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Les explications par un troisième facteur permettent-elles aux réalistes moraux de relever le défi épistémologique?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2016

FÉLIX AUBÉ BEAUDOIN
FÉLIX AUBÉ BEAUDOIN*
Affiliation:
Université Laval
*
*<felix.aube-beaudoin.1@ulaval.ca>
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Abstract

Moral realists face an epistemological challenge: they must explain why many judgments that are likely to be (mind-independent) moral truths are those it would be evolutionarily adaptive to hold. Is it a coincidence? Do evolutionary forces track these truths? Third-factor explanation is the strategy most commonly adopted by moral realists to explain this striking correlation. In this article, I argue that it does not allow them to meet the challenge.

Les réalistes moraux font face à un défi épistémologique : ils doivent expliquer pourquoi plusieurs jugements moraux qui sont candidats au statut de vérités morales (indépendantes de l’esprit) ont une grande valeur sélective. Est-ce le fruit du hasard? Les pressions évolutives ont-elles permis de retracer ces vérités? La stratégie argumentative qu’ils adoptent le plus communément afin d’expliquer cette corrélation frappante est l’explication par un troisième facteur. Dans cet article, je soutiens qu’elle ne permet pas de relever le défi épistémologique.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 161 - 191
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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