¹ Cf. nn. 33 and 35 below.

² ‘Supplication in the Iliad and the Odyssey’, TAPA 112 (1982), 125–40, 129.Google Scholar

³ Cf. Page, D. L., History and the Homeric Iliad (Berkeley, 1959), pp. 297–315, esp. p. 303Google Scholar; for an argument against the separatist view, Scott, J. A., ‘Phoenix in the Iliad’, AJP 33 (1912), 68–77.Google Scholar

⁴ Pedrick, art. cit. (n. 2), 132 n. 29.

⁵ Pedrick thinks that ‘Zeus is imagined as protecting the suppliant even in battle’ (art. cit. 133) in this passage. However, if we look at the passage closely, Zeus is not involved in the supplication itself. The king spared the suppliant out of his pity (14.279 μ' λησεν) and took him to his palace on his chariot (280 ς δϕρον δ μ' ἕσας ἄγεν οἴκαδε). By then, therefore, the suppliant had acquired ξεῖνος status. And it is at this point that the authority of Zeus Xeinios (14.283–4) is brought into the story.

⁶ Art. cit. 133.

⁷ Art. cit. 129, 135.

⁸ Cf. Od. 11.537 πιµξ δ τε μανεται Ἄρης; cf. Heubeck, A., West, S. and Hainsworth, J. B., A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey Volume I: Books I–VIII (Oxford, 1988), on 5.447Google Scholar: ‘αἰδοῖος: the claim of the suppliant, except in the heat of battle, was absolute against other men, and sanctioned by Zεὺς ἱκετσιος (xiii, 213)…’ (my italics); even in the successful example of wartime supplication in the Odyssey, i.e. a fictitious episode of Odysseus being saved by the king of Egypt, we see the ‘ethics of war’. While the pious king protects the helpless enemy in awe of Zeus Xeinios because the foreigner is already accepted into his house as ξεῖνος (14.280), other angry Egyptians still demand his life (14.281–2).

⁹ Note how different Hector the family man (e.g. Il. 24.767–72) is from Hector the warrior (e.g. Il. 24.739).

¹⁰ ντ = as good as; cf. Leaf, W., Homer: The Iliad² (London, 1902)Google Scholar, ad loc.

¹¹ W. Leaf, op. cit. (n. 10), on Il. 21.75, referring to the parallel custom of the Arabs, says that ‘The mere breaking of bread under another man's roof entitles to the position of a suppliant, even though the intention to protect be absent’. Cf. bT scholion ad loc. But Achilles is fully aware of the fact that Lycaon was once his captive, as we know from his monologue, and that is precisely what drives him to try to ‘kill him again’ (21.54–63). The bread they shared simply is no hindrance at all to Achilles. Similarly, Odysseus does not hesitate to kill the suitors who have eaten under his roof. Here again, some might like to quote the Egyptian episode of Odysseus as an example of the protection guaranteed to a captive. However, the king obviously treats the Cretan (Odysseus' assumed identity) not as his captive, but as his guest, for the man is even given property by the king and other Egyptians. That is by no means what every captive can expect from his enemy. Achilles' attitude, on the other hand, is not that of a bloodthirsty killer, but of a man who has renounced the joy and warmth of life. He calls Lycaon ϕλος (106), not because they once shared bread, but because they are dying together. Cf. Whitfield, G. K., The Restored Relation (Diss. Columbia, 1967), p. 151Google Scholar; Daude, C., ‘Homère: un humanisme pessimiste’, Actes du Congrès, Association G. Budé, VII^e Congrès, Aix-en-Provence (Paris, 1964), pp. 543–64, p. 554.Google Scholar

¹² But, in fact, Achilles' release of Hector's body is his κδος bestowed by Zeus. Cf. Il. 24.110.

¹³ There is one example of divine wrath against a man who has rejected a suppliant, namely, Agamemnon, who has rejected Chryses' appeal to him to release his daughter (Il. 1.1 Iff.). However, although Chryses is described with a term of supplication (15 λσσετο), he pleads in his capacity as a priest of Apollo rather than a suppliant (21), and the Achaeans are punished for Agamemnon's insult to Chryses' priesthood by Apollo on his priest's request (1.35–52). Therefore, the issue here is solely Apollo's τιμή, not the right of a suppliant.

