¹ Green, Peter, Alexander of Macedon (Harmondsworth, 1974), p. 405Google Scholar; Borza, Eugene N., ‘Alexander's Communications’, Ancient Macedonia 2 (1977), pp. 295–303. The following abbreviations will be used in this paper: A.-Arrian, Anabasis; C.-Quintus Curtius, History of Alexander the Great; D.-Diodorus Siculus, Library of History; J.-Justin, Epitome; P.-Plutarch, Life of Alexander.Google Scholar

² Hegmont, Irving, Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1960), pp. 2–9Google Scholar; Glass, Robert R. and Davidson, Philip B., Intelligence is for Commanders (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1952), pp. 84 f.Google Scholar; Victor Séverin Sobieski de Janina, Théorie générale des reconnaissances militaires (Paris, 1851), pp. 281–92Google Scholar; Starr, Chester G., Political Intelligence in Classical Greece, Mnem. Suppl. 31 (Leiden, 1974), pp. 30 f. Hegmont notes that while the methods of collecting intelligence have changed greatly in recent years, the general principles directing its collection have remained the same for millennia.Google Scholar

³ Cf. Borza, op. cit., p. 296.

⁴ Of course, intelligence was transmitted to subordinates when they were sent on their own missions, C. 3.13.1–4.

⁵ Tactical and strategic intelligence collected simultaneously: C. 9.2.2–7; cf. Hegmont, op. cit., pp. 2–6.

⁶ C. 9.2.2–7; A. 5.25.1; A. 4.1.2; A. 3.7.3; D. 17.93.2; cf. Sobieski de Janina, (above, n. 2), pp. 278–92; Hegmont (above, n. 2), pp. 2–6; Glass and Davidson (above, n. 2), pp. 84 f.; Starr (above, n. 2), pp. 30 f. The details of Alexander's intelligence system given by Arrian, Curtius, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Strabo form a coherent pattern, consistent with general principles of intelligence collection. On the whole, their descriptions are complementary and not contradictory. The only exception is the apologetic Arrian–s failure to mention the activities of Alexander's agents within his own camp (although they are mentioned by another apologetic source, Plutarch, as well as by Curtius). See below, n. 60.

⁷ Xenophon's Cyropaedia, Anabasis, and Hellenica would be of value as would Ctesias' now lost work On the Tribute Throughout Asia, Persica, and Tour of the World (FGrHist. 688, F 53, F 1, F 55–9). Other works on the Persians which would be available to Philip and Alexander were by Dionysius of Miletus (FGrHist. 687); Hellanikos of Lesbos (FGrHist. 687a); Charon of Lampsakos (FGrHist. 687b); Herakleides of Cyme (FGrHist. 689); Demon of Colophon (FGrHist. 690); Skylax of Caryanda, Periplus (FGrHist. 709, F. 3–7); and Ephorus of Cyme (FGr Hist. 70). Alexander was probably well acquainted with Xenophon's march to Cunaxa (A. 2.7.8–9) and his route of march in Cilicia was the same as that followed by Xenophon, Engels, D., Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley and London, 1978), pp. 49 f.Google Scholar

⁸ Athenian agents in Persia: Demosthenes, On the Navy Boards, 27. Athenian and Macedonian envoys to Persia: Aeschines, Ctes. 238; A. 2.14.2. These individuals and others as well undoubtedly obtained a great deal of strategic intelligence on the Persian Empire which enabled contemporaries such as Isocrates (Philip 101–4) to be well acquainted with Persian political affairs. Cf. Starr (above, n. 2), pp. 22 f.; Riepl, Wolfgang. Das Nachrichtenwesen des Altertums (Leipzig, 1913), p. 464.Google Scholar

⁹ For the events of the period see, D. 16. 22.1–6; 52; Olmstead, A. T., History of the Persian Empire (Chicago, 1970), pp. 417–32.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Artabazus, Memnon, and Menapis were exiled in 352 BC and Sisines was sent to Philip's court by the satrap of Egypt, D. 16.52.3; C. 6.5.1–2; C. 3.7.11; Green (above, n. 1), p. 37. It is significant that Philip seems to have formulated his plans for the conquest of Persia about the same time these exiles were in his court (Ellis, J. R., Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London, 1976), pp. 227 f.) and undoubtedl much of the planning was based on intelligence supplied by these individuals.Google Scholar

¹¹ p.5.1; Plut. de Fort. aut Virt. Alex. 342C; Polyb. 12.22.5. Information becomes intelligence after it has been evaluated for its reliability, accuracy, and usefulness.

