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Boorse et les antipsychiatres : même combat?



Dans le débat portant sur la définition de la santé mentale, trois grandes approches peuvent être distinguées : l’approche normativiste (Szasz, Sarbin), l’approche naturaliste (Boorse) et l’approche hybride (Wakefield). Cet article vise à nuancer cette classification en clarifiant en quel sens Boorse, le représentant de l’approche naturaliste, peut être rangé dans cette catégorie. La conception de Boorse est beaucoup plus critique à l’égard de l’entreprise psychiatrique que ce qui est habituellement admis et les similarités entre Boorse et l’approche normativiste, quant à elles, sont beaucoup plus importantes.

In the debate over the definition of ‘mental health,’ three different approaches are generally distinguished: the normativist approach (Szasz, Sarbin), the hybrid approach (Wakefield) and the naturalistic approach (Boorse). This paper qualifies this classification by clarifying the sense in which Christopher Boorse defends a naturalistic approach vis-à-vis the central concepts of psychiatry. This paper also clarifies in what way Boorse is opposed to the normativist approach advocated by some authors of the anti-psychiatric movement, such as Szasz.


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