)’, RE 22.1 (1953), 284; for the influence of Porphyry on Ammonius and Boethius cf. Merlan P., ‘Ammonius Hermiae, Zacharias Scholasticus and Boethius’, GRBS 9 (1978), 199 f.; also den Boeft, op. cit., p. 134,Frede, op. cit. (n. 79), p. 26 n. 1. J. Shiel,Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle’, Med. and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958), 217–44, argues that Porphyry was the intermediary between Alexander and Boethius' commentaries on de int. (231) but holds that Boethius' knowledge of Porphyry was not direct but from scholia combining Porphyrian with later material (pp. 231–4, cf. pp. 227, 242–4).

159 Théry G. (above, n. 22) p. 17 and n. 2.

160 Cf. the comment of Proclus, in Tim. 3.272.7 ff. Diehl that Alexander's doctrine of fate is not in accord with the common notions of men on the subject (cf. mantissa 186.9–13); and above, n. 76.

161 loc. cit.

162 inline-graphic xi. 178.12; for the term cf. SVF 2.1156–7, Epictetus, diss. 2.8.6.Verbeke, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 50 (1978), 87 n. 47. Alexander allows that there are some things that are not ‘for the sake of anything' (inline-graphic cf. v. 169.2): iv. 167.22–168.2, V. 168.26 f.

163 xi. 178.8–180.2. For nature doing nothing in vain cf. Aristotle, de caelo 1.4, 271a33,Politics 1.2, 1253a9, 1.8, 1256b20.

164 xi. 179.24; cf. Verbeke, loc. cit. So also at Ammonius, in de int. 148.19 (below, n. 166).

165 mantissa 183.15 ff.

166 in de int. 148.11 ff. For another parallel between Alexander and Ammonius cf. Ammonius 150.23 f., inline-graphicinline-graphic though the general idea is admittedly a commonplace (cf. Amand (above, n. 8), pp. 573 f., and especially Chrysostom John, horn. 8, Patr. Gr. 63.510.33. f. (ibid. 517)).

167 comm. ed. sec. 220.8 ff.

168 Alexander, de fato xi. 178.12,mantissa 183.25–9 (cf. also ibid. 172.19 ff., 173.6 ff.); Ammonius, in de int. 142.17–20.

169 Boethius, comm. ed. sec. 196.26 ff.

170 xxxix. 764 b.

171 loc. cit.; cf. xli. 773 c-776 a. For the parallel with Alexander cf. Domański (above, n. 20), pp. 152 f. and n. 1;Siclari A., L 'antropologia di Nemesio de Emesa, (Padua, 1974), p. 244 and n. 33.

172 Calcidius clxiii. 196.3, compared with Alexander, de fato xi. 178.8 ff. by Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96.

173 Above, nn. 117,154; Verbeke (above, n. 162), p. 90 n. 57. Nemesius xli. 773 b-776 a; Doma–ski, op. cit., pp. 166 f. Calcidius, clvi. 190.12 f., compared with Alexander, de fato xi. 178.17 ff., xiv. 183.30 ff., xv. 186.3 ff. by Switalski, p. 95, Waszink, p. 190.13n.; however, the point preceding this passage in Calcidius, the link between re sponsibility and that sub-class of the contin gent that can equally well happen or not, is absent from Alexander (cf. n. 84).

174 mantissa 184.14–18.

175 comm. ed. sec. 236.11–16;cf. Sharpies, Pbronesis 20 (1975), 248 n. 3.

176 Alexander, de fato xi. 178.11 (n. 162),mantissa 183.26;Boethius, comm. ed. sec. 236.16 (proprium).

177 mantissa 184.18 ff.,Boethius, comm. ed. sec. 236.5 ff., cf. 237.24 f.

178 Hintikka J., Time and Necessity (Oxford, 1973), pp. 100, 171 ff.

179 comm. ed. pr. 120.1, ed. sec. 190.1, 14, 203.4, 240.5.

180 Chs. viii, ix-x, and xi ff. respectively.

181 de fato xxiv. 194.23–5; cf. also mantissa 184.27 ff. (coming just after a discussion of the contingent), 183.1–8. Contrast de fato vii. 172.4 ff. where only chance and the contingent are mentioned.

