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Some Epistemological Trends in Philosophy of Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2024
Extract
Some of the relatively significant contributions to epistemology, in recent times, have been made by Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Hans Reichenbach. All these authors seem to make some radical departures from the inherited theories of knowledge. A common characteristic of their epistemologies is that they try to tackle the problem of growth of knowledge; that is to say, what is meant by saying that theories of science, as they get more and more refined, increasingly approach the truth and what the nature of relationship is between the earlier theory and the more refined. later, and present theory. Philosophy in the past hardly grappled with these issues, and therefore it would be of interest to critically examine these new dimensions in Epistemology, which is the concern of this paper.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © 1984 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)
Footnotes
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This research was supported by the Special Assistance Programme (UGC), and the author is grateful to Professor Daya Krishna, Director of the SAP, for necessary suggestion and encouragements.
References
1 Karl Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, Hutchinson, 1980.
2 Thomas Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of Chica go Press, 1962.
3 P. Feyrabend, Against Method, London: Verso, 1978.
4 H. Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938.
5 A comprehensive and satisfactory presentation of some of the views can be found in F. Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1979.
6 Kuhn, op. cit., p. 120.
7 Feyerabend, op. cit., p. 175.
8 P. Feyerabend, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, Ed. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, Vol. 3, p. 29.
9 Reichenbach, op. cit., p. 315.
10 op. cit., p. 357.
11 See V. Shekhawat, "Scientific vs Darsanik Knowledge: Two Techniques of Theorisation," Diogenes, 116, 1982.
12 Popper rather shifts the attention to the fact that the proposing of conjectures and their selection as suitable candidates for theory are not strictly logical processes. But imaginative creation of hypotheses can have a logic of randomness and selection of conjectures can also be conjectural in so far as it involves an objective, practical decision.
13 It appears that Feyerabend in his book either does not accept or confuses the two issues: "What are the characteristics of a scientific practice?" The former is an epistemological issue but the latter is not—it has ethical, cultural, economic implica tions.
14 But, again, Feyerabend does not seem to be clear about what he means by anarchist epistemology. Is this a doctrine of policy towards seeking of knowledge proper? Or, does it insist that there cannot be and is not one single method in scientific investigation? Or, that there ought not to be any law and order in scientific enterprise if it is to progress freely? Epistemological adventurism (try anything) as it exists in Kuhnian extraordinary science is not the same as epistemological anarchism, since the former does not reject at least some of the basic norms of objectivity in science. If every theoretical knowledge is true in its own way and can be tested only within its internal structure then Feyrabend comes close to Jain epistemology which says that "everything is true" (though in its own context) and, in effect, makes epistemological enterprise futile.
Further, even if, for certain reasons, proliferation of techniques and theories be allowed, this is bound to arrest progress unless they are subjected to common, objective criteria of adequacy. These must be subject to some "principle of selec tion" which alone can guarantee progress consisting not in the mere proliferation of theories and techniques but in the improvement of their "genetic structure". Perfection of technique and evolution of theoretical knowledge can best proceed by "random mutations" (extraordinary research, adventurism) and "natural selection" (objective criteria). A single generation of mutations cannot change the theory beyond recognition—tor mutually inconsistent theories to come into being long temporal gaps are necessary.
15 Perhaps no scientist after Newton has given a serious thought to the adequacy criteria of methodology and theory. See Newton's System of the World.
16 One of the classical Indian texts on technique of spiritual liberation takes up the question of epistemological preconditions of liberation. In the course of this, it provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for the realisation of true knowledge of objects as well as of self. These are called vrttinirodh (control of internal perturbation) and samskar nirodh (control of inherited and acquired propensities and attitudes). See Patanjali, Yoga Sutra. Also see V. Shekhawat, Yoga: A Techni que of Liberation, New Delhi, Sterling Pub., 1979.
17 "An exploration into the unknown cannot be planned in advance with the precision of a mass-production process. Nevertheless, some investigators are far more effective than others… We have no way of acquiring the inborn wisdom which is mostly responsible for their success, but perhaps there are a few techniques which we can learn from them". See E. Bright-Wilson, Jr., An Introduction to Scientific Research, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952, p. iii.
18 Klesas or impediments to true knowledge constitute the subjectivity of the knowing subject and their elimination (Eklesa han) amounts to overcoming sub jectivity error. The objective errors arising due to the dynamic, unstable and deceptive nature of the object of knowledge are sought to be overcome by measure ment. See V. Shekhawat, Concept of Science and the Yoga Sutra, private circulation, Philosophy Department, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, 1982.