¹ For the thesis that Crito's values prevent him from understanding Socrates see Miller, M., ‘“The arguments I seem to hear”: argument and irony in the Crito’, Phronesis 41 (1996), 121–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Bentley, R., ‘Responding to Crito: Socrates and political obligation’, History of Political Thought 17 (1996), 1–20Google Scholar, and Harte, V., ‘Conflicting values in Plato's Crito’, AGPh 81 (1999), 117–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Scholars who also support the thesis that Crito has poor cognitive and dialectical skills include Young, C., ‘Socrates and obedience’, Phronesis 19 (1974), 1–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Weiss, R., Socrates Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato's Crito (Oxford, 1998).CrossRefGoogle ScholarLane, M. (‘Agreement and action in Plato's Crito’, History of Political Thought 19 [1998], 313–30)Google Scholar claims that the text of the Crito leaves it open whether Crito's failure to understand Socrates is ‘due to willful blindness or intellectual incapacity’ (315 with n. 9).

² The view that Crito is unable to comprehend Socrates' values is normally coupled with the interpretation that the speech of the Laws is un-Socratic; see Miller, Harte, Young and Weiss (n. 1). According to it, Socrates presents to Crito the speech of the Laws because Crito is unable to understand the real reasons behind Socrates' decision to remain in prison. In this paper I do not directly address the question of whether the speech of the Laws is Socratic (I take on this task in ‘Socrates and the speech of the Laws’ [manuscript]). My arguments, however, challenge the account of the dramatic development of the dialogue offered by supporters of the un-Socratic tenor of the speech of the Laws. For, as I argue, Crito is able to understand Socrates' values and thus does not need to be presented with a second-best system of values.

³ By ‘Socrates’ views' I refer to the views of the Socratic character in Plato's early dialogues. I focus primarily on the Protagoras and to a lesser extent on the Meno (for my use of evidence from the Meno see n. 23). I do not assume that these views are necessarily the views of the historical Socrates.

⁴ Crito qualifies his claim that the many can cause the greatest harm by adding ‘roughly speaking’ (σχεδόν, Crito 44d4). The use of σχεδόν, however, does not indicate that Crito has any real reservations about whether death is the greatest harm. Crito has already described death as disaster (συμϕορά) for everyone who is about to die (43c2). In any case, Socrates understands Crito to put forward the unqualified thesis that the many can cause the greatest harm (44d6–7) and Crito does not protest against this interpretation of his thesis.

⁵ It is not clear from the discussion between Socrates and Crito whether Crito came to hold (or confirm his commitment to) T3 and T4 partly as a result of being himself the subject of elenctic examinations by Socrates or simply witnessing elenctic examinations of others. This distinction, though interesting in its own right, is not important for my argument.

⁶ A fourth explanation may be that Crito is in what Schwitzgebel, E., (‘In-between believing’, PhilosQ 51 [2001], 76–82)Google Scholar calls an ‘in-between state of belief’. The idea is roughly that Crito should not be considered to either fully believe or fully not believe T1, T2, T3 and T4. Rather he is in an intermediate state of believing with respect to these theses. I avoid exploring this fourth explanation as there is no evidence that Socrates recognizes such intermediate states of beliefs in the Crito or other early dialogues. As the analogy of Daedalus (see § 4 of this paper) indicates, Socrates prefers to speak in terms of acquisition and loss of flat-out beliefs rather than in terms of degrees of beliefs.

⁷ Young (n. 1), 6.

⁸ Apart from Young (see n. 7), Bentley (n. 1), 8 and 17, Harte (n. 1), 130–4 and Weiss (n. 1), 80 also support E1. Miller (n. 1), 134 is not explicit about what prevents Crito from following Socrates' line of reasoning, but his claim that ‘it is precisely the perspective of the many … that rules in [Crito]’ suggests that he thinks it is Crito's moral framework.

⁹ Weiss (n. 1), 43–9; Young (n. 1) at 12. Lane (n. 1), 135 speaks of Crito's ‘obduracy’.

¹⁰ I focus exclusively on the dramatic persona of Crito in the Crito. For an account of Crito's dramatic persona in other dialogues see Stokes, M., Dialectic in Action: An Examination of Plato's Crito (Swansea, 2005), 29–32Google Scholar. Stokes shows that Crito is not depicted as a fool or stupid in either the Phaedo or the Euthydemus. I am in substantial agreement with Stokes's remark that “‘un-Socratic” and “intelligent”, even in Plato's eyes, need not be mutually contradictory epithets’ (p. 32).

¹¹ See Weiss (n. 1), 64–5 and 82–3. My arguments in the main text also tell against Harte's claim (n. 1), 132 that Crito and Socrates have fundamentally different understandings of harm.

¹² The tension between these two conceptions of harm and justice maps the tension between ordinary and psychic justice in the Republic.

