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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 April 2014
A conjecture made by Lambinus in 1565 proposes replacement of difficilest (present in the three authoritative manuscripts O, Q and V) at 3.361 with desiperest. Although commonly printed until the end of the nineteenth century (including in Lachmann's famous edition and Heinze's edition of Book 3, but excluding Wakefield's and Munro's), in the twentieth century the conjecture fell out of favour, both in editions of the entire De rerum natura (DRN) and of Book 3; the manuscript reading of difficilest has been kept by editors since 1900: Duff, Bailey, Martin, Kenney, Müller, Smith and Brown. But with this consensus there are problems, and there are several reasons for preferring Lambinus' conjecture.
I should like to thank Gavin Kelly sincerely for his suggestions and for his time when first writing up this note. David Butterfield was kind enough to discuss several points with me, and I am fortunate to have benefited from his expertise. For his interest and his advice in the earlier stages of thinking about this textual issue, I owe thanks to Dominic Berry; for reading a later version of the note, to Stephen Harrison. Not least, I gratefully acknowledge the comments of the editor, and of the anonymous reader, whose learned suggestions (particularly on the more ‘poetic’ and polemical Lucretius) helped me to make a stronger case for resurrecting Lambinus' conjecture.
1 Unless stated otherwise, all translations are W.H.D. Rouse's, from Smith, M.F., Lucretius. De Rerum Natura. With an English Translation by W.H.D. Rouse (Cambridge, MA and London, 1992 2)Google Scholar.
2 The conjecture is found listed in the emendations at the end of D. Lambinus' 1565 pocket edition of Lucretius: Titi Lucretii De Rerum Natura Libri Sex (Paris, 15652). Where desiperest is printed, it is invariably accompanied by Lambinus' dicat rather than ducat. This is attractive, but it is a separate question. The choice is between seeing dicat balancing dicere at 3.359 or ducat anticipating the physical language of trahit at 3.362.
3 Lachmann, K., Caroli Lachmanni in T. Lucretii Cari De rerum natura libros commentarius (Berlin, 1850)Google Scholar, on 3.361, supports the 1563 conjecture: ‘Lambinus optime desiperest contra cum dicat; cui Wakefieldus et Forbiger cum contra dicunt, desipiunt’; as do Creech, T., Titi Lucretii Cari de rerum natura libri sex, quibus interpretationem et notas addidit Thomas Creech (Oxford, 1695)Google Scholar, and Heinze, R., T. Lucretius Carus de rerum natura. Buch III. Erklärt von Richard Heinze (Leipzig, 1897)Google Scholar. For those who do not print Lambinus' conjecture, see: Wakefield, G., T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex, comm. illustr., et cum animadversionibus R. Bentleii aliorum subinde miscuit G. Wakefield (London, 1796–74)Google Scholar; Forbiger, A., T. Lucretii Cari de rerum natura libri sex, ed., annotationem adiecit A. Forbiger (Leipzig, 1828)Google Scholar; Munro, H.A.J., T. Lucreti Cari, De Rerum Natura, Libri Sex (London, 1886 4)Google Scholar, who, with Duff and Müller, prints difficilest with dicat; Duff, J.D., T. Lucreti Cari, De rerum natura. Liber tertius (Cambridge, 1903)Google Scholar; Bailey, C., Titi Lucreti Cari. De Rerum Natura. Libri Sex (Oxford, 1947)Google Scholar; Martin, J., T. Lucreti Cari, De Rerum Natura, Libri Sex (Leipzig, 1969)Google Scholar; Kenney, E.J., Lucretius De Rerum Natura Book III (Cambridge, 1971)Google Scholar; Müller, C., T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex (Zürich, 1975)Google Scholar; Smith (n. 1); and Brown, P.M., Lucretius De Rerum Natura Book III (Warminster, 1997).Google Scholar
4 David Butterfield suggests to me that one could also read credere for dicere. This is a valid alternative solution to the problems of expression in the transmitted text. It should be noted, however, that Lambinus' solution is easier palaeographically. The visible and sonic similarities of difficilest and desiperest make it perfectly plausible that an unusual form was replaced by a more common one in copying the text. Another explanation for the route of corruption is that in Lucretius both difficilest and desiperest occur naturally in line-initial position (except for difficilest at 5.1168). For difficilest see 3.361, 5.527, 735, 1168 (one might note too Catullus 76.13, 14); for desiperest see 3.802, 5.165, 1043.
5 See Bailey (n. 3), on 3.359–62.
6 See TLL 5.1.984.12–985.61 s.v. dicere, iii.c.i. Although dicere can mean ‘declare’ or similar when with a direct object, no example in the accusative and infinitive construction relies solely on this meaning for sense. Cf. OLD 2, s.v. dicere, 2a.