¹² A. 4.1.2. Perhaps heralds were used in this way also.

¹³ 17.93.2, A. 5.25.1, A. 6.1.5, A. 6.4.5, C. 8.12.12–13, C. 9.2.2–7, Str. 2.1. 6, cf. A. 3.7.3.

¹⁴ Engels (above, n. 7), p. 41.

¹⁵ Hegmont (above, n. 2), pp. 2–6. For example, the conquest of the Mediterranean coastline to deprive the Persian fleet of a base of operations was a strategic objective, while the siege of Tyre was one of the tactical operations undertaken to accomplish this objective.

¹⁶ Cf. the armies of Cambyses (Hdt. 3.5–8); Artaxerxes (D. 16.46.5); Antigonus (D. 20.73–4); and Bonaparte (HeroldJ, Christopher J, Christopher, Bonaparte in Egypt (New York, 1962), pp. 267Google Scholar f.). There is virtually no cultivable land or vegetation along the coastal route and the few meagre wells would be dry in early autumn when the Macedonians crossed. See Hogarth, D. G., ‘The Geography of the War Theatre in the Near East’, Geo. Journ. 45 (1915), 464Google Scholar; Elgood, P. G., Egypt and the Army (London, 1924), p. 267Google Scholar; Murray, G. W., ‘The Land of Sinai’, Geo. Journ. 119 (1953), 142–3.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Engels (above, n. 7), p. 21. The Sinai represents only one of a great many barren regions in Asia where the Macedonians would need special logistic planning.

¹⁸ See Engels, op. cit., pp. 18 f., and also Creveld, Martin L. Van, Supplying War: Army Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge, 1977)Google Scholar; and Huston, James A., The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775–1953 (Washington, 1966). The logistic capabilities of pre-industrial armies have been exhaustively studied in these works and there is no need to study the same problems again in this paper. The reader is urged to consult these works for further information.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Engels (above, n. 7), pp. 56, 38, 27.

²⁰ Crassus: Plut. Crass. 21–2, Julian: Amm. Marc. 24.7.3. Cf. the problems Hannibal encountered while crossing the Alps when guides led him into an ambush, Polyb. 3.52.7–8.

²¹ As in Fox, Robin Lane, Alexander the Great (New York, 1974), p. 103.Google Scholar

²² For the Royal Road from Sardis to Susa, see Hdt. 5.52–4, 8.98. The route of the road in Anatolia has been restored by Starr, Frederick S., ‘Mapping Ancient Road in Anatolia’, Archaeology 16 (1963), 162–9Google Scholar, and the whole route by Hagen, Victor W. Von, ‘The Horror of the Tomissa Crossing’, Geographical Magazine 48 (1976), 278–81.Google Scholar

²³ Engels (above, n. 7), p. 41.

²⁴ A. 4.22.6, C. 8.13.2.

²⁵ See above, n. 13.

²⁶ C. 8.10.1–2, A. 4.15.4.

²⁷ C. 3.13.4, C. 5.3.5–6, C. 5.4.20, C. 8.10.2, C. 9.8.30–9, 9.1, C. 9.9.5–6, D. 17.55.3, D. 17.68.3–4, A. 1.25.9, A. 3.3. 4, A. 3.17.2, A. 3.18.4–5, A. 3.21.7, A. 4. 29.1, A. 4.30.7.

