^{page 112 note 1} C.Q., Vol. XXV., pp. 27–37.

^{page 112 note 2} Refut. omn. her. i. 8. 2 (Diels A 42).

^{page 112 note 3} ξέ ὦν παγέντων, as we see from fr. 16, stands for the intermediate stages (1) Clouds (2) Water which come between Ether and Earth. The dense etc. ‘Separate off’ from the hot etc. (i.e. from the Ether) to form Clouds, then Clouds solidify to form Water, and Water solidifies to form Earth. See C.Q. XX., pp. 67–8.

^{page 112 note 4} The difference between the two stages is slight; see below, pp. 117, 118, 119.

^{page 112 note 5} Simpl. phys. 27 (Diels A. 41).

^{page 112 note 6} It will be useful to quote the passage here (Met. A 984a 13 sqq.) σΧεδὀν Υἀρ ἄπαντα τἀ ὁμοιομερῆ (καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἤ πῦρ) οὕτω γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόγγνσθαί ϕησι συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον, ἄλλως δὲ οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὔτ' ὰπόλλνσθαι ἀλλὰ διαμένειν ἀὶδια

^{page 113 note 1} Simplicius does not explicitly introduce these words as a verbatim quotation from Theophrastus; and as he does so introduce a quotation a little further on, it seems probable that Theophrastus need not be held responsible for these two examples (gold and earth). They are of course, strictly, incorrect. ‘Like’ certainly did ‘come to like’ to from them as to form everything else; but they were not portions of actual earth or gold which so came together for there was nothing in the All at the very beginning which ‘was earth’ or which ‘was gold,’ for neither of them are elements (see also pp. 117, 118).

^{page 113 note 2} See above, p. 35.

^{page 113 note 3} Lucretius of course says that Anaxagoras held the principle of infinite divisibility as well; but he rightly makes an entirely separate point of it (as Anaxagoras himself does: see fr. 3 and 6; fr. 12, etc.). He goes on after the above quotation to another point—(2) denial of the void (1. 843): nec tamen esse ulla idem ex parte in rebus inane concedit; and then (3) assertion of infinite divisibility: neque corporibus finem esse secandis; ‘Like to like’ does not automatically imply in finite divisibility.

^{page 113 note 4} Lucretius speaks not only of bone, flesh, blood as being formed thus, but also of gold, earth, fire, water. This is the same slight inaccuracy as was made by Simplicius (above, p. 112). It is not a serious one, unless it leads us to suppose that the latter substances are elements.

^{page 113 note 5} See below, p. 116, 117.

^{page 114 note 1} Simplicius says that ‘each νμνινέρεια just like the Whole, has all things present within itself’ (460); and Aetius says: ‘Because the νέρη in the food were similar (ὃμοια) to the substances produced by them, he called them ὁμοιομἑρειαι' (i. 3.5). The word is here used in the concrete; but the tendency is clear. The connexion of the word ὁμοιομἑρεια (not ὁμοιομερής) with the doctrine ὲν παντί etc., may thus be probably put back as far as Theophrastus, and indeed why should we not say with Lucretius that Anaxagoras himself used it?

^{page 114 note 2} The word ὁμοιομἑρειαι seems not to occur in Aristotle. Similarly, the word ῤίζωμα does not appear in Aristotle in Empedocles' sense at all. See above, p. 29, nn. 1, 3; and below, note 8.

^{page 114 note 3} The view that the Seeds are the elements is held by Burnet, (E.G.P., ed. iii., p. 264)Google Scholar and by MrCornford, (C.Q. XXIV. 22, 29, 30, 84)Google Scholar; and partially by Mr. Bailey (The Greek Atomists, App. i.).

^{page 114 note 4} Unless we know the size of Seeds we cannot profitably speak of ‘more’ or ‘fewer’ Seeds (as MrBailey, does, op. cit., 548Google Scholar, ‘the majority of the Seeds in a compound structure’; ‘most bread seeds,’ ib. 549; cf. also ‘more portions of the Hot’ (MrCornford, , C.Q. XXIV, 86)Google Scholar. ‘more or fewer portions’ (p. 87).

^{page 114 note 5} See C.Q. XXIV. 84.

^{page 114 note 6} I take no notice of the hypothesis that σπέρμα may be equivalent to the Empedoclean ῤίζωμα as it seems incompatible with fr. 4.

^{page 114 note 7} The point of this will be seen later, p. 116.

