^{page 254 note 1} No historian seems to doubt that Aeschines reported certain promises of Philip to the assembly, but there is much disagreement, (a) whether Aeschines himself believed in the promises which he reported and (b) if he did have faith in them, whether he was deceived. Arnold Schaefer (Demosthenes and seine Zeit, 2nd rev. ed. Leipzig, 268–74) gives Demosthenes' version that the promises were intended to deceive the Athenians. Gustave Glotz and Robert Cohen (Histoire Grecque, Paris, 1936, 290–5)Google Scholar, Paul Cloché (La Politique etrangire d'Athines de 404 d 338 ay. J.-Chr., Paris, 1934, PP- 233–4)Google Scholar, and Pickard-Cambridge, A. W. (Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom, New York, 1914, pp. 274 and 278–82)Google Scholar argue that Aeschines was sincere but had been deceived by Philip. Cawkwell, G. L. (‘Aeschines and the Ruin of Phocis in 346’, R.E.G. lxxv (1962), 453–9 on p. 457)Google Scholar does not doubt Aeschines' laudable motives but does not commit himself to an answer to the question whether Aeschines was deceived; he writes that Aeschines offered the promises to the assembly of 16 Skirophorion as ‘consolation and hope when nothing else was possible …’. Karl Julius Beloch (Griechische Geschichte, 2nd rev. ed., Berlin, 1922, iii. I. 506-II on p. 507), wast, Fritz R. (Philipp II. von Makedonien and Griechenland in den jahren 346 bis 338, Munich, 1938, pp. 5–6 and 1)Google Scholar, and Bury, J. B. (A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, 3rd ed., rev. by Meiggs, London, 1955, pp. 708–12) argue that Philip was serious about the offers which he made to the Athenians and that Aeschines was not deceived. The view to be argued in this article most closely resembles that proposed by Bury.Google Scholar

^{page 255 note 1} Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit. [above, p. 254 n. 1], pp. 251–2, points out ‘that anyone who desired the Peace must give way on the question of the alliance’. That Demosthenes' sole motive for supporting the peace was to allow Athens the time to prepare herself for a decisive struggle with Philip has been received opinion, and rightly so, since the time of Schaefer, op. cit. [above, P. 254 n. 1], ii. 176.

^{page 255 note 2} Cersobleptes was a friend and ally of the Athenians, though not a member of the synod of the Athenian naval league, Aesch. 2. q; 3. 6 x. His representative Critobulus of Lampsacus tried to have him enrolled on 25 Elaphebolion so that he could share in the peace, but this attempt failed, Aesch. 2. 82–6; cf. 3. 73–5.

^{page 256 note 1} In Aesch. 2. 132–4, the Mysteries must be the Lesser Mysteries, for which there was a truce for 55 days, Gamelion 15 through Anthesterion to Elaphebolion so (roughly January to March): see I.G. i². 6. 76–87. I intend to treat this chronological problem in detail in a forthcoming book.

^{page 257 note 1} There are numerous problems about the First Embassy with which I will deal in a forthcoming book, but none of them is very relevant to Philip's strategy in 346, which is the subject of this paper. Only a few matter! require comment in this note. Philip sent back a letter with the First Embassy (set above, pp. 254–5) in which he spoke vaguely of certain ‘great benefits’ he would confer or Athens if she entered into an alliance with him, but none of the sources attest that the specific benefits and conditions of the affiance were made clear to the Athenian! by the First Embassy. In the assemblies 0 18 and 19 Elaphebolion the Athenians most objected to the clause excluding the Phocians, Cersobleptes, and Halus, and the exclusions were eventually not made express: the final decision merely provided for ‘the Athenians and their allies’ to make peace and alliance with Philip and his allies (Dem. 19. 159, 174; Aesch. 2. 82), leaving the question whc precisely Athens' allies were to be decided at the assembly of 25 Elaphebolion at which the oaths were sworn. Philip had made ii clear to the First Embassy that he was determined to complete his conquest of the kingdom of Cersobleptes in eastern Thrace and that Parmenion would continue the siege of Halus in support of his ally Phan salus. In respect to the Phocian allies of Athens, as will be shown below, it was important that Philip keep his options open until he had reached Thermopylae; they could, therefore, not be included in the treaty at this time. Cawkwell, G. L. in an article entitled ‘Aeschines and the Peace of Philocrates’ in R.E.G. lxxxiii (1960), 416–38 has confused the embassies sent out under the decree of Eubulus in early 347 with a decree passed in early 346, with the result that he has given a false picture of the choice of policies with which the Athenians were faced in the assemblies of 18 and 19 Elaphebolion. I expect to consider his theory later in detail but must now be content to point out that if the embassies which went out under the decree of Eubulus and those which were sent out in early 346 were the same, then Demosthenes could easily have met Aeschines' challenge (2. 59) by simply naming Aeschines, since Aeschines participated in the embassies under the decree of Eubulus (Dem. 19. 303–4; cf. s 0–1; Aesch. 2. 79).Google Scholar

^{page 257 note 2} For the various embassies from the Greek states at Pella in June 346 see Aesch. 2. 112; cf. 103, 136; Justin 8. 4; on the Phocian ambassadors, also Dem. 9. 11 and Hypoth. 2 on Dem. 19 p. 337,5–6.

^{page 258 note 1} For the precise date of the Philippus see Mathieu, Georges, Les Idles politiques d'Isocrate (Paris, 1925), pp. 155–6.Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 2} Modern historians strangely ignore these passages of Isocrates in their accounts of the proceedings at Pella. See Schaefer, op. cit. [above, p. 254 n. I], ii. 251 n. 1, where, among all the other sources cited for the embassies gathered at Pella, he includes the reference to Isocrates, Phil. 74, pp. g6 f. with the comment: ‘According to him, one should presume that embassies from Argos, Messene, Megalopolis were present’ (my translation). Note that in the text (see p. 251) Schaefer does not include the information supplied by Isocrates but writes as if no embassies were present from the above-mentioned cities. Among modern accounts, only Wiist, op. cit. [above, p. 254 n. 1], 5, cites and employs Isocrates 5. 74 and he ignores the relevance of 49–50.

^{page 259 note 1} The translation of Vince in the Loeb Classical Library of Dem. 19. 85 is inaccurate: ‘Philip was resolved from the first to do for the Thebans all that he has done, but Aeschines by the perversions of his report revealed your repugnance, and so intensified both your hostility and Philip's friendliness towards the Thebans.’ The Greek text reads: … suggests that this passage must be translated ‘he has created hatred against you among the Thebans’. Athens was shown by her acceptance of Aeschines' report to advocate Philip's destruction of Theban power. The display of such hostility would not increase Athens' hatred of Thebes but surely would only increase Theban hatred for Athens. An exactly parallel phrase in another speech of Demosthenes is accurately translated by Vince in the Loeb edition (18. 36): 'A further result was that Athens got all the ill will of the Thebans and Thessalians, and Philip all their gratitude for these transactions. ‘The Greek text reads: Another parallel passage is to be found in Aeschines’ speech (2. 105): . This can only be translated: ‘… they avoid stirring up hostility among the Thebans.’ The schol. on Aesch. 2. 141 is another example: . This must be translated: ‘If he had not fought the Phocians, enmity would have been left for Philip at the hands of Thessalians and Thebans.’ These translations are supported by one of the meanings of πpos given by L.S.F., s.v.n., C. with Accus., I, 6 (b), p. 1498, col. 1 ‘at the hands of’. Examples given are Thuc. 5. 105, Dem. 6. 3, and 18. 36 (cited above).

