In Plato's Euthyphro two suggestions are offered to account for the accusation of impiety brought against Socrates. The first comes from Euthyphro (3b), who takes it that the accusation is directed primarily against Socrates' ‘divine sign.’ The second is made by Socrates himself (6a), who puts forward the view that he is being brought to trial because he refuses to accept such tales about the gods as Hesiod told regarding the maltreatment of Uranus by Cronus and of Cronus by Zeus—tales which Euthyphro not merely believes but regards as justifying his action in prosecuting his own father. Both these suggestions used to be taken at their face-value, as, for example, by Grote (Plato I, chap. IX). But according to J. Burnet (notes on Euthyphro 3b 5 and 6a 8), followed by A. E. Taylor (Plato, chap. VII), neither is meant to be taken seriously.

In his Works of Pindar, Vol. II, p. xxiii, Dr. L. R. Farnell discusses the admission of metrical licences into Pindar's text, and pronounces that ‘the “Responsion-law” should not be pressed with over-strained severity.’ In general he agrees with Wilamowitz and Schroeder and disagrees with the stricter school of P. Maas. But none of these scholars have formulated the principles by which long syllables may be equated with short in Pindar's text, or even those by which two short syllables may take the place of one long and vice versa. Such attempts were made by great scholars of the past, notably by Erasmus Schmid, Hermann and Boeckh, but recent developments in metric and textual criticism have created a new attitude towards metrical problems and provided a new vocabulary. It is time that Pindar's practice was re-examined. Only from it can we deduce what his rules of composition were and find out what licences he allowed and what not. The question is important both for the textual critic and for the student of Greek metric. If we can discover the principles on which Pindar used such metrical licences, we shall be more qualified to consider emendations which involve them and to understand the rules which he set before himself when composing an ode.

The ‘Αρμονικ Στοιχεῖα of Aristoxenus, being the earliest treatise on Greek Music extant, have hitherto held an unchallenged position as the foundation of much of our knowledge of ancient musical theory. Mr. R. P. Winnington-Ingram's shrewd and critical examination (C.Q. XXVI, 195 ff.) of the many difficulties involved in Aristoxenus’ treatment of subtleties of intonation is a very welcome contribution to a thorny subject; and it is in the hope of furthering our understanding that I venture to offer these comments on one or two points where alternatives or modifications may be suggested.

The object of this paper is to determine the relations between the two parts of Parmenides' poem: the Way of Truth, which deduces the necessary properties of a One Being, and the False Way, which contains a cosmogony based on ‘what seems to mortals, in which there is no true belief.’

These lines of Cassandra's speech, as given in the MSS., run thus:

νεν τ' ἄπαρχος Ἰλίου τ' ναστάτης

οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα γλσσα μισητς κυνς

λέξασα κα κτείνασα ϕαιδρνους, δίκην

ἄτης λαθραίου, τεξεται κακῇ τχῃ.

τοιάδε τολμ· θλυς ἄρσενος ϕονεὺς

ἔστιν.

The question discussed in this paper is the relation of the Topics (including the Sophistici Elenchi) to the two Analytics. The smaller works are here ignored.