^{page 114 note 8} This is apparently what the doxographers in often mean by ὁμοιομέρειαι, which may if desired be considered the ‘units’ of matter. See below, p.116sq. Ientirely agree with MrBailey, (op. cit., pp. 553. 554)Google Scholar that the usage of ὁμοιομέρɛια must be clearly distinguished from that of ὁμοιομερὴς and that ‘the doxographers did not get [these usages of ὁμοιομέρειαι] from Aristotle’ (p. 555). But they are by no means consistent in their usage. Aristotle himself never uses the word όμοιομέρεια, which is in keeping with his customary procedure (see note 2 above). It so happened, however, that some of Anaxagoras’ elemental substances coincided with some of the substances called τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ and τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ by Aristotle. There is really no essential connexion between ὁμοιομέρεια and τὰὁμοιομερῆ, although a superficial reading of the evidence has frequently given rise to the belief that there is, and that Anaxagoras himself used the term ὁμοιομερὴς.

^{page 115 note 1} MrCornford, (C.Q. XXIV. 22Google Scholar) says: ‘Our authorities agree that, in Anaxagoras’ system, the ςτοιχεῖα… are the Seeds or homoeomereiai (Aristotle calls them σπέρματα or ἀόρατα or ἀόρατα ὁμοιομερῆ)… They cannot begin or cease to exist, and so cannot be increased or diminished in number.’ ‘… Aristotle's repeated statements that the Seeds are the only elements in Anaxagoras’ (ib. 29). These assertions are based on the equation of five terms: τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ = ἀ όρατα ὁμοιομερῆ = ὁμοιομέρῆ = ὁμοιομέρειαι = σπέρματα = στοιχεῖα, for which no justification is, or indeed can be, offered. Some of them, though not all, can be equated, as we have seen. For example, although the στοιχεῖα (i.e., the kinds of elementary substances) cannot be in creased or diminished in number, this cannot apply to the σπέρματα (i.e., the bits of those elementary substances), unless they are of a fixed size.

^{page 115 note 2} Phys. 203 a 19 sq.

^{page 115 note 3} The meaning in hypothesis (a) (ii.) is not suggested by Aristotle's words.

^{page 116 note 1} Diels B. 10.

^{page 116 note 2} And, of course, of every other substance too. See also. Ar. de gen. an. 763^b 30.

^{page 116 note 3} So might a Seed of meaning (a) (ii). In many respects these two meanings coincide.

^{page 116 note 4} That is, taking the words to mean that one. Seed would have the ἰδέα Flesh, another the χροιὰ λενκόν, another the ἡδονὴ πικρόν, etc.; and as they would be ‘all ὁμοῦ’ always, what we call ‘qualities’ would not be found apart from what we call ‘substances.’

^{page 116 note 5} That is, of course, a larger portion, not more portions numerically.

^{page 116 note 6} This is an interesting stage in the history of predication. With it may be compared the ὅναρ-theory in Plato' Theaetetus. 201d–202c, in which the problem is treated as one of logic and psychology rather than of physics. There seems also to be an implicit analogy with Anaxagoras in the statement that isolated στοιχεῖα are ἂλογα have no meaning. For the πολλὰ ὀνόματα. cf. Sophist, 251a, b.

^{page 116 note 7} Frag. 12. It will be seen that, with this explanation, the plurals ὄτων and ταῦτα are readily intelligible.

^{page 116 note 8} Note that a complete description of any object is provided for by Anaxagoras‘ scheme, since every one of what we call ‘qualities’ will have a substance corresponding to it in his third class of elements (the so-called Opposites). The first two classes consist of ‘substances’ proper.

^{page 117 note 1} Ar. phys. 187^b 24 sqq.

^{page 117 note 2} See too p. 119, para. 6.

^{page 117 note 3} I take this opportunity of correcting an inaccuracy of mine in C.Q. XX. 66 which has misled Bailey, Mr (op. tit., p. 544)Google Scholar. I said there: ‘An ὁμοιομέρεια (meaning a ‘unit’ as described above, p. 116) is not divisible.’ This would be more accurately stated ‘the substances in it are not separable,’ which is what the context there indicates. Mr. Bailey however in his own interpretation introduces (p. 547) a contrast between ‘juxtaposition’ and ‘fusion,’ and holds that things in juxtaposition are separable, and can be inseparable only if in fusion. There seems to be no justification for this view. Nor does it help: for Mr. Bailey assumes the proportions of the fusion in each ‘Seed’ (=? unit of definite size) to remain fixed so that the substances are locked up within it; which means that as far as explaining change is concerned, the position is the same as if the ‘Seeds’ were simple, and Mr. Bailey has further to assume Seeds of all sorts in everything (p. 549). Thus things are fused in Seeds and Seeds juxtaposed in objects, Mr. Bailey's view can be corrected by making the Seeds simple (destroying the fusion and their fixed size) and admitting universal inseparability,

^{page 117 note 4} As if Anaxagoras had said, ‘A portion of everything in every portion of everything in everything.’ See above, p. 33, n. 7.

