^{page 33 note 1} Platonis Parmenides Phaedrus (Rome, 1966).Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 2} Plato on the One (New Haven, 1961), 270.Google Scholar

^{page 33 note 3} Review of Brumbaugh, Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos. xlvi (1964), 123.Google Scholar

^{page 34 note 1} In Parm. 1177, 27–1178, 3 Cousin.

^{page 34 note 2} I imply here the Russellian notion of quantity explored by Cartwright, Helen in her recent article ‘Quantities’, Phil. Rev. lxxix (1970), 25–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 35 note 1} For this interpretation compare Owen, G. E. L. on Phd. 74 a 9–12Google Scholar, in ‘Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of Forms’, Aristotle on Dialectic, ed. Owen, (Oxford, 1968), 114–15.Google Scholar

^{page 36 note 1} The Parmenides of Plato (Oxford, 1934).Google Scholar

^{page 36 note 2} Euripides: The Phoenissae (Cambridge, 1909).Google Scholar

^{page 37 note 1} References kindly supplied to me by Mr. D. Bostock.

^{page 37 note 2} Plato and Parmenides (London, 1939), 124.Google Scholar

^{page 38 note 1} But he never considers what point ‘one with itself’ might have.

^{page 39 note 1} According to this account of the argument at 139 d I-e 4, it depends solely on quite general assumptions about predication: similar arguments would go through for any pair of subjects identified by single, but distinct, predicates. This distinguishes it from the very next argument of the deduction, which has a similar conclusion, but depends on a feature special to ‘one’, viz. that it is not really a predicate at all, but a quantifier masquerading as a predicate. Parmenides first gets Aristoteles to accept that what is characterized by (or, has as an attribute: πεπovθós—the possibility of alternative renderings is not significant here) the same is like (139 e 8–9). He then continues (139 e 9–140 a 4): ‘That which is the same appeared distinct from the one in its nature. —It did.—But if the one is characterized (πέπovθε) by anything apart from being one, it would have the character of being more than one, and that is impossible.—Yes.—It is not possible, then, for the one to be characterized by the same in any way, neither with another thing nor with itself.—It appears not.’ Cf. also 140 a 4–b 3. In distinguishing between 139 d 1–e 4 and 139 e 7–140 a 4 in this way, I exploit a suggestion made by Owen, G. E. L., ‘Notes on Ryle's Plato’, in Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Wood, O. P. and Pitcher, G. (New York, 1970), 350, although the terms of my discussion differ from his.Google Scholar

^{page 40 note 1} See Parm. 128 a 8-b 1, Theaet. 180 e 2–4, Soph. 242 d 4–6, 244 b 6–245 d II.

^{page 40 note 2} So Parmenides is read by e.g. Owen, G. E. L., ‘Eleatic Questions, CQ N.S. X (1960), esp. 89–99;Google ScholarMourelatos, A. P. D., The Route of Parmenides (New Haven, 1970), esp. 90–3, 134–50.Google Scholar

^{page 40 note 3} Parm. 137 c 5-d 3; cf. DK 28 B 8.22–5.

^{page 40 note 4} Parm. 138 b 7–139 a 3; cf. DK 28 B 8. 26–33.

^{page 40 note 5} Cf. in general DK 28 B 8.4 (with text as in Owen, op. cit. 101–2) and 22–33, 42–9, with Theaet. 180 e 3–4, Soph. 244 e 2–8 (which implies that Plato took Parmenides to be ascribing spherical shape to what is). My thesis here is not, of course, a new one: see Cornford, , Plato and Parmenides, 134, with n. 2.Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 1} A line of thought suggested by Anscombe, G. E. M., ‘The New Theory of Forms’, The Monist, I (1966), 404–9Google Scholar. Cf. also Prauss, G., Platon and der logische Eleatismus (Berlin, 1966), esp. 99–136, 183–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 41 note 1} Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books T, ▵. and E, translated with notes by Kirwan, Christopher (Oxford, 1971), 83.Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 2} ‘Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness’, Phil. Rev. lxxx (1971), 184–9.Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 3} ibid. 178–82.

^{page 41 note 4} It is reasonably supposed that Diogenes Laertius lists this same work as , On Contraries (5. 22). The fragments which Ross allots to On Contraries (Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta [Oxford, 1955], 106–10Google Scholar = Fr. 118–24 Rose³), extracted from Simplicius, are convincingly held by Moraux, P., Les Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d' Aristote (Louvain, 1951), 53Google Scholar, to derive from a different work: not mentioned in the ancient lists of Aristotle's writings. It has much material in common with the later chapters of Metaph. I and Cat. 10 and 11. Rose, followed by Moraux, thinks it spurious: see e.g. Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus (Leipzig, 1863), 130–1.Google Scholar

^{page 42 note 1} It is conceivable that On Contraries B are in fact one and the same work. For brief and inconclusive discussion, see P. Wilpert, ‘Neue Fragmente aus , Hermes, lxxvi (1941), 241; Moraux, op. cit. 52–3.

^{page 42 note 2} The word is, of course, a favourite of Aristotle's in contexts where àpxai are mentioned: see Bonitz, , Index Aristotelicus (Berlin, 1870), 42^a 11 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 42 note 3} White offers an account of why Aristotle may have thought the treatment of same in terms of one natural, op. cit. 189–97: Aristotle, he claims, was exercised by problems about the identity of objects and movements through time, and such problems naturally present themselves as puzzles about what makes an object or a movement one. But he does not attempt to explain the origin of Aristotle's doctrine, as I have tried to do.