181 Pseudo-Plutarch 570 f; Dillon (above, n. 7), p. 323.

183 Above, nn. 79, 101; cf. pseudo-Plutarch 570 f. The threefold division of the contingent (n. 79) does also appear in Boethius; cf. comm. ed. pr. 120.24 ff., ed. sec. 188.4, 192.16, 240.8, 248.20.

184 xxx. 200.28–201.6, 201.21–4. Cf. Cicero, de div. 2.15 ff., 25, de fato 32;Pease A. S., Cicero: de divinatione (Chicago, 1920-1923), pp. 372 ff.

185 xxx. 201.24–9. With Alexander's strategy in this argument cf. Boethius, comm. ed. sec. 225.17 ff., 21 ff.; but his position is in fact different (cf. n. 193). On Alexander's argument cf. Huber P., Die Vereinbarkeit von göttlicber Vorsehung und menschlicber Freiheit in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius (Zurich, 1976), pp. 13 f.

186 xxx. 201.13–18, cf. 201.28 ff., and 200.25–7 where the possibility that there is a type of foreknowledge that is compatible with contingency is perhaps kept open inline-graphic

187 de prov. 63.8 ff., dec. dub. q.2, 7.28, 8.9 (these works cited by reference to the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke in Boese H., Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula, Berlin 1960 (Quell, u. Stud, zur Gesch. der. Philos. 1)), El. Theol. 93, 124, in Tim. 1.352.5–27Diehl, in Parm. 1.956.10 ff. especially 957.18 ff. Cousin; cf. Iamblichus ap. Ammonius in de int. 9, 135.12 ff., Boethius, comm. ed. sec. 225.21 ff., 226.12 f., cons. phil. 5.36,Psellus, de omnif. doctr. 17.7,Aquinas St. Thomas, Summ. Theol. la q. 14 art. 13,Summa contra Gentiles 1.67. Patch H. R., ‘Necessity in Boethius and the Neoplatonists’, Speculum 10 (1935), 399;Theiler, op. cit., pp. 51 f.; Dodds E. R., Proclus: The Elements of Theology 2 (Oxford, 1963), pp. 266 f.; den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 53–6; Wallis (above, n. 147), p. 149; Huber (above, n. 185), pp. 45 ff. In Proclus himself, however, the emphasis is not on foreknowledge and the problem of freedom so much as on that of divine knowledge of what is indefinite, subject to change and infinite, except in de prov. On the relation between the solutions of Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius cf. Huber, pp. 20–59.

188 Proclus, de prov. 64,dec. dub. q.2, 7.10 ff., El. Tbeol. 124, in Tim. 1.352.15, in Parm. 1.956.10 ff.; Iamblichus ap. Iamblichus ap. Ammonius 135.15 ff., 136.1 ff. especially 11, Boethius cons. phil. 5pr.4.72ff., pr.6.1ff., 59 ff., Psellus, op. cit. 17.1 ff., Aquinas, Summ. Theol. la q.14 art.13 ad 2. Patch (above, n. 187), p. 399 and n. 4, Frede (above, n. 79), pp. 122 f., Huber (above, n. 185), pp. 40 ff,

189 de prov. 63.1–5, cf. dec. dub. q.2, 6.3 ff. Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 51 f. n. 4; Hager F. P., ‘Proklos und Alexander von Aphrodisias uber ein Problem der Vorsehung’, Kephalaion: Studies … presented to C. J. de Vogel (Assen, 1975), pp. 171–82.Huber, op. cit., pp. 22 f.

190 So Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 51 f. n. 4;Hager op. cit., pp. 175–8;Huber, op. cit., 22 and n. 8 (but cf. below, n. 193).Cf. Wallis (above, n. 147), p. 149.

191 Above, n. 184; cf. Huber, p. 42 n. 18.

192 de fato xxx. 201.12–16.

193 Proclus dec. dub. q.2, 8.10 ff., Boethius comm. ed. sec. 225.25 ff. (wrongly assimilated to (1) by Huber, p. 18 n. 45, who fails to observe that it is explicitly stated that God does know the outcome (226.12 f.) – that is, it would seem from the context, bow men will choose, not just what will happen if they choose in a certain way). Cf. also cons. phil. 5 pr.6.93; and for the application to a view of type (1), Calcidius clxii. 195.6 (below, n. 194).

194 So Huber, p. 14. View (2) is after all paradoxical (ibid., pp. 45, 59) and is only naturally advanced as a reaction to (1). Cf. especially Alexander, de fato xxx. 201.18–21.

195 clxii. 195.2 ff.; den Boeft (above, 1.4), pp. 53 ff., Huber, pp. 18 f. The parallel with Alexander is also noted by Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96, Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 50 n. 3.

196 Porphyry ap. Proclus, in Tim. 1.352.12.Den Boeft and Huber, locc. citt.

197 Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, pp. xxxviii-lxxxii; on fate cf. especially lviii-lxii. (However, cf. above, n. 6).

198 Ibid., pp. lxii f., lxxx f. For Calcidius' use of Porphyry cf. ibid., pp. xc-xcv; van Winden J. C. M., Calcidius on Matter (Pbilosopbia antiqua 9, Leiden, 1959), p. 247; den Boeft (above, n.4), pp. 131–7; Waszink, ‘Calcidius: Nachträge zum Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum’, Jahrb. für Antike und Cbristentum 15 (1972), 240 f.Contra, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 401–4.

200 Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, pp. lxiii, lxxxvi, xc, cii; cf. den Boeft, p. 134.

200 Waszink, pp. lx f.; Calcidius clxxi. 200.14 ff., clvii. 191.12 respectively. For Old Testament references as a sign of Numenian influence cf. Waszink, pp. xlii-xliv, lxviii f., lxxxvii; Dillon, p. 405. Waszinkat first argued tht they could not come through Porphyry, (pp. xlii n. 2, cv) but later revised his position (Entretiens Hardt 12 (1965), 61. f. and n. 1; den Boeft, p. 135). Cf. how ever below, n. 202.

201 Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, p. lxi. Cf. den Boeft, pp. 71 and 128 f. Den Boeft himself connects the doctrine of foreknowledge of the contingent as contingent, both in Calcidius and in Porphyry, with Timaeus 29 be and Porphyry's commentary on that work, rather than with Alexander (den Boeft, pp. 53–6); it is true that this might seem to be supported by the absence of any specific reference to foreknowledge in the Porphyry passage, but this might only reflect its being reported by Proclus (cf. above, n. 187).

202 Den Boeft, pp. 135 f.;Waszink, Jahrh. für Antike und Christentum 15 (1972), 236–44.

203 Albinus, Didasc. xxvi. 179.28, pseudo-Plutarch 570 F (above, n. 79). Theiler, op. cit., p. 74 and n. 6: followed in the attribution to Gaius by Huber (above, n. 185), p. 18 n. 44.

204 Above, n. 83.

205 Cf. also Albinus 179.29. Above, n. 84.

206 Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 50 n. 3; above, n. 78.

207 Above, pp. 250–1.

208 Ammonius, in de int. 131.2–4,138.16 f., 139.14 f., etc.;Boethius, comm. ed. pr. 106.30, 115.5, etc.,comm. ed. sec. 191.5, 208.11 ff., 215.21 ff., 245.9, 246.12, 219.29. Cf. Lukasiewicz J., ‘Philosophical remarks on many-valued systems of prepositional logic’, in Polish Logic 1920–1939 (ed. McCall S., Oxford, 1967), p. 64;W. and Kneale M., The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1963), p. 190 n. 3; Frede (above, n. 79) pp. 24–7, 69; Huber (above, n. 185), pp. 38 f. and n. 6.

209 de fato 21, 28, 31; Ac. Pr. 97. Cf. also de not. deorum 1.70.Lukasiewicz, loc. cit.;Verbeke, Arch. Gesch. Philos. 50 (1978), 86 n. 42;Rist, Stoic Philosophy p. 116 n. 1.

210 comm. ed. sec. 208.1; cf. 215.6. Lukasiewicz, loc. cit. It is clear that Aristotle did hold that the disjunction ‘either there will be a sea-battle or there won't be’ is true; de int. 9 19 a 28, Ammonius, in de int. 154.7 ff. CompareCicero, de fato 37, Ac. Pr. 97 (last n.).

211 Simplicius, in cat. 406.6 ff.;Lukasiewicz, loc. cit. I am grateful to Dr. R. Sorabji for this reference.

212 407.7 and 407.12 suggest the latter; but 407.6 f. implies that the future-tense disjuncts do already have truth values, and the contrast drawn in 407.10 is with pasttense statements which are definitely true or false.