²⁸ Pharnuches: A. 4.3.7, D. 17.68.4–5, C. 5.4.4; Cophes: C. 7.11.5–6; Mithrines: C. 3.12.6. Cf. D. 17.76.7, C. 6.5.19, C. 8.12. 9. Darius needed interpreters as well: C. 5.13.7.

²⁹ Engels (above, n. 7), pp. 71 f.

³⁰ A. 3.17.2; A. 4.15.4; cf. C. 4.7.8; C. 5.4.4–10; Riepl (above, n. 8), p. 468. Xen. Anab. 4.7.19.

³¹ C. 3.13.1–5, cf. C. 9.8.30–9. 9.1, A. 4.30.6–7, Aeneas Tacticus 6, Onasander 6.7.

³² See above, n. 27. Cf. Xen. Anab. 3.2.20, 4.1.21–25.

³³ C. 8.11.3–4, C. 7.2.18. Cf. Xen. Anab. 4.6.1.

³⁴ D. 17.68.4–6, D. 17.85.4–5, C. 5.7. 12, C. 8.11.3. Cf. Xen. Anab. 4.7.27.

³⁵ C. 6.4.14, while crossing the Shemshir-cur Pass over the Elburz Range into Hyrcania. Although no guides are mentioned in the passage, presumably it was not by mere coincidence that Alexander took one of the major passes over the Elburz Range, but it was probable that guides were leading him. For the route see, Stahl, A. F. von, ‘Notes on the March of Alexander the Great from Ecbatana to Hyrcania’, Geo. Journ. 64 (1924), 324–6Google Scholar; Pédech, P., ‘Deux campaignes d' Antiochus III chez Polybe’, REA 60 (1958), 75–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁶ A. 4.29.4; cf. Onasander 10.15. Prisoners that had been captured on previous occasions were also used as guides for territory with which they were familiar, A. 3.18.4–5; C. 5.4.20. Their reliability was probably checked by the same methods as those used for other guides. Notably Laomedon, who was bilingual in Persian and Greek was placed in charge of Persian prisoners, A. 3.6.6. Cf. Xen. Anab. 3.5.15.

³⁷ Whenever our sources inform us who is questioning guides, prisoners, spies, or scouts, it is always Alexander himself, never a subordinate (except of course, when subordinates were sent on their own missions, C. 3.13.1–4): D. 17.68.4–6, A. 3.18. 4–5, A. 3.21.7, A. 4.30.7, C. 5.3.5–6, A. 4. 24.8, A. 5.15.2, A. 6.8.4, C. 5.4.10. The quotations from Napoleon and Wellington are in Fuller, J. F. C., The Generalship of Alexander the Great (London, 1958), pp. 291–2.Google Scholar

³⁸ C. 9.10.8. The Ichthyophagai, who dwelt along the Makran coast had no social, commercial, or diplomatic relations with their neighbours. The Macedonian fleet found them completely lacking ports and sailing vessels for travel and commerce, Arr. Ind. 24–30. On occasion, naval reconnaissances were used as well, A. 2.7.2, A. 7.20.

³⁹ D. 17.31.6, D. 17.32.2, C. 3.1.10, C. 3.5.6, C. 3.5.10, C. 4.9.11, C. 5.13.1, C. 5.13.7, C. 5.13.2–3, C. 5.13.9, C. 5.13. 11, A. 2.6.1, A. 3.19.1, A. 3.19.3, A. 3.19.4, A. 3.21.4–5, A. 3.21.7, J. 11.8.1. All this information was obtained about Persian armies before contact was made with them by Macedonian scouts. Persian custom of maintaining silence: C. 4.6.5–7. Much of this information was supplied by deserters, see nn. 40 and 41.

⁴⁰ Deserters in Media and Comisene: A. 3.19.4, A. 3.19.5, A. 3.21.1, A. 3.25.3, C. 5.13.2–3, C. 5.13.7, C. 5.13.9, C. 5.13. 11, cf. C. 5.13.1, A. 3.19.1, A. 3.19.3, A. 3.21.4–5, A. 3.21.7.