^{page 118 note 1} It is necessary to repeat this explanation of ὁμοιομέρεια (see C.Q. XX. 62), since in essence it has been dismissed without argument as impossible (MrCornford, , C.Q. XXIV. 16, n. 4Google Scholar: ‘The suggestion in Aet. 1. 3. 5 … is the irresponsible conjecture of a doxographer. Anaxagoras, if he called flesh and the other tissues “things having like parts” could not have meant “having parts like the parts of the food which nourishes them ”’).

^{page 118 note 2} MrCornford, C.Q. XXIV. 90 sqqGoogle Scholar.) represents the doctrine ἐν παντί παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι as a means of explaining ‘the eternal differences between one elementary substance and another.’ (a) But in no case can it be that; for the difference between one element and another is exhypothesi ultimate, and therefore incapable of explanation. (b) Consonant with this, all our evidence is that Anaxagoras meant it as an comexplanation of ‘becoming’ and ’change.’ Mr. Cornford's remarks on p. 91 about beer and the letters of the alphabet depend on the identification of element (e.g. bone) with object (bone): see above, pp. 36, 116. (c) It is difficult to see how the difference between one ‘element’ and another can be accounted for by supposing that each ‘element’ consists of the self-same substances, viz. the ‘Opposites.’ (d) MrCornford's, criticism of MrBailey's, (C.Q. XXIV. 91, n. 1)Google Scholar hardly applies. Mr. Bailey's theory does not profess to explain the differences between thi elements.

^{page 118 note 3} In this summary I have confined myself to points which seemed particularly to need statemeans, and have not mentioned others which take their places in the scheme without difficulty.

^{page 118 note 4} Frag. 1.

^{page 118 note 5} Frag. 12.

^{page 118 note 6} See above, pp. 112, 113.

^{page 118 note 7} Frr. 12, 15, 16.

^{page 118 note 8} Theoph, . hist. plan. iii. 1. 4Google Scholar. Cf. Anax. fr. 4.

^{page 118 note 9} Cf. also Hippol. ref, i. 8. 2.

^{page 118 note 10} Anaxagoras tells us about the chief components of some of them in frr. 15 and 16.

^{page 118 note 11} Frr. 4, 6, 8, 12.

^{page 118 note 12} Fr. 12.

^{page 118 note 13} σνμπήγννται γῆ, λίθοι σνμπήγνννται, fr. 16.

^{page 119 note 1} Whence Anaxagoras' ‘impiety’: the Sun is no god; it is not even alive; for it is inorganic. Cf. Achilles (Diels A. 79), and Diog. ii. 8 and 12.

^{page 119 note 2} Aetius ii. 13. 3, Plut. Lys. 12, Hipp. ref. i. unb. 6. Cf. frr. 12, 16.

^{page 119 note 3} And of course fire comes out of stones, Simplicius 460 (Diels A. 45).

^{page 119 note 4} Fr. 4.

_{page 119 note 5} Fr. 1.

^{page 119 note 6} Theoph, . hist. pl. iii. 1Google Scholar. 4.

^{page 119 note 7} Ibid.; Ireneus ii. 14. 2; Aetius ii. 8. 1.

^{page 119 note 8} Fr. 6.

^{page 119 note 9} Schol. in Greg, xxxvi. 911 (Diels B. 10).

^{page 119 note 10} Fr. 12.

^{page 119 note 11} Cf. Simplicius (Diels A. 45), πᾶν ἐκ παντός λιγνόμενονον, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀμέσως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τάξιν: cf. id. phys. 174. 19; 176. 27.

^{page 119 note 12} Cf. Arist. Met. 984a II sqq. See also fr. 10, where the Schol. definitely connects διάκρισις with αὒξησις

^{page 119 note 13} The alternative to saying that all things are in all things is to say that some things are in some things, which is the view put forward by MrCornford, (C.Q. XXIV. 17–21)Google Scholar. But this, as Anaxagoras no doubt saw, is impracticable, unless we are able definitely to say (e.g.) ‘This food nourishes hair, and is the only food in which there is any.’ Anaxagoras took the only practical course when he said every thing was in everything, (Mr. Cornford's difficulty arises from his view that gold, emeralds, rubies, etc., are elements, ib.. 16, 17, 20.)

^{page 119 note 14} Cf. π γονῆς, 22–34; π διαίτησ, 6, 26.

^{page 119 note 15} Fr. 12.

^{page 119 note 16} This does not imply that (e.g.) isolated flesh can be obtained out of a food by cutting it up. The transference goes on inside the body, and the flesh in the food attaches itself directly to the flesh in the body. In other words, the process depends upon the controlling power of νο. It is biological, not mechanical.