7 This is not how Lucretius conveys difficulty of expression or argument in any case. Where difficile occurs, the infinitive which it modifies is never dicere, but the following: inlustrare (1.137), credere (1.487), vitare (4.1146–7), pervincere (5.99), ponere (certum) (5.526–7), docere et vincere (verbis) (5.735), and (rationem) reddere (verbis) (5.1168). Of these seven examples, five refer explicitly to difficulty in the expression of ideas (while 1.487–8 communicates the idea of problems in understanding them), yet not one example uses dicere to convey this: when discussing the communication of philosophy, Lucretius prefers periphrasis. This is also seen where difficile is avoided with dicere, at 3.730: neque … dicere suppeditat; and 4.174–5: nemost | qui possit neque eam rationem reddere dictis. Compare too 1.833, 2.381, 763, 5.1053 for the use of (per)facile and an infinitive (never dicere) to form a phrase generally referring to ease of expression. For comprehension of these ideas and facile, see: 2.462, 3.158, 856, 4.633, 749, 5.1282, 6.423, 532. nil est quod possis dicere at 1.430 could be problematic, since it seems to imply difficulty with expression similarly to dicere … difficilest. But the phrase ‘there is nothing which you can call [wholly distinct from body and separate from void]’ puts an emphasis on the nil est. Lucretius' point is that there is nothing of a third nature, and that there is nothing which can be called separate from body and void: in this case, it is not something which is debatable. Cf. 3.1024 for an example of posse with dicere. Similarly, dicere contra at 4.484 might be considered to mean something like ‘argue against’, but it equally makes sense as simply ‘contradict’. Far from being problematic, these examples strengthen the argument that Lucretius illustrates difficulty of expression without using dicere … difficilest.
8 Bailey (n. 3), on 3.361. Here, Bailey cites three passages in defence of difficilest: 5.526, 735 and 1168. He concedes that ‘ponere certum, docere, and rationem reddere go more easily with difficilest than dicere here’, but insists that ‘there is no need to accept desiperest from Lambinus, comparing iii.802, v.165, 1043’. Cf. Munro (n. 3), on 3.361, who admits that when the meaning of dicere is ‘pressed’ the construction with difficilest is problematic, but keeps difficilest. Conversely, see Heinze (n. 3), on 3.361, who argues against Munro and Bailey that difficilest cannot make sense with dicere, and also cites Lucretius' habit of using desiperest.
9 See TLL 1.400.8–45 s.v. acies, i.a and i.b. Cf. OLD 2, s.v. acies for the primary meaning. The observations of Kenney (n. 3), esp. on 3.362, are valuable here. My thanks to the anonymous reader for their instructive suggestions at this point, in particular.
10 See n. 7 for the uses of difficile in DRN; see n. 4 for instances of difficilest. Looking at equivalences, haud facile (est) occurs just twice in DRN (in the same sentence), with evellere (3.327–8) and extrahere (3.330), while non facile does not occur at all. Likewise, difficile's direct opposite, (per)facile, is never used with dicere. Where it is seen as an adjective (as opposed to an adverb), it is with the following: exponere (verbis) (1.833), exsolvere (2.381), cognoscere (4.663, 5.1282, 6.423), investigare (4.701–2), factu (4.889), docere (5.1052–3), (placidam ac pacatam) degere (vitam) (5.1154), obsistere (6.331) and reperire (6.532). Moreover, when used as an adverb, facile is seen with agnoscas (2.402), cognoscere (2.462, with possis), (rationem) reddere (2.763, with possis), inditur (2.1125, 1136), tolerarit (aevom) (2.1171), noscere (3.158, with possit), effervescit (in ira) (3.295), insequitur (3.400), (hoc) adcredere (3.856, with possis), concrescere (4.133), penetrare (4.197, with queant), spoliatur … et repletur (4.377–8), (inter se) iunguntur (4.726), haerescit (4.742), commovet (4.746), cognoscere (4.749, with possis), expletur (4.1093), insuescat (4.1282), penetrare potest (5.698), caperetur (5.929), fregere (5.1018), docere … suadereque (5.1052–3), dempsit (honorem) (5.1114), cedebant (5.1291–2), conlaxat (6.232–3), dissoluit (6.352), fit uti des (6.801), insinuatur (6.802–3) and ardescunt (6.898).
11 See also e.g. 3.455–8, 3.526–47 and 3.819–29.
12 Compare Bailey (n. 3) on 5.321, where a repetition at 5.238 ‘is decisive’ in accepting a conjecture made by Bernays, J., T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex (Leipzig, 1862).Google Scholar
13 And at 2.978, dicere callent can illustrate wisdom in speaking as opposed to folly.