¹⁴ Cf. Willcock, M. M., ‘Mythological Paradeigma in the Iliad’, CQ 14 (1964), 141–54, esp. 149–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ For the corresponding roles of the members of two sets of supplications, cf. Ebel, H., After Dionysus (Cranbury, NJ, 1972), p. 99.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cf. Bassett, S. E., The Poetry of Homer (Berkeley, 1938), p. 201Google Scholar: ‘…Achilles now recognizes the claim of friendship, but feels that the slight upon his honour still remains, since his best friends misunderstand the real point at issue.’

¹⁷ For the emotional impact of the speeches of the Embassy on Achilles, see Tarkow, T. A., ‘Achilles' Response to the Embassy’, CB 58 (1982), 29–34, 30–1.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Cf. Bassett, S. E., ‘The 'Aμαρτα of Achilles’, TAPA 65 (1934), 47–69, 59–62Google Scholar; Eichholz, D. E., ‘The Propitiation of Achilles’, AJP 74 (1953), 137–48, 144.Google Scholar

¹⁹ E.g. Thornton, A., Homer's Iliad: its Composition and the Motif of Supplication (Göttingen, 1984), p. 132.Google Scholar

²⁰ Cf. Whitman, C. H., Homer and the Heroic Tradition (Cambridge, MA, 1958), pp. 192–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ Note also Agamemnon's proud words, βασιλετερς εἰμι. (9.160) echoed by Achilles' rejection of his daughter's hand, δʼ Ἀχαιν ἄλλον λσθω, ὅς τις οἷ τʼ ποικε κα ὂς βασιλετερς στιν (9.391–2).

²² As in Bacchylides, 5.127–9.

²³ On the contrary, of course, he has specially asked Zeus to restore his honour through the death of many Achaeans. In his eye, the Achaeans who did not check Agamemnon from dishonouring him share the king's responsibility. Cf. Il. 16.18, ‘ὑπερβασης ἕνεκα σϕς.’

²⁴ He has another occasion to recover (2), when Patroclus urges him to save the Achaeans in book 16, but he does not agree to go himself, and sends Patroclus instead, which results in the latter's death. But is Achilles punished for this ‘error’, as A. Thornton maintains (op. cit. (n. 19), pp. 135–6)? On the contrary, I think, Achilles should be commended for his concern for the Achaeans, which makes him send Patroclus to battle. Although Achilles has not received a true apology, (1), which he expects to come soon (Il. 11.609–10), he sends his friend and other Myrmidons to save the Achaeans before it is too late. This good will has never been appreciated by anybody in the story, least of all by Agamemnon, and, probably as a consequence, not very often pointed out by critics. However, who can deny that it is the result of his concession, rather than his moral error, that he did save the Achaeans?

²⁵ Ed. W. Leaf, op. cit. (n. 10), ad loc.

²⁶ Cf. Dodds, E. R., The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, 1951), pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

²⁷ Cf. Bremer's, J. M. observation in Hamartia (Amsterdam, 1969), pp. 111–12Google Scholar: ‘The Homeric conception of ate relates the error to an arbitrary and malicious interference of the gods with human action, causing infatuation in man and resulting in disaster.’

²⁸ Cf. Leaf, op. cit. (n. 10), on 10.391: ‘ἄτηισι is so far peculiar here that it is used of “blinding”, deception, of a purely human origin; ἄτας ἔϕη τς π κακι ὑποσχσεις, Schol. BT. In every other instance it conveys the idea of some divine or mysterious blindness.’ Dodds (op. cit. [n. 26], p. 19 n. 20) does not accept the view that this passage is an exception, maintaining that ἄται means ‘a symptom of Hector's own condition of (divinely inspired) ἄτηʼ and not that ‘Hector's unwise advice produced ἄτη in Dolon,’ on the ground that ἄται as ‘acts productive of infatuation’ is ‘a unique psychology’ and ‘a unique use of ἄταιʼ. His interpretation has two major problems. First, ἄτη always involves disastrous consequences for the person who acts under its influence, whereas the present situation is Dolon's disaster and not Hector's. Therefore, even if Hector's suggestion was a strategic error, Hector cannot be considered the victim of ἄτη. If it is to be interpreted as Dodds proposes, namely that Hector is hit by ἄτη but not affected by it himself, we are indeed dealing with a unique use of ἄτη. Also in this context, it is difficult to visualize ‘many’ ἄται on Hector's side. Secondly, although Dodds has successfully eliminated two possible meanings of ἄται here, namely, one as ‘temporary blinding of mind (produced in Dolon)’ and one as ‘acts productive of infatuation’, he has failed to take account of another aspect of ἄται, i.e. as ‘deluders’, as agents causing mental malfunction. If we interpret πολλα ἄται arcu here as Hector's many words of dazzling promises (which caused Dolon to lose his head), all the difficulty is dissolved. It seems, therefore, by far the best to take the ἄται as ‘producers of infatuation’. I find Dodds' analysis of ἄτη in Homer generally sound and accurate, except that he does not make it explicit that ἄτη is defined by its consequences, not by its origin.

²⁹ We see another example of a dream as an experience in the simile at Il. 22.199–200.

³⁰ On dreams in Homer, see Dodds, op. cit. (n. 26), pp. 104–7.

³¹ Cf. Dawe, R. D., ‘Some Reflections on Ate and Hamartia’, HSCP 72 (1967), 89–123, 100Google Scholar: ‘The division of responsibility between men and gods has long been properly understood to be an irresolvable problem in Homer…the Homeric poets did not recognise any contradiction between assigning responsibility for a particular event to the gods in one line and to men in the next.’

³² The theory does not, therefore, serve as decisive evidence for interpolation. Hope for divine justice is often expressed by human characters in Homer, though the gods themselves do not always live up to their expectations. For example, while human beings believe that Zeus is the guardian of oaths who punishes liars (Il. 4.235–9). it is he who prompts Athena to cause the truce to be broken (Il. 4.68–72).

³³ Fränkel, H., Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy (tr., New York, 1951), p. 63Google Scholar. Cf. Bowra, C. M., Tradition and Design in the Iliad (Oxford, 1930), p. 17Google Scholar: ‘The theme is how Achilles' temper leads him both to disaster and to moral degradation’; Lloyd-Jones, H., The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley, 1971), p. 27Google Scholar: ‘…both Agamemnon and Achilles receive rough justice for their injustice to each other and the rest of the Achaeans perpetrated during their quarrel’; Arieti, J. A., ‘Homer's Litae and Atê’, CJ 84 (1988), 1–12, 4Google Scholar: ‘…when Achilles refuses the Litae in Book 9, he is in the grip of Atê…’

³⁴ Cf. Bassett, S. E., The Poetry of Homer, p. 201Google Scholar: ‘Like all noble natures, he forgets the shortcomings of others, and thinks only of what he believes to be his own.’

³⁵ E.g. A. Thornton, op. cit. (n. 19), pp. 135–6: ‘According to the plea of the goddesses of supplication to Zeus (I 512), Blind Madness “follows” Achilles, and it does so by attacking his “substitute”, his beloved friend Patroclus…. The death of Patroclus is the punishment (I 512) which Zeus inflicts upon Achilles for rejecting the supplications of the Embassy and of Patroclus…’

³⁶ There was once an alternative of long and less glorious life, but the choice apparently is already made. Thetis says to Zeus: ‘Please give honour to my son who is destined to be shortlived’ (Il. 1.505–6).

³⁷ Cf. Poseidon's comment on Agamemnon at Il. 13.111: λλʼ … κα πμπαν τήτvµον αἴτιος στιν …

³⁸ See the poet's report on Zeus' reaction to Achilles' prayer at Il. 16.249–50, emphasizing his ignorance. And also his comment that Zeus' νος is stronger than men's (16.688). The dying Patroclus says that µορα and Apollo are ultimately responsible for his death (16.849); cf. Kirk, G. S., The Songs of Homer (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 379–80Google Scholar: ‘[The poet] is emphasizing the power and the pathos of fate, the way in which Achilles's anger involved those he least expected to involve, and the inevitability of retribution once Patroclus had exceeded his orders and his nature’. Besides, those who argue that Patroclus' death and the sorrow for it have been intended by Zeus as the punishment of Achilles will have difficulty in explaining the god's ‘pity’ for him. Zeus pities Achilles (Il. 19.340) when he laments Patroclus, and sends Athena to feed him (19.341–8). Why does the god try to lighten Achilles' suffering, if it is his punishment?