¹³ The controversy over whether κακουργεῖν means here mere harm as opposed to wrongful harm is irrelevant to my argument. For different views compare Harte (n. 1) with Kahn, C., ‘Problems in the argument of the Crito’, Apeiron 22 (1989), 29–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ Lane (n. 1), 322 claims that Crito fails to grasp the minor premise of Socrates' practical deliberation, the conclusion of which is that Socrates should not escape. According to Lane the major premise is the agreed principle that one should never do injustice and the minor premise is that to escape is to do injustice because it is harmful. The minor premise, however, follows from Socrates' equation of ἀδικεῖν with κακουργεῖν at 49b4–c9, only if we assume that for Socrates escaping from prison would be an act of κακουργεῖν. But Socrates has not argued for this point yet. The relevant justification is provided in the speech of the Laws. Weiss (n. 1), 79 also claims that Crito fails to grasp an argument against escape that Socrates has already established. For criticisms (in my view conclusive) of Weiss's interpretation, see Brown, L., ‘Did Socrates agree to obey the Laws?’ in Judson, L. and Karasmanis, V. (edd.), Remembering Socrates (Oxford, 2006), 72–87Google Scholar, at 76–7; Stokes (n. 10), 201–9.

¹⁵ I side with the interpretation that Socrates' disavowals of knowledge are genuine. For a defence, see Irwin, T., Plato's Ethics (Oxford, 1995), 27–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ For an analysis of Aristotle's argument see Burnyeat, M., ‘Aristotle on learning to be good’, in Rorty, A.O. (ed.), Essays on Aristotle (Berkeley, 1980), 69–92.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Bentley (n. 1), 8 and 16–7; Miller (n. 1), 125; Weiss (n. 1), 62–3; and Harte (n. 1), 130.

¹⁸ Vlastos, G., Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 195 (my emphasis). Weiss (n. 1), 62 and Harte (n. 1), 130 agree with Vlastos's interpretation.

¹⁹ In fact the elenchus is based on the assumption that this wide agreement is possible. If someone disagrees with Socrates' principles Socrates could gain his agreement on some other principles and through them get him to revise his commitment to his original un-Socratic principles. This is precisely what Socrates does in the Crito when he gains Crito's agreement on T3 and T4 and makes him reconsider his commitment to T1 and T2.

²⁰ On this reading δοκεῖ and δόξει at 49d2 refer to the disposition of believing that one should never retaliate as opposed to the acquisition of the relevant belief.

²¹ Though the comment is ‘ironic’ in the sense that Socrates means the opposite of what he says, the aim of Socrates is not to ridicule or mock Crito. Rather his aim is educational: he wants to make Crito realize that his anxiety affects his reasoning. Once Crito becomes aware of this fact he will be more readily benefited by an elenctic discussion. For an illuminating discussion of the nature and scope of Socratic irony to which I am indebted, see Lane, M., ‘Reconsidering Socratic irony’, in Morrison, D. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Socrates (Cambridge, 2011), 237–59.Google Scholar

²² Socrates consistently uses μένειν and ἐμμένειν to refer to the stability of beliefs. μένειν is used at Euthyphro 11b8, c4, c6, c9 and d8, Euthydemus 288a3, Gorgias 480b3 and Meno 83d3 (cf. μένουσαν at Protagoras 356e2). ἐμμένειν is used at Protagoras 353b3. In the context of the analogy of Daedalus in the Meno παραμένειν is used possibly because of the contrast with δραπετεύειν, see Meno 97d10, e4 and 98a2. For more on the analogy of Daedalus see § 4 of this paper.

²³ Despite the fact that the Meno contains ‘Platonic’ doctrines like the theory of recollection, two considerations which I have already mentioned suggest that the analogy of Daedalus is primarily ‘Socratic’ in spirit. First, in the Euthyphro Socrates compares beliefs to the statues of Daedalus. Second, in the Protagoras Socrates implicitly assumes what the analogy of Daedalus illustrates in the Meno, namely that true beliefs are unstable.

²⁴ For opposing interpretations, see Taylor, C.C.W., Plato Protagoras (Oxford, 1991), 164–70Google Scholar and Zeyl, D., ‘Socrates and hedonism: Protagoras 351B–358D’, Phronesis 25 (1980), 250–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵ It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the question of why some things have the power of appearance. For an original answer to this question and review of the relevant literature, see Brickhouse, T.C. and Smith, N.D., Socratic Moral Psychology (Cambridge, 2010), 70–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ Crito's sleeplessness and distress may be considered to be somatic and emotional manifestations of his fear.

²⁷ We need not infer from the fact that Socrates always obeys his reflective judgement and thus does not fall prey to the power of appearance that Socrates believes that his true beliefs are stable. I suggest that Socrates thinks that it is possible that he may lose his true beliefs because of an argument by a superior dialectician. I base my suggestion on the fact that Socrates acknowledges that he holds his beliefs provisionally and that they may be refuted. For example, in the Crito he is willing to examine whether there is a better argument in favour of his escaping from prison (46c2–3) and even to give up his previous beliefs if they are found wanting under the current examination (46d5–7). In the Gorgias he claims that he assumes but does not know his beliefs to be true on the grounds that no one so far has refuted them (implying thus that he does not rule out that one might refute them in the future, Grg. 509a4–b1).

²⁸ Since Socrates is able to exhibit extreme devotion to arguments he cannot mean that it is beyond the reach of any human being. Cf. Hatzistavrou, A., ‘Socrates' deliberative authoritarianism’, OSAPh 29 (2005), 75–113Google Scholar, at 86 with n. 20.

²⁹ To believe that all humans are likely to err at some point is not a reason for believing that when they do err they are not responsible.