^{page 289 note 1} Plato, Port. 321 b ff.

^{page 289 note 2} Plato, Prot. 322 c.

^{page 289 note 3} Hesiod, W.D. 276 ff.

^{page 289 note 4} Hesiod, W.D. 192f.

^{page 289 note 5} Taylor, A. E., Plato: The Man and his Work (London, 1937), 243.Google Scholar

^{page 289 note 6} Sinclair, T. A., Hesiod, Works and Days (London, 1932), 35.Google Scholar

^{page 290 note 1} Evelyn-White, H. G., Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homerica (London and New York, 1914), p. xviiiGoogle Scholar.

^{page 290 note 2} A similar view of the fable seems to be implied by Wade-Gery, 's comment (‘Hesiod’, Essays in Greek History [Oxford, 1958], 12)Google Scholar: ‘Historically the poem's importance lies in the fact that the Nightingale had won. The Hawk had said, “Good bird why all this twittering …” but the Nightingale had got its hearing and the Hawk had to let it go.' He would appear to equate the hawk with the βασιλεîς and the nightingale with Hesiod, so that the fable would show the (wrongful) exercise of power by a stronger over a weaker.

^{page 290 note 3} Sinclair, T. A., A History of Greek Political Thought (London, 1951), 19Google Scholar.

^{page 290 note 4} Hesiod, W.D. 202 ff.

^{page 290 note 5} Hesiod, W.D. 213 ff.

^{page 290 note 6} Hesiod, W.D. 219, 238 f.

^{page 291 note 1} Xenophanes points out (D.K. 21. B. 11) thatThis certainly suggests that he saw a discrepancy in these poets between the portrayal of the gods as the champions of ‘right’ and the gods' own behaviour to each other. In this view he was almost certainly unique, for, as Lloyd-Jones points out (‘Zeus in Aeschylus’, JHS lxxvi [1956], 65 f.Google Scholar), ‘What is emphasized, in Hesiod and also in tragedy, is the supremacy of his [Zeus’] power… The poets talk not of the righteousness of the gods but of their power, and of their insistence that we be righteous.’

^{page 291 note 2} Hesiod, W.D. 210. It may be argued that this interpretation ignores the obvious equation between the nightingale and Hesiod. But άοιδòν έουσαν need not necessarily refer to Hesiod. The point is that the hawk has power over the nightingale even though she is a singer. In the same way Zeus has power over the judges even though they are kings. Moreover if the fable was really a condemnation of the violence and injustice of the hawk, would we not expect Hesiod to point this moral at the end ? Most ‘cautionary tales’ of this sort do have their ‘punch line’ at the end, with an open or implied exhortation to avoid a similar fate. Phoenix ends his tale of Meleager's anger {II. 9. 598 ff.), This, it seems to me, is exactly the formula of Hesiod's fable: (exhortation). I am indebted to Prof. Gould for drawing my attention to a similar interpretation of this fable by Welles, C. Bradford (‘Hesiod's Attitude Toward Labor’, G.R.B.S. viii (1967), 5–23, esp. 17–19Google Scholar).

^{page 291 note 3} Hesiod, W.D. 192 ff.

^{page 292 note 1} Hesiod, W.D. 200 f.

^{page 292 note 2} Hesiod, W.D. 225 ff.

^{page 293 note 1} Hesiod, W.D. 260 f. In the Theogony (901 f.) Hesiod says that Dike is one of the daughters of Themis who are called the Ωραι. Palmer, points out (‘The Indo-European Origins of Greek Justice’, Trans. Phil. Soc. 1950, 149 ff.Google Scholar) that ώρα is a word which is used for a boundary or division of time, and he argues very convincingly that the word δίκη itself may bear the basic meaning of ‘(boundary) mark’. He derives δίκη from the root *deik, which appears most obviously in δείκνυμι. Its primary meaning is thus ‘mark’, ‘indication’, as it occurs, for example, in the phrase δίκη θεών, the mark or characteristic of the gods. He shows that in many other languages words with this basic meaning are also found indicating ‘boundary mark’ or ‘limit’, and argues that the usage of δίκη in early Greek authors is consistent with a meaning of the limit or boundary beyond which one may not trespass.