213 Cf. also Frede (above, n. 79), p. 26.

214 This is interpretation (1) in Ackrill J., Aristotle: Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), pp. 133, 139 f., and the ‘Non-Standard Interpretation’ of McKim V. R., ‘Fatalism and the Future: Aristotle's Way Out’, Rev. Met. 25 (1972), 83 and n. 7. So Linsky L., ‘Professor David Williams on Aristotle’, Philos. Rev. 63 (1954), 250–2;Anscombe G. E. M., ‘Aristotle and the Sea-Battle’, in Moravcsik J. M. E. (ed.), Aristotle (Modern Studies in Philosophy series, London, 1978), p. 24;Strang C., ‘Aristotle and the Sea Battle’, Mind 69 (1960), 454, 459 ff.

215 Cf. especially Ammonius, in de int. 145.9 ff., Boethius, comm. ed. sec. 212.8 ff., 213.12 (The point is not just that we cannot know and so cannot justifiably say which alternative will occur; cf. comm. ed. sec. 192.5 ff., 197.18 ff., 208.17 ff., 245.19 ff.). Contrast the position of Carneades (Cicero, de fato 19 f., 27 f., 31–3, 37 f.) and of Ryle Gilbert (Dilemmas, Cambridge, 1954, pp. 1535);Long A. A., Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 162 f.

216 Cf. Frede (above, n. 79), pp. 71 ff. Ammonius adds ‘definitely’ in commenting on 18b4 (141.20), Boethius on 18a34 (ed. pr. 108.23, ed. sec. 204.24); its absence is however felt at ed. sec. 232.15 and at ibid. 249.5 (19a39). Cf. Lukasiewicz, loc. cit.

217 12.16, 18, 13.5. Frede, p. 26.

218 Bruns I., ‘Studien zu Alexander von Aphrodisias – I. Der Begriff des Möglichen und die Stoa’, Rh. Mus. 44 (1889), 624 f.

219 de fato x. 177.15 ff., xvi. 187.22 f., xvii. 188.3 f.

220 Cf. especially x. 177.28 f.: the truth of the prediction implies the event's being fated inline-graphic The whole discussion from 177.7 has been in the context of an argument advanced by determinists.

221 Nor is xxvii. 197.11–15 necessarily decisive, for the reference is not just to the question of future truth but rather to the unalterability of a character once established (cf. nn. 53, 75). Alexander need only be asserting that it is true before the character is fixed to say ‘the man may become so-and- so’, but not afterwards; there need not be any reference to the truth or otherwise of ‘he will become so-and-so’. At the same time, it may be doubted whether Alexander would have expressed himself in precisely this way if he had held that the contingency of the event was compatible with the truth of the prediction (see below).

222 § 2,11.10,17; cf. § 3,12.8ff. Frede (above, n. 79), p. 26. Unless the reference to physical determinism is carried over from § 1 to § 2 (contra Bruns, loc. cit.) the reference to prevention in 11.4 f., not taken up elsewhere in § 2, seems out of place.

223 A fortiori, he would be unlikely to do this if he held that predictions of future contingents could be true or false simpliciter (cf. Carneades and Ryle cited in n. 215).

224 Boethius, comm. ed. sec. 119.19 ff. cites Alexander with approval as saying that, in the case of things which admit of change, it is not necessary for one contradictory always to be true and the other false. Boethius at least must have understood this as asserting that it is not always the same one of a pair of contradictories that is true, rather than as saying that it is sometimes the case that neither is true or false; for he himself would reject the latter assertion (cf. above, n. 210).

235 In addition to those already cited in nn. 19 f., 26, 49, 63–70, 125, 173, and 195, cf. Alexander, de fato vii. 171.18–20,inline-graphicinline-graphicinline-graphic with Calcidius. clx. 193.15–17, ‘sed quia sunt aliquanta quae contra haec e diverso dicuntur, proponenda sunt et diluenda; tunc demum enim firm is erit fundamentis locata Platonis sententia’ (Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96, Waszink ad loc). Waszink also compares Calcidius clxiii. 195.20 ff. with Alexander, de fato xxxiv. 206.5 ff. (ad loc); but it may be remarked that the latter picks up 205.29, which is part of an argument attributed by Alexander to his determinist opponents (above, n. 111).

