Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-45l2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T13:11:34.068Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Stroud on Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Community

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Claudine Verheggen
Claudine Verheggen
Affiliation:
City University of New York, City College and Graduate Center
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

According to Barry Stroud, Wittgenstein thought that language is social only in this minimal way: we cannot make sense of the idea of someone having a language unless we can describe her as using signs in conformity with the linguistic practices of some community. Since a solitary person could meet this condition, Stroud concludes that, for Wittgenstein, solitary languages are possible. I argue that Wittgenstein in fact thought that language is social in a much more robust way. Solitary languages are not possible because we cannot make sense of the idea of someone having a language unless we can think of her as actively participating in the linguistic practices that fix the standards governing the applications of her words.

Résumé

Selon Barry Stroud, Wittgensteinpensait qu'une langue n'est sociale que de maniére minimale: “'idee qu'une personne possède une langue n'a de sens que si nous pouvons la décrire comme se servant de signes conformément aux pratiques linguistiques de quelque communauté. Un solitaire pouvant satisfaire à cette condition, Stroud en conclut que pour Wittgenstein, les langues solitaires sont possibles. Je ferai valoir qu' en fait, Wittgenstein pensait qu'une langue est sociale en un sens beaucoup plus robuste. Les langues solitaires ne sont pas possibles, parce que l'idée que quelqu'un possède une langue n'a de sens pour nous que si nous le concevons comme participant aux pratiques linguistiques fixant les standards qui gouvernent l'application des mots qu'il emploie.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 1 , Winter 2005 , pp. 67 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Baker, G. P., and Hacker, P. M. S. 1990 “Malcolm on Language and Rules.” Philosophy, 65: 167–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1984 “The Individual Strikes Back.” Synthese, 58: 281–301.Google Scholar
Burge, T. 1979 “Individualism and the Mental.” In Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 4. Edited by French, P., Uehling, T., and Wettstein, H.. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Canfield, J. 1996 “The Community View.” Philosophical Review, 105: 469–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crary, A., and Read, R., eds. 2000 The New Wittgenstein. London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald 2001 Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, Saul 1982 Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Malcolm, Norman 1986 Nothing Is Hidden. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
McGinn, C. 1984 Wittgenstein on Meaning. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Pears, D. 1988 The False Prison. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pears, D. 2000 “The Private Language Argument.” Manuscript.Google Scholar
Stroud, Barry 1983 “Wittgenstein's «Treatment» of the Quest for a «Language which Describes My Inner Experiences and which Only I Myself Can Understand.»” In Proceedings of the Seventh International Wittgenstein Symposium. Edited by Weingartner, P. and Czermak, H.. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.Google Scholar
Stroud, Barry 1990 “Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community.” In Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-evaluation—Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Wittgenstein Symposium. Edited by Haller, R. and Brandl, J.. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.Google Scholar
Stroud, Barry 1996 “Mind, Meaning, and Practice.” In The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Edited by Sluga, H. and Stern, D. G.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Stroud, Barry 2000 Meaning, Understanding, and Practice: Philosophical Essays. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Stroud, Barry 2001 “Private Objects, Physical Objects, and Ostension.” In Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in Honour of David Pears. Edited by Charles, D. and Child, W.. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Verheggen, Claudine 1995 “Wittgenstein and «Solitary» Languages.” Philosophical Investigations, 18: 329–47.Google Scholar
Verheggen, Claudine 1997 “Davidson's Second Person.” The Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 361–69.Google Scholar
Verheggen, Claudine 2000 “The Meaningfulness of Meaning Questions.” Synthese, 123:195–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Verheggen, Claudine 2003 “Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning.” Philosophical Investigations, 26: 285–310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Verheggen, Claudine 2004 “Meaning and Practice.” In Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society. Vol. 12. Edited by Marek, J. C. and Reicher, M. E.. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludgwig Wittgenstein Society.Google Scholar
Williams, M. 1999 Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning. London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1958 Philosophical Investigations. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M.. 3rd ed.New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1978 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Edited by Wright, G. H. Von, Rhees, R., and Anscombe, G. E. M.. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M.. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar