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Computation and Intentional Psychology

  • Murat Aydede (a1)
Abstract
Résumé

Le rapport entre une approche computationnelle et une approche intentionnelle en psychologie a toujours été une question difficile. La crainte est que si les processus mentaux sont computationnels, alors ces processus, définis sur des symboles, ne soient sensibles qu'aux propreétés non sémantiques des symboles. Stich, on le sait, a fait grand cas de cette tension et défendu une psychologie purement «syntaxique», en traçant une distinction tranchée entre l'individuation sémantique des occurrences de symboles et leur individuation fonctionnelle étroite. Si cette dernière peut être réalisée, affirme-t-il, nous n'avons pas besoin des types sémantiques. Je soutiens, pour ma part, que puisque l'individuation fonctionnelle étroite ne permet pas l'identityé de type entre des occurrences de symboles qui seraient liées à des organismes distincts, une approche sémantique des types reste la seule possible (l'individuation interpersonnelle physique des occurrences étant exclue).

Résumé

Le rapport entre une approche computationnelle et une approche intentionnelle en psychologie a toujours été une question difficile. La crainte est que si les processus mentaux sont computationnels, alors ces processus, définis sur des symboles, ne soient sensibles qu'aux propreétés non sémantiques des symboles. Stich, on le sait, a fait grand cas de cette tension et défendu une psychologie purement «syntaxique», en traçant une distinction tranchée entre l'individuation sémantique des occurrences de symboles et leur individuation fonctionnelle étroite. Si cette dernière peut être réalisée, affirme-t-il, nous n'avons pas besoin des types sémantiques. Je soutiens, pour ma part, que puisque l'individuation fonctionnelle étroite ne permet pas l'identityé de type entre des occurrences de symboles qui seraient liées à des organismes distincts, une approche sémantique des types reste la seule possible (l'individuation interpersonnelle physique des occurrences étant exclue).

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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