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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
As Professor Burns has shown, even though Hume did not offer an explicit, exhaustive treatment of “The Women Question”, there are many (and, I would add, much more than three) passages in which he explains principles or facts related to the status of women. Generally speaking, and on this I fully agree with Professor Burns, the “Humean Female” qualifies as an expression of what we call today a male chauvinist position.
1 In the following, I shall quote some of such passages which, to my knowledge, constitute more than one hundred references, including references to love, parentage, family, property, authority, all of which touch the women question directly. All the passages quoted by Professor Burns are central to Hume's views on women but one crucial passage has been omitted (the “Dialogue” appended to the Enquiry, pp. 324–43) to which I shall refer below.
Unless otherwise indicated, in the following T stands for the Treatise (pages) and E stands for the Enquiries (Numbers), both in the Selby-Bigge edition.
2 One can, for example, think of the ironical opposition between Diogenes and Pascal (E. pp 341–343) and the ironical presentation of an imaginary Alcheic whose mistress is… the university (E. p. 325).
3 T. 492, 494, 483, 485, 492, 474, 524. E. 219, 228, 224. pp. 342–3.
4 See, e.g., T. pp. 521, 470, 483, 466, 467, 478, 486, 493, 500, 604, 409, 609. The same seems to hold for pride as a natural virtue. Regarding this, see Hume's comments on the “women's men”. T. 614–5.
5 See T. 598, 603, E. pp. 213, 232, 334.
6 The connection between degree of obligation and social function is explained by the fact that the imagination would be at a loss, should the circumstances remain numerous and unclassified. (T. 556).
7 In Hume's moral language, an “exception” is not the fact that some people do not have such and such an obligation. In turn, the degree of obligation needs an explanation by means of utility because in general the conventions are rooted in the expectation that all members of a society have the same obligations. (T. 498). Notice also that in particular, morals must not be changeable by spite, favour, or particular views. (T. 531).
8 One reason for this claim is that the utilitarian hypothesis is much clearer than the appeal to “obscure origins” of moral approvals. See T. 542.
9 Another (sexual) example of degree is barrenness and impotence (E. p. 200). In as much as chastity is a question of degree, it cannot relate directly to property wherein there is no degree (T. 529). Hume also refuses to treat chastity in a reductivist relation to pride and reputation (T. 501). As pride is often related to the advantages of fortune, this suggests that Hume does not see the rule of chastity along the line of “the abstinence from the possessions of others” or interested commerce. (See T. 590, 523, 487, 522).
10 On the close-remote criterion, see T. 579, 456, 469, 484, 487, 488, 491, 519, 531, 534, 535, 603, 581, 582, 594.
11 This argument is central in as much as it relates to Hume's numerous strictures on treachery. See, e.g., T 546, E 233, 242. However, as the duty of keeping promise follows the establishment of convention (rather than conversely), Hume's account of the rule of chastity must have the convention itself as its object. This is another sense in which his position on women is consistent. See T. 567, 518, 548.
12 This extension of the rule, by the operation of the imagination, is quite a common fact in Hume's theory, (See, e.g., E. 166–7; T. 551). In particular, regarding questions of security, fear, uncertainty, instability, see, e.g., 313, 445, 446, 490, 585.
13 The importance of the last point may be confirmed by Hume's comments on the fact that it is not out of duty that a father takes care of his children; it is due to natural sentiments. See T. 518.
14 I leave it to the reader to speculate why Hume did not seem to have fancied that the stricter rule of chastity would have a better basis, had it been applied more strictly to males whose very interest in this case is greater, by his own account.
15 In the rules of property, the imagination seems to play the greater role. See, e.g., T. 505 ff., esp. 504 note, 509 note. For Hume, there is one counter-example to the little-great transition: the case of accession (T. 510 note).
16 In a general context, Hume has argued that when the utility is not clear, the imagination takes up the slightest analogies (E. 157). But he did not apply this general possibility to our case.
17 See, e.g., T. 581, 582, 594, 603.
18 See also Hume's comments on the difficulty of succession when there are no children (T. 513 note); the imagination is apparently at loss to choose either the father's own family or the mother's.
19 This is utopia because it implies an abundance in goods and a generosity in human nature which are counter-factual; this is dangerous because it would require tyranny.
20 Recall that Hume argues against “rigid stability” and “uncertain changeable adjustments” concerning the rules of property. What he suggests is the transference of property by the consent of the owner (T. 503, 504, 514). Again, he did not apply such general positions to the case of women.
21 In his discussion of the patriarchal theory, Hume opposes the (natural) familial gentleness to an (artificial) state of war characteristic of politics. This point suggests that “gentleness” is not basically a sexual trait, although it has sexual manifestations.
22 On the common conservative tendency of societies, see T. 557, 561, 521, 537. Hume's point is that the “utmost” we can change is circumstance but not, directly, the sentiments. The goodness of end, he says, bestows merit on means which actually produce the end (T. 584).
23 As we know, Hume holds that reason, will and generous sentiment do not play in morals the role which the moralist's “painters of laudable traits” would like them to have. See E 239, 234, 235, 244, 255, 246, T. 536, 469, 517, 457, 458, 583, 619–21.
24 In his speculative philosophy, Hume has argued that prejudice can be corrected by general rules only (T. 146).
25 One should be careful in reading this passage as an ad absurdum defence of the theory of the intrinsic nature of women. For one thing, Hume sees Fourli as the direct opposite to the general feeling of mankind. Besides, he clearly realized that such a feeling was inextricably tied to (diverse) conventions on women's role. It is, therefore, difficult to state what Hume saw as “natural to women”. The only clear indication is the anatomy in the question of chastity.
26 For example, Hume observes that one trait usually described as feminine (the love of music) was an important trait of Athens, i.e., a society in which women had a very restricted role. (E. p. 340). Notice, also, that Hume considers that one test (!) for the important constituents of merit, considering different customs, is to look at what prevails chiefly with regard to young men. (E. p. 341)
27 A study of this question should include Hume's rather literary Essays Moral, Political and Literary (Oxford Univ. Press, 1963Google Scholar) especially the puzzling passages p. 600 and pp. 133–5. See also pp. 185–96, 552–8. My analysis focusses on the Treatise and the Enquiry only.