^{page 260 note 1} Additional evidence of the pro-Theban policy which motivated those who were opposed to Aeschines and his supporters is to be found in Aeschines' speech Against Timarchus. A considerable proportion of the persons named by Aeschines as guilty of shameful homosexual relations can be identified on independent evidence as belonging to the pro-Theban group which included Eubulus, Demosthenes, and Aristophon among its leaders (that Eubulus and Aristophon were leading pro-Thebans before Demosthenes is attested by Dem. 18. 162 and Aesch. 3. 139). Leodamas of Acharnae is accused of homosexual relations with Hegesander (Aesch. 6g-70, 111; see also P.A. 9077) and later named as an avid pro-Theban in the days before the alliance with Thebes was concluded (Aesch. 3. 1389). Pyrrhandrus of Anaphlystus is given as a defender of Timarchus (Aesch. 81–5) and later listed among the pro-Thebans (Aesch. 3. 139). Demosthenes himself is accused of sexual relations with Timarchus and others (Aesch. 1. 130–1, 167, 181; cf. Dem. 19. 257). Other supporters singled out for vituperation in this speech were anti-Macedonian extremists. Hegesippus, son of Hegesias, of Sunium (Aesch. i. 71), who in 343 advocated the most aggressive Athenian claims against Philip (Ps.-Dem. 7 passim), is connected with the destruction of the Phocians (schol. on Dem. 19 p. 363, 27 IX; schol. on Aesch. I. 71). Landing hard on Phocis was a corollary of the policy to favour Thebes, and thus Hegesippus is placed in the pro-Theban group; the man who originally proposed the Phocian alliance found it no longer expedient (Aesch. 3. t 18). Hegesander, son of Hegesias, of Sunium, the brother of Hegesippus (Aesch. 1. 67, 69, 95, 510–51), is named as a supporter of Timarchus in the trial (Aesch. 1. 71). Diopeithes of Sunium, who as leader of cleruchs and strategos in the Chersonese from about 343/2 attacked Philip's allies and subjects in Thrace (Dem. 8. 6, 8; 9. 15; Ps.-Dem. 12. 16; Philoch. F. Gr. H. 328 F 158), is discredited by alleged involvement with Hegesander (Aesch. 63). Finally, the reference to an individual among the strategoi (Aesch.. 132 fr.) who is expected to support Timarchus is probably to Chares, but space does not permit me to argue this point. Against all this evidence surely the argument of Cawkwell, ‘Demosthenesc’ Policy after the Peace of Philocrates. II', C.Q. N.s. xiii (1963), 20013, on pp. 207–8, that ‘Demosthenes' real aim all along was to involve Thebes in the Hellenic resistance to Macedon …’ is a view supported only by ‘very slight’ evidence cannot be maintained. Brunt, ‘Euboea in the Time of Philip II’, C.Q. xix (1969), 245–65, on p. 253 n. 3, points out that Cawkwell ‘gravely underrates the political significance of the proxenia’.