226 Above, n. 199. Den Boeft (above, n. 4), p. 134, argues that there are Aristotelian elements in Calcidius derived from Porphyry other than those owed by the latter to Alexander.

127 Cf. especially Koch (above, n. 21), pp. 26 f., 32 ff., and 40, pointing out that there are parallels with Aspasius and Anon. in Eth. Nic. 3 (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 19/1 and 20 respectively) rather than with Aristotle himself; also Siclari (above, n. 171), p. 232 and n. 18, Amand (above, n. 8), pp. 559 f., Telfer (above, n. 8), p. 413. On Porphyry as a source for Nemesius cf. Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, p. lxiii and n. 1, den Boeft, p. 98, and Jaeger W., Nemesios von Emesa (Berlin, 1914), pp. 61 ff.

228 Cf. Domański (above, n. 20), pp. 133, 136,138 ff., 142–7,151 f., 158 f. nn.; Koch, pp. 24, 30–2,38–41,44.

229 Nemesius xxxiv. 737 a – 740 a seems closer to Anon, in Eth. Nic. 149.14 ff. than to Alexander, de fato xi. 180.9 ff. and probl. eth. xxix. 160.5 ff. (Domański, p. 146 n. 1); cf. also Aspasius, in Eth. Nic. 71.16 ff.Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 3.3, 1112a21 ff. is clearly the starting-point for all these passages; and there do not seem to be any points of similarity between those in Nemesius and Alexander that cannot be explained by their ultimately deriving from this same Aristotelian original. The definition of the voluntary at Alexander, probl. eth. xxix. 159.20 f. is almost exactly repeated in Nemesius xxxii. 729 b; but it is already in Aristotle Eth. Nic. 3.1, 1111a22 ff. (to which Nemesius is slightly closer than Alexander). (Koch, op. cit., p. 30). Nemesius, ibid., makes the point that the voluntary is opposed both to the involuntary through ignorance and to the involuntary through force, which is discussed as a logical problem in Alexander, probl. eth. xi. 131.18 ff. (Domański, p. 138 n. 1); cf. however Aspasius, in Eth. Nic. 65.33 ff.

230 Above, n. 134.

231 Cf. n. 73; admittedly this is not a strong argument in itself, cf. text at n. 160 above.

232 Above, n. 86.

233 Nemesius xliv. 797 a, contrasting providence and sublunary nature, whereas for Alexande providence, fate, and nature are identical or closely linked (Zeller, (above, n. 157), p. 330;Moraux, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, p. 198;Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics, 224. Admittedly, Alexander's doctrine of providence does not appear in the de fato, and Nemesius' knowledge of Alexander's works may have been incomplete.). Cf. Atticus fr.3, especially 43 ff., 71 ff., and fr. 8.10 ff. Baudry (Paris, Budé, 1931); Aëtius 2.3.4, D. L. 5.32, Arius Didymus, fr. phys. 9, Critolaus fr.15 p. 52 Wehrli. Moraux, ‘L'exposè de la philosophic d'Aristote chez Diogène Laërce’, Rev. Philos. de Louvain 47 (1949), 33 f., and D'Aristote à Bessarion (Laval, 1907), pp. 54ff.;Happ H., ‘Weltbild und Seinslehre bei Aristoteles’, Antike und Abendland 14 (1978), 77 ff.; Todd, op. cit., p. 213.

234 Above, nn. 63, 64, 66; cf. n. 69.

235 Above, n. 171.

236 Above, n. 173.

237 Amand suggests (above, n. 8), p. 560) that Nemesius xxix-xli in its entirety is derived from a Peripatetic commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics which incorporated an attack on various theories of fate, chs. xxxv-xxxviii being based on this. This commentary might then be the source, attacking Philopator by name, which may be reflected both in Alexander's de fato and in Nemesius (above, n. 134). Alexander might himself have named Philopator in a commentary where he did not do so in the de fato; but there is no evidence that Alexander wrote a commentary on the Ethics, though the ethica problemata suggest interest in that work in his school.

* This article is largely composed of material from my 1977 Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, ‘Studies in the De fato of Alexander of Aphrodisias; I am particularly grateful to my supervisor, Dr. G. E. R. Lloyd, for his interest and advice.

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