⁴¹ Deserters and traitors were a common source, perhaps the most common, for obtaining information about enemy forces: see n. 40 and A. 3.29.6, A. 4.29.4, A. 5.23. 6, C. 7.4.19, C. 5.5.2, D. 17.31.3. Deserters were often highly rewarded for valuable information, D. 17.83.8. Individual decisions to desert seem to have been based heavily on the morale in the deserter's army or city. The morale was based not only on the leadership in the deserter's army but also on Alexander's success in battle, reputation, and policies. Indeed, the king is said to have remarked that he had won far more through his reputation for invincibility than in actual fighting, C. 4.4.2. In fact, one of the reasons for Alexander's generally lenient treatment of surrendered populations was to lower the morale of his opponents, weaken their will to resist, and enable intelligence from high-ranking natives to be collected more easily. Other policies which would weaken adversaries' morale were Alexander's great speed and surprise manoeuvres, his swift, thorough suppression of revolts, and the apparent invincibility of his army. Captured scouts: A. 3.7.4, agents: cf. Starr (above, n. 2), p. 16. Perhaps the Greek mercenary Bion, who deserted to the Macedonians before the battle of Gaugamela with information of the caltrops planted by the Persians on the battlefield, was a Macedonian agent (C. 4.13.36). It is also possible that he was a Persian counterintelligence agent who supplied the Macedonians with false information to confuse their battle plans. However, this is unlikely, because a reconnaissance of the battlefield, which was indeed undertaken before the engagement, could easily ascertain the truth (A. 3.9.4–5) and the agent's life would be in jeopardy if his report was false. Bion was placed under guard after giving his report to the king (C. 4.13.37), probably until the veracity of his report could be determined.

⁴² A. 3.7.3, Engels (above, n. 7), 44 f.

⁴³ D. 17.33.1, A. 1.13.2, A. 3.7.7, A. 3.21.2, A. 5.15.2, A. 6.8.5, C. 3.8.1718, C. 4.10.9, C. 4.10.11, C. 4.12.1–5. For the use of prodromoi see, Berve, H., Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage, I (Munich, 1926), pp. 129–35Google Scholar; Pritchett, William Kendrick, Ancient Greek Military Practices, Part 1, University of California Publications: Classical Studies, vol. 7 (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 127–32. Yet another method of acquiring intelligence-or so some Macedonians thought-was from the gods themselves through the seers Aristander and Demophon (D. 17.98.3, A. 1.25.8, A. 2.18.1, C. 4.2.14, C. 4.6.12). They were regularly consulted before any major engagement or undertaking, or after an ominous occurrence, and our sources ‘record that their predictions were invariably correct. This leads one to believe that their ‘predictions’ were either written post hoc for dramatic effect, or since the predictions were generally favourable to the Macedonians, they may have been used by the king to boost morale.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Glass and Davidson (above, n. 2), 101 f.

⁴⁵ A. 5.10–12, C. 8.13.17–23. Cf. Xen. Anab. 3.5.13.

⁴⁶ D. 17.85.7, A. 4.26.2–3.

⁴⁷ C. 6.8.15. Cf. Philip–s false march order to Amphissa when in fact he was marching to Elatea, Polyaenus 4.2.8.

⁴⁸ D. 17.4.5, A. 1.4.3, A. 1.7.5, A. 7. 28.3.

⁴⁹ C. 4.13.3, C. 6.8.1, A. 3.9.3, A. 2.6.1. Cf. Xen. Anab. 3.5.14–17.

⁵⁰ C. 6.2.15, C. 6.8.15, cf. Str. 2.1.6, Onasander 10.22, Starr (above, n. 2), p. 16.

⁵¹ C. 6.8.18, cf. Aeneas Tacticus 22, 24, Onasander 26.1–2, C. 7.2.28.

⁵² A. 1.25.9–10, C. 7.2.17–19, cf. Aeneas Tacticus 31.

⁵³ C. 3.7.12–14.