^{page 293 note 2} Anaximander, D.K. 12. B. i :cf. Heraclitus (D.K. 22. B. 94) .

^{page 294 note 1} Hdt. 7. 10. ε.

^{page 294 note 2} Aesch. Pers. 827 f.

^{page 294 note 3} Aesch. Choeph. 306 ff. As Lloyd-Jones emphasizes (loc. cit. p. 391 n. i), in Aeschylus ‘Zeus is indeed the champion of Dike’, but that ‘the sort of justice implied… seems to be a rough, eye-for-an-eye justice’. ‘There can be little doubt that the view of Zeus and that we find in Aeschylus is not materially different from that of Hesiod.’ But, while agreeing very much with this, I would suggest that when, in a fragment discussed by Lloyd-Jones, (P. Oxy., vol. xx, 2256, fr. 9 (A)Google Scholar), Dike says: a vital point is that Zeus won (κρατήσας). Lloyd-Jones's statement that ‘lines 6 and 7 seem to have said that Zeus gained his victory justly, because his father began the fight’ might appear to imply that Zeus had Dike on his side because he was attacked. But I would argue that Zeus had Dike on his side because having been attacked he took successful counter measures. In other words, he would not have had Dike on his side if he had failed in his attempt to take vengeance. It is when the attacker is worsted, and only then, that Dike ‘crosses over’ to his victim, and this, I suggest, is what is meant, in the lines of the Choephori quoted, by the phrase ‘τò δίκαιον μεταβαίνει’.

^{page 294 note 4} As Latte, suggests (‘Der Rechtsgedanke im archaischen Griechentum’, Antike und Abendland, ii [1946], 63 ffGoogle Scholar.), ‘Erst der Widerstand des Verletzten stempelt ihn zur Hybris’, so that ‘Unrecht im wesentlich an den Folgen für den Täter erkannt wird’.

^{page 294 note 5} Homer, , Il. 1. 203Google Scholar.

^{page 294 note 6} Ibid.19. 181 ff.

^{page 295 note 1} Homer, Il. 3. 351 ff.

^{page 295 note 2} Aesch. Ag. 532 ff.

^{page 295 note 3} Homer, Il. 19. 180.

^{page 295 note 4} Hdt. 2. 120. 5.

^{page 296 note 1} Hdt. I. 34. 1.

^{page 296 note 2} Hdt. I. 91. 1.

^{page 296 note 3} Solon, fr. 40. 25 ff. (Linforth, I. M., Solon the Athenian [;Berkeley, 1919]Google Scholar).

^{page 296 note 4} Gf. Lattimore, R., ‘The Wise Adviser in Herodotus’, C.P. xxxiv (1939), 24–35Google Scholar.

^{page 296 note 5} Hdt. 8. 13.

^{page 296 note 6} Hdt. 8. 109. 3.

^{page 296 note 7} Aesch. Pers. 818 ff.

^{page 297 note 1} As Finley points out {The World of Odysseus [London, 1956], 89Google Scholar): ‘Only once in either poem did a commoner, Thersites, presume to take the floor at an assembly, and he was promptly beaten down by Odysseus.’ Thersites is very much the exception that proves the rule, and Odysseus' treatment of him only illustrated the complete lack of regard with which the ãριστοι. viewed the rank and file. (Cf. Odysseus' very different approach to the ãνδρες δήμου on the one hand and the βασιλεîς καì έξοχοι ãνδρες on the other when attempting to stop the headlong flight to the ships, Il. 2. 188 ff., 198 ff.) It was hopeless for Thersites to expect any better treatment than he received, for, as Finley points out with reference to the dispute after the chariot race in Il. 23 (op. cit., p. 122), ‘Menelaus and Antilochus were equals in status. That was an essential fact, for justice among the heroes … was a matter for equals alone. Menelaus could not more have challenged Thersites to an oath than a Junker could have challenged a Berlin shopkeeper to a duel.’

^{page 297 note 2} Thuc. 5. 89.

^{page 297 note 3} Thuc. 1. 23. 6.

^{page 297 note 4} Thuc. 1. 76. 2.

^{page 298 note 1} Indeed Hermocrates goes so far as to accuse of cowardice those who, in the face of danger, take refuge in claims for justice (Thuc. 6. 79. 1),

^{page 298 note 2} 2 Thuc. 2. 64. 3. In exactly the same way men like Archelaus who usurp their master's throne etc. are greatly admired (Plato Gorg. 470 d ff.). They can be and are termed αδικοι. because people who do these things normally come to grief. But until such time as they do come to grief they are the object not of censure, but of envy. As is stressed in Plato, Rep. ii, a ‘normal’ Greek would give his right hand to do such things and get away with it. Such acts are rash or imprudent only because of the penalties normally attaching to them. The notion that a man should not steal etc. even when, like Gyges, he knew he would never be found out was felt to be that of an utter lunatic, and this Socrates is constantly accused of being.

^{page 298 note 3} Thuc. 4. 87. 3.

^{page 298 note 4} That the Athenian allies were not the unwilling victims of Athenian oppression longing to be ‘liberated’ by the blameless Spartans is argued very persuasively by de Croix, Ste. (‘The Character of the Athenian Empire’, Historia, iii [1954/1955], 1–41)Google Scholar. As he says of Lysander taking Iasos by storm, massacring the 800 male citizens, and selling the women and children into slavery, all presumably because he met with vigorous opposition, ‘so much for the alleged enthusiasm of the allies of Athens for’ ‘liberation]’ (loc. cit., p. 9). He points out that Sparta, like other Greek states, was no more nor less ‘humane’ than Athens in the conduct of the war, and the ‘liberation‘ of the Greek states meant in fact the setting up of pro-Spartan oligarchies in the ‘freed’ cities. It was the Few who welcomed ‘liberation’, whereas the Many remained always loyal to Athens (Thuc. 3. 47. 2).

^{page 298 note 5} Thuc. 5. 105. 4.

^{page 298 note 6} Thuc. 5. 105. 2.

^{page 298 note 7} As de Ste. Croix argues (loc. cit. n. 4 above), in this passage the Athenians ‘are merely recognising a natural tendency, a "law of human nature", not trying to adduce a moral justification’.

^{page 299 note 1} That Dike is very much a ‘harsh corrector’, an exponent of power and might, is, I think, well illustrated by the vase-painting where she is depicted beating Adikia over the head (Beazley, , ARV ², p. 11, no. 3Google Scholar). I am indebted to Mr. Boardman for drawing my attention to this vase, and to the description in Pausanias of the same scene on the chest of Cypselus (Paus. 5. 18. 2):

^{page 299 note 2} Homer, Il. 1. 149, 158.

^{page 299 note 3} Homer, Od. 4. 690 ff.

^{page 300 note 1} Plato, Prot. 322 b.

^{page 300 note 2} Homer, Od. 9. 214 f.

^{page 300 note 3} Ibid. 112.

^{page 300 note 4} Indeed in direct contrast to Hesiod, in a fragment of Archilochus (fr. 94, E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, 1952) the fox(?) is made to say,

Here δίκη is attributed to animals as well, but since this fragment is probably part of a fable, the society of animals is doubtless made analogous to that of human beings.

^{page 301 note 1} Aristotle too seems to have known something of the communication system of bees. It is known that hive bees pass on information about food supplies by ‘dancing’ and Haldane (‘Aristotle's Account of Bees’ "Dances"’, JHS lxxv [1955], 24–5Google Scholar) suggests that it is this ‘waggle dance’ which Aristotle describes in Hist. Animal. 9. 624b òταν δ είς τò σμήνος αøίκωνται, ãποσείονται

^{page 301 note 2} University Paperbacks (London, 1965), I47f.

^{page 301 note 3} Homer, Il. 1. 287 ff.

^{page 301 note 4} Ibid. 184 ff.

^{page 301 note 5} I am very grateful to Professor Huxley for his many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.