^{page 262 note 1} Cawkwell, op. cit. (above, p. 254 n. ) on p. 453 cites Dem. 19. 58 as evidence that ‘the second Athenian embassy returned from Macedon and reported to the Council on the 13th of Scirophorion’. This passage, however, dates only the arrival of the embassy, and the date of the Council meeting at which the embassy reported is not given by Demosthenes or any other source. Since 14 Scirophorion was the Bouphonia (see Deubner, Att. Fest. 158), the embassy would have made its report either on the 13th or the 15th, and there is no way to decide between these two dates. If, however, the testimony of Demosthenes is accepted that Aeschines remained with Philip for a day and a night at Pherae after the other ambassadors had left for Athens, he would have returned too late for a report to the Council on the 13th (19. 175; note that he makes a deposition and summons witnesses). That the Bouleuterion was crowded perhaps also suggests the 5th. Secondly, Cawkwell argues (pp. 4556) that ‘on the 13th, when the chamber was thronged by the public (Dem. 19. 17), the Council was concerned with drafting a “probouleuma” proposing an expedition to save Phocis’. There is no evidence that any such resolution was ever drafted or considered. Demosthenes (19. 3i-2) has the real resolution read out to the court in 343, surely in its entirety, since his main point is that it did not contain the usual congratulation of the Second Embassy. There is nothing here to suggest that the resolution contained a proposal for ‘an expedition to save Phocis’. Demosthenes' other account of this meeting of the Council (19. 17–18) is studiously vague; he makes no explicit reference to the resolution at all, but only the most oblique implication that he is speaking of it when he states: . This claim is preceded by a very general and vague defence of himself that on that occasion he had advised that the Phocians and the Gates be not abandoned and that the Athenians should not trust to hopes and promises and allow matters to go too far. This apology is, of course, a lie, and nothing in the resolution drafted on the occasion would have supported it; otherwise, Demosthenes surely would have called for it to be read at this point. Indeed, the only argument Cawkwell himself tries to produce (457 n. 23) is that 'Dem. 59. 50 seems to quote it', and this is entirely without foundation: Demosthenes is merely giving some of the alternatives Philocrates might conceivably have adopted at the Assembly on 16 Skirophorion, and there is not the least reason to see here a reference to the resolution. Next, Cawkwell argues (p. 458) that there was ‘another meeting of the Council after the 13th at which it was known that Philip was actually “en Pylais” and at which a new 'probouleuma' was drafted on the motion of Philocrates’… Cawkwell finds support for this second meeting in Aeschines' claim (2. 121 f.) that ‘Demosthenes on his return from the second embassy … moved the vote of thanks in his decree …’. Cawkwell adds: ‘Perhaps in the later meeting of the Council the formalities omitted on the 13th were attended to, and there is no need to choose between Demosthenes' and Aeschines' accounts.’ But if any such resolution gave thanks to the second embassy, Aeschines could have made a fool of Demosthenes by responding to his challenge (19. 32) to produce evidence that the ambassadors were congratulated. Aeschines (in 2. 525–3) was deliberately trying to confuse the reception of the Second Embassy with that of the First, which he had already described at great length (2. 45–54). On returning from the First Embassy, Demosthenes had moved congratulations: see Aesch. 2. 45–6, 53–4, where Aeschines produces the decree and testimony. When Aeschines said at the end of 2. 121: ‘Demosthenes praised us in his ’, he was clearly hoping that the dicasts, who a few minutes earlier had heard the real psephism proposed by Demosthenes on the return of the First Embassy, would confuse the two embassies and would be left with the impression that the members of the Second Embassy had also been congratulated by Demosthenes. Demosthenes (19. 234–6) warns the dicasts (or was this passage added after the trial but before publication ?) that Aeschines will employ this very tactic.

^{page 265 note 1} Misunderstanding by modern historians of the circumstances in which the agreement with Phalaecus was made has produced the most inadequate explanations of the decree of Callisthenes. The view of WUst, op. cit. [above, p. 254 n. 1], 14, who regards it as an 'unsirinige Demonstration', is rather typical. See also Beloch, Gr. Gesch. iii². i. 513; Schaefer, ii² 293 and n. 3; Cloché, op. cit. [above, p. 254 n. i], 236–7, and Pickard-Cambridge, Dem. [above, p. 254 n. I], 285. The most adequate treatment may be found in the article by Rohrmoser, , ‘Kritische Betrachtungen über den philokrateischen Frieden’, Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien, xxv (1874), 789–815, on pp. Br 1- 12. Note that in such passages as Dem. 19. 125 there is nothing about Philip's passing Thermopylae; it is the ruin of the Phocians which is stressed; and this, rather than Philip's coming is also what one should concentrate on in Aesch. 3. 80, where the unpleasant strengthening of Thebes is also stressed, as in Dem. 19. 60. Note Dem. 18. 32–6, esp. 32 (….) and the even more specific 35 ( ) from which it is clear that at the Assembly on 16 Skirophorion the Athenians knew Philip had already passed Thermopylae.Google Scholar

^{page 266 note 1} That Demosthenes' claim in 343 that he had urged the Athenians to prevent Philip from entering Thermopylae and seizing Phocis in Skirophorion 346 was false is argued most convincingly by Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit. [above, p. 254 R. 1], 277–8.