⁵⁴ This was apparently how the letter to Sisines from the Persian commander Nabarzanes was intercepted before it reached him (C. 3.7.14). The letter was intercepted, read by Alexander, re-sealed by him with a foreign seal, and re-delivered to Sisines to see if he would report the treasonable material in the letter to the king as a test of his loyalty. Sisines recognized that the seal on the letter was foreign, and presumably knowledge about the types of seals used by prominent Macedonians would have been known to others as well. Alternatively, the foreign messengers carrying enemy letters into the Macedonian camp may have been recognized and stopped, and their letters intercepted in this way. Unfortunately, there is no information concerning the methods used to intercept suspicious letters coming into and sent from the Macedonian camp.

⁵⁵ Darius had agents in the Macedonian camp, at least according to the letter of Alexander to Darius preserved in A. 2.14.6. 56 P. 48.4–5. Information from agents concerning intelligence given to adversaries of the king would be counter-intelligence, while information concerning plots directed against the king would be intelligence. Nonmilitary intelligence of this nature may have been distorted or obstructed on occasion by intermediaries (cf. C. 6.7.1623), but such obstruction could have fatal consequences, as Philotas learned.

⁵⁷ C. 7.2.35–36. Presumably, this important information was not obtained fortuitously, but by the king's orders from those he could trust.

⁵⁸ C. 3.7.12'15, C. 6.7.26.

⁵⁹ C. 7.2.36.

⁶⁰ C. 4.10.16–17, C. 3.7.14, cf. C. 6.9.13. These agents were probably ordinary soldiers, servants, or followers such as Antigone who were found to be loyal to the king. They probably behaved no differently from anyone else, for if they acted suspiciously, their intelligence-collecting roles would soon be discovered and their effectiveness eliminated. It will be noted that the apologetic Arrian omits any mention of these agents and their activities.

⁶¹ Information about Alexander and the army: C. 3.7.1, C. 4.9.1–2, C. 4.9.7, C. 5.8.2; deserters: A. 1.25.3; scouts: C. 4.12.1–5, A. 3.7.4; interrogation of natives: C. 3.8.24; agents in the Macedonian camp: A. 2.14.6; interpreters: C. 5.13.7.

⁶² A. 3.7.4. Cf. Xen. Anab. 2.4.16–24.

⁶³ The practice was well known, Aeneas Tacticus 7.2–5, A. 1.26.5.

⁶⁴ One might add a third failure before the battle of Issus, but since this has been discussed numerous times (most recently by Munson, C. L., ‘Darius III and the Battle of Issus’, Historia 21 (1972), 399–423 and Engels (above, n. 7), pp. 41 f.) it will not be included here. The reader is directed to the divergent views of these two authors.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ C. 7.4.28–9. For the nature of the country see, Olufsen, O., The Emir of Bokhara and his Country (Copenhagen, 1911), C. 7.4.26–31. Cf. A. 3.3.4, A. 6.26.4.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ C. 7.9.22, A. 4.6.5.

⁶⁷ D. Introduction to Book 17, part 2.

⁶⁸ A. 6.20.5.

⁶⁹ Engels (above, n. 7), pp. 112 f.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 114. Ancient sailing vessels could not sail closer than seven points off the wind, Casson, Lionel, The Ancient Mariners (New York, 1959), p. 220.Google Scholar

⁷¹ A. 6.16.3–6.18.1, Str. 15.2.5.

⁷² A. 6.18.4, C. 9.8.30–9.9.1. New guides could not be found.

⁷³ C. 9.9.9–25 and n. 38.

⁷⁴ Str. 15.2.5.

⁷⁵ C. 9.9.5–6.

⁷⁶ C. 9.10.8, Arr. Ind. 24–30.

⁷⁷ Str. 15.1.7, Str. 15.2.3, Engels (above, n. 7), p. 112.

⁷⁸ Bellinger, Alfred R., Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great, AmericanNumismatic Society Study 11 (1963), p. 38